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MCIB
Marine Casualty Investigation Board

REPORT INTO THE COLLISION BETWEEN THE IRISH FISHING VESSEL "RENEGADE" AND AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL IN THE IRISH SEA ON 25TH JULY, 1999.

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25th, March 2003 under The Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000

CONTENTS

1. SYNOPSIS.

1.1 On Sunday July 25th, 1999 at 0025 hours GMT an unidentified vessel was in collision with the Irish fishing vessel "Renegade" in the Irish sea at position 53 40 North 005 25 West.

1.2 The "Renegade" was fishing at the time of the incident and the unidentified vessel did not stop after the collision. The "Renegade" was holed and took water in the engine room. The skipper sent out a "Mayday" call.

1.3 Pumps were put on board by the emergency services and these were used to lower the water level in the engine room. Without these pumps the "Renegade" would probably have sunk. Four of the six crew abandoned to another fishing vessel.

1.4 The "Renegade" proceeded to Howth at slow speed accompanied by another fishing vessel.

1.5 Efforts to establish the identity of the other vessel involved in the collision were not successful.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Particulars of the Vessel "Renegade"

Built:	1968 by Scheepswerfvisser B.V. Denhelder, Holland.
Previous names:	1968 to 1986. "Nagen Gebroeders" (Dutch flag). 1986 to 1st March 1999. "Girl Cliona" (Irish flag).
Owner:	Kevin Downs, New Ross, Co. Wexford.
Purchased:	1st March 1999.
Registered Length:	86.90 feet.
Registered Breadth:	21.00 feet.
Registered Depth:	7.85 feet.
Gross Tonnage:	159 tons.
Register Tonnage:	47 tons.
Port of Registry:	Dublin.
Official Number:	402481.
Machinery:	One Stork – Wartsilla 6 Cylinder Diesel Main Engine. 625kW. Engine made in 1989. The above engine was fitted in 1998 and gives a speed of approximately 11 knots.
Description of Vessel:	Carvel built, steel fishing vessel with a counter stern. The vessel has four watertight bulkheads fitted. A shelter deck was fitted to the vessel at Arklow and was completed in April 1999. The vessel was being used as a stern trawler fishing for prawns.

2.2 Lifesaving Appliances available on board.

Lifejackets:	Eight.
Lifebuoys:	Four.
Pyrotechnics:	Twelve parachute flares.
Line throwing apparatus:	one.
Liferafts:	Three. (Two eight man and one six man). Both eight-man liferafts were fitted with a hydrostatic release unit
Radio:	Furuno GMDSS Area 2 Equipment.

2.3 Navigational aids provided on board.

One	Furuno Radar model FR 2115.
One	Furuno Radar 7040D.
Two	Furuno Depth sounders FCV 291.
Two	Quodfish 510 fish plotters.
One	Furuno Integrated Heading sensor.
One	Navitron Auto pilot.
One	Furuno DGPS Navigator GP 35
One	Furuno DGPS Navigator GP 80.
One	Furuno GPS Navigator GP 70.
Four	ICOM VHF Installations M 55, M 58, M 59, M 80.
One	Furuno MF/HF Installation 1562.
One	Sailor VHF Installation 144.

2.4 The crew of the "Renegade" on 25th July 1999 consisted of the following:

1. Trevor Byrne from Co. Louth. Mr. Byrne is the holder of a Second Hand Full Certificate of Competency No. 007 which he obtained in 1990. He has been fishing at sea for about 22 years and was the Skipper of the vessel.

2. Des Jacob from Co. Wexford. Mr. Jacob has been fishing for 25 years and completed a Basic Sea Survival course in 1991. He does not have any other seagoing certificates or qualifications.

3. Michael Kinneen from Co. Wexford. Mr. Kinneen has been fishing for 20 years but holds no sea going qualifications except for a Basic Sea Survival course and First Aid course. He was the engineer of board the vessel.

4. Richard Butler from Co. Wexford. He started fishing in march 1998 and has no formal sea going qualifications.

5. Steve Hogan from Co. Wexford. Mr. Hogan has been summer fishing since the age of 13 years. It was his first trip on the "Renegade" and he had been aboard for two weeks. He had completed a shore based first aid course and lifeguard water safety course.

6. Peter Butler from Co. Wexford. He had been fishing for one year and on the "Renegade" for two months.

3. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

3.1 The vessel, manned and equipped as stated above, sailed from Howth at about midnight on 19-07-1999. Initially the vessel fished for prawns about ten miles off the Irish coast and on the 22nd proceeded to fish in the area where the collision subsequently occurred.

3.2 The fishing routine was the vessel would stern trawl for prawns for about six hours at a time, the nets would then be hauled and reshot at about mid tide, (this operation would normally take about one hour) then the fish would be sorted would take another two hours approximately.

3.3 The Skipper had planned to haul the nets at about 0100 hours BST on 25-07-1999. However there were problems with the air valves on the hauling winches. The hauling of the nets was deferred until the air valves were repaired.

3.4 Two crewmembers Michael Kinneen and Peter Butler repaired the air valves on the shelter deck.

3.5 The Skipper, Trevor Byrne lay down on his bunk at about 0040 hours BST. His bunk is located in a room off the after end of the wheelhouse.

3.6 Richard Butler was on watch on his own in the wheelhouse. It was planned that the Skipper would not be called until they were ready to haul the nets.

3.7 During the winch repair Richard Butler was testing the winches from the controls in the wheelhouse under instruction from Michael Kinneen. Richard Butler was also ensuring that the two crewmembers on deck were clear of the winches by observing them on the close circuit television monitor.

3.8 The vessel proceeded on a North Easterly course at about 3 knots for approximately 2 hours. The vessel was on autopilot. The "Renegade" was displaying green and white trawling lights as well as sidelights and sternlight.

3.9 It was a fine, cloudy night with light northerly winds and good visibility. The sea was calm. (See Met report in Appendix A). Richard Butler recalls that he could see the lights of other fishing vessels on his port side.

3.10 The two Furuno Radars were operating. One radar was on the 6-mile range and the other one was on the 1.5-mile range.

4. THE INCIDENT

4.1 At approximately 0125 hours BST on July 25th 1999 when in position 53 40.0 North 005 25.0 West the "Renegade" was struck on the port side by an unidentified vessel which did not stop after the collision. (See position in Appendix B).

4.2 The Skipper immediately went into the wheelhouse and stopped the engine. At this stage the vessel had a large list to starboard. The Skipper recalls that Richard Butler was in shock.

4.3 The unidentified vessel caught the port side trawling wire of the "Renegade"

4.4 After the initial list to starboard, the fishing vessel was pulled to port until the wire parted. The vessel then came upright.

4.5 The Skipper called, on Channel 16, to the vessel which had struck them, giving the position of the "Renegade" from the DGPS. There was no reply from the other vessel.

4.6 It would appear that the winch repair had just been completed when the collision occurred as Michael Kinneen was putting away the tools and Peter Butler was in the galley. However Richard Butler states that he was still testing the winch, watching the monitor and also watching the course track on the plotter.

4.7 Richard Butler states that he did not see any vessel approaching. The first time that he saw the other vessel was just after contact. It seemed to be empty with a brownish red coloured lower hull with a dark colour, maybe black or dark blue above this. The superstructure was white.

4.8 Nobody saw the name of the other vessel.

4.9 Richard Butler recalls that there was nothing close on the 6mile range when he last looked in that radar about 15 minutes before the incident. He states that he was only really concentrating on the 1.5mile range and that when he last looked at the radar about 3 or 4 minutes before the incident, there was nothing on the screen.

5. EVENTS FOLLOWING INCIDENT

5.1 All the crew were alerted by the collision. The chain locker, net store, fish hold and engine room were checked by the crew for damage and water ingress.

5.2 All were found to be intact save that water was squirting into the engine room. The flywheels fore and aft were throwing up water.

5.3 The bilge pump on the port side of the engine room had been dislodged in the collision and the pipework to the pump was fractured. Two seacocks were turned off to reduce the flow of water into the engine room through the damaged pipes.

5.4 The Skipper sent out a "Mayday" on Channels 16 and 70.

5.5 The six-man liferaft forward was launched. The flare, VHF radio, SART and lifejackets were prepared.

5.6 The bilge pump was not working. Michael Kinneed started the two submersible pumps but the water level was still rising in the engine room. The main engine was stopped.

5.7 After about ten minutes another fishing vessel "Mellifont" which had been fishing about a half mile away, arrived alongside the "Renegade" and took four of the crew of the "Renegade" onboard. The Skipper, Trevor Byrne and Michael Kinneen remained on board the Renegade.

5.8 The fishing gear of the "Renegade" was cut loose.

5.9 After about 40 minutes, a helicopter arrived and put a diesel pump on board. This pump succeeded in lowering the water level below the flywheel in the engine room.

5.10 The engine was restarted and the vessel proceeded at slow speed towards Howth.

5.11 After about 70 minutes the Howth lifeboat arrived and two men with a pump came on board the "Renegade". They stayed on board until the vessel arrived in Howth at about 0710 hours BST. This pump succeeded in pumping the engine room basically dry.

5.12 On the voyage to Howth the "Mellifont" accompanied the "Renegade", at a short distance off.

5.13 Shortly after the collision it appeared to the crew of the "Renegade" that the other vessel involved was nearly stopped or slowed down.

5.14 This fishing vessel was struck on the port side at watertight bulkhead between the engine room and the fish hold approximately one metre below the water line.

5.15 The ship's side plating was set in over an area of approximately 12 square metres, from the water line to below the bilge keel. The maximum plate set in was about 0.25 meters. (See photographs in Appendix 10.3)

5.16 The side plating was holed in the engine room in way at the bilge keel. These holes were plugged by divers when the vessel reached Howth.

5.17 The bulkhead between the engine room and the fish hold was buckled.

5.18 The bilge pump, which is located in the forward port side of the engine room, was displaced and associated pipework was damaged.

5.19 Some engine holding down bolts were found to be loose.

5.20 There was no damage sustained above the waterline. It would appear that the damage to the "Renegade" was caused by the bulbous bow of the other vessel, which did not stop after the collision.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

6.1 This collision was caused because the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended, were not observed.

6.2 From the accounts given by the crew of the "Renegade" it would appear that the other vessel involved in the collision was a large merchant vessel. Because this merchant vessel was never identified it is not possible to establish why she collided or what factors led to the accident.

6.3 Likewise it cannot be established if a proper lookout, in accordance with Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended, was being kept on this unidentified merchant vessel. (See Appendix 10.4 for Rule 5).

6.4 Under Rule 18 (a) a power driven vessel under way shall keep out of the way of a vessel engaged in fishing. (See Appendix 10.4 for Rule 18 (a)).

6.5 A proper lookout was not maintained on the "Renegade" in accordance with Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended. Those entrusted with lookout duties should not be distracted from this important task and should remain alert at all times. In this case, the merchant vessel was not observed by the fishing vessel until after the collision.

6.6 As a proper lookout was not maintained on the "Renegade" it was not possible for the vessel to comply with Rules 7 and 17 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended. (See Appendix 10.4 for Rules 7 and 17).

6.7 The whistle for making sound signals required on the "Renegade" was found to be disconnected and could not have been used.

6.8 The Skipper of the "Renegade" was the holder of a Second Hand Full Certificate of Competency. The "Renegade", due to her length, when operating in the Limited Area, is required to carry a Skipper Limited Certificate and, in addition, either a Second Hand Limited or Second Hand Special Certificate. The watchkeeper on the bridge had no formal sea going qualification.

6.9 The unidentified vessel did not respond to the Mayday call of the fishing vessel as required under SOLAS Chapter V Regulation 10.

6.10 The completion of this report was delayed as efforts were made to establish the identity of the other vessel involved in the collision and despite considerable efforts, it has not been possible to establish, with certainty, the identity of the other vessel involved.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972, as amended, must be obeyed by all vessels at all times.

7.2 All fishing vessels should at all times keep a safe navigational watch on board. The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has adopted Resolution A. 484 (XII) "Basic Principles to be observed in keeping a navigational Watch on board Fishing Vessels" relating to the principles to be observed in order to ensure that a safe navigational watch is maintained. The basic principles have been reproduced in the Annex to Marine Notice No. 9 of 2002 and should be observed by all concerned. (See Appendix 10.5).

7.3 A Marine Notice should be issued stating that all fishing vessels must be manned as required by the Fishing Vessels (Certification of Deck Officers and Engineer Officers) Regulations, 1988 (S.I. No. 289 of 1988), as amended. A Marine Notice is given at Appendix 10.6.

7.4 Skippers should ensure that navigational watchkeeping duties must be carried out by properly qualified personnel at all times. A competent alert watchkeeper keeping a proper all round lookout at all times is absolutely essential.

8. APPENDICES

8.1 Weather Report.

8.2 Map showing location of Collision.

8.3 Photographs showing damage to the "Renegade"

8.4 Extract detailing Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972.

8.5 Marine Notice No. 9 of 2002 – "Keeping a Safe Navigational Watch on Board Fishing Vessels".

8.6 Proposed Marine Notice No. 10 of 2002 – "Manning of Fishing Vessels".

8.1 Weather Report.

APPENDIX A.

Weather Report for the Sea Area near 53.75 N 5.5 W
Between the 24th July, 1999 at 2100 hours and the 25th July, 1999 at 0300 hours.

General Situation

A ridge of High Pressure extended from the Atlantic over Ireland.

Details for the above sea area

Winds:	Northerly between north-west and north-east Force 1 to 3.
Weather:	Cloudy but generally dry.
Visibility:	Good.
Sea State:	Calm (less than 0.5 significant wave height)

8.2 Map showing location of Collision.



NOT TO USE FOR NAVIGATION

8.3 Photographs showing damage to the "Renegade"



APPENDIX 8.4

8.4 Extract detailing Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972.

Rule 5

Look-out

Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.

Rule 7

Risk of Collision

(a) Every vessel shall use all available means appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions to determine if risk of collision exists. If there is any doubt such risk shall be deemed to exist.

(b) Proper use shall be made of radar equipment if fitted and operational, including long-range scanning to obtain early warning of risk of collision and radar plotting or equivalent systematic observation of detected objects.

(c) Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of scanty information, expecially scanty radar information.

(d) In determining if risk of collision exists the following considerations shall be among those taken into account:

(i) such risk shall be deemed to exist if the compass bearing of an approaching vessel does not appreciably change;

(ii) such risk may sometimes exist even when an appreciable bearing change is evident, particularly when approaching a very large vessel or a tow or when approaching a vessel at close range.

Rule 17

Action by stand-on vessel

(a) (i) Where one of two vessels is to keep out of the way the other shall keep her course and speed.

(ii) The latter vessel may however take action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre alone, as soon as it becomes apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way is not taking appropriate action in compliance with these Rules.

(b) When, from any cause, the vessel required to keep her course and speed finds herself so close that collision cannot be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel alone, she shall take such action as will best aid to avoid collision.

(c) A power-driven vessel which takes action in a crossing situation is accordance with sub-paragraph (a)(ii) of this Rule to avoid collision with another power-driven vessel shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, not alter course to port for a vessel on her own port side.

(d) This Rule does not relieve the give-way vessel of her obligation to keep out of the way.

Rule 18

Responsibilities between vessels.

Except where rules 9, 10 and 13 otherwise require:

(a) A power driven vessel underway shall keep out of the way of:

(i) a vessel not under command
(ii) a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre
(iii) a vessel engaged in fishing
(iv) a sailing vessel

(b) A sailing vessel underway shall keep out of the way of:

(i) a vessel not under command
(ii) a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre
(iii) a vessel engaged in fishing

(c) A vessel engaged in fishing when underway shall, so far as possible, keep out of the way of:

(i) a vessel not under command
(ii) a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre

(d) (i) Any vessel other than a vessel not under command or a vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, avoid impeding the safe passage of a vessel constrained by her draught, exhibiting the signals in Rule 28.

(ii) A vessel constrained by her draught shall navigate with particular caution having full regard to her special condition.

(e) A seaplane on the water shall, in general, keep well clear of all vessels and avoid impeding their navigation. In circumstances, however, where risk of collision exists, she shall comply with the Rules of this Part.

8.5 Marine Notice No. 9 of 2002 – "Keeping a Safe Navigational Watch on Board Fishing Vessels".

Department of the Marine and Natural Resources

Roinn na Mara agus Acmhainní Nádúrtha

MARINE NOTICE
No. 9 Of 2002

NOTICE TO ALL OWNERS, OPERATORS, SKIPPERS, SECOND HANDS AND CREWS OF FISHING VESSELS, AND TO NAUTICAL SCHOOLS

Keeping A Safe Navigational Watch On Board Fishing Vessels

The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has adopted Resolution A.484 (XII) "Basic Principles to be Observed in Keeping a Navigational Watch on board Fishing Vessels" relating to the principles to be observed in order to ensure that a safe navigational watch is maintained.

These principles were in effect reviewed and updated by the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Fishing Vessel Personnel 1995.

The basic principles are reproduced in the Annex to this Notice and should be observed by all concerned.

Candidates for all fishing certificates of competency will be expected to have a thorough knowledge of the content and application of the basic principles.

Marine Notice 39 of 1999 is hereby withdrawn as this Notice supersedes it.

Secretary-General
Department of the Marine and
Natural Resources
Dublin 2

12th May 2002

Any enquiries concerning Marine Notices should be addressed to:
Maritime Safety Division
Tel: 01-6199358 Fax: 01-6620774 email: marine.notices@marine.gov.ie

BASIC PRINCIPLES TO BE OBSERVED IN KEEPING A NAVIGATIONAL WATCH ON BOARD FISHING VESSELS

1 These basic principles are to be observed by skippers and watchkeeping personnel to ensure that a safe navigational watch is maintained at all times.

2 The skipper of every fishing vessel is bound to ensure that watchkeeping arrangements are adequate for maintaining a safe navigational watch. Under the skipper's general direction, the officers of the watch are responsible for navigating the vessel safely during their periods of duty when they will be particularly concerned with avoiding collision and stranding.

3 The basic principles, including but not limited to the following, should be taken into account on all fishing vessels. However, very small fishing vessels may be excluded from fully observing the basic principles. References to the wheelhouse should, in such vessels, be construed as meaning the position from which the navigation of the ship is controlled.

4 En route to or from fishing grounds

4.1 Arrangements of the navigational watch

4.1.1 The composition of the watch should at all times be adequate and appropriate to the prevailing circumstances and conditions and should take into account the need for maintaining a proper look-out.

4.1.2 When deciding the composition of the watch the following factors, inter alia, should be taken into account:

(i) at no time should the wheelhouse be left unattended;

(ii) weather conditions, visibility and whether there is daylight or darkness;

(iii) proximity of navigational hazards which may make it necessary for the officer in charge of the watch to carry out additional navigational duties;

(iv) use and operational condition of navigational aids such as radar or electronic position-indicating devices and any other equipment affecting the safe navigation of the vessel;

(v) whether the vessel is fitted with automatic steering;

(vi) any unusual demands on the navigational watch that may arise as a result of special operational circumstances.

4.2 Fitness for duty

4.2.1 The watch system should be such that the efficiency of watchkeeping personnel is not impaired by fatigue. Duties should be so organised that the first watch at the commencement of a voyage and the subsequent relieving watches are sufficiently rested and otherwise fit for duty.

4.3 Navigation

4.3.1 The intended voyage should, as far as practicable, be planned in advance taking into consideration all pertinent information and any course laid down should be checked before the voyage commences.

4.3.2 During the watch the course steered, position and speed should be checked at sufficiently frequent intervals, using any available navigational aids necessary, to ensure that the vessel follows the planned course.

4.3.3 The officer in charge of the watch should have full knowledge of the location and operation of all safety and navigational equipment on board the vessel and should be aware and take account of the operating limitations of such equipment.

4.3.4 The officer in charge of a navigational watch should not be assigned or undertake any duties which would interfere with the safe navigation of the vessel.

4.4 Navigational equipment

4.4.1 The officer in charge of the watch should make the most effective use of all navigational equipment at his disposal.

4.4.2 When using radar the officer in charge of the watch should bear in mind the necessity to comply at all times with the provisions on the use of radar contained in the applicable regulations for preventing collisions at sea.

4.4.3 In cases of need the officer of the watch should not hesitate to use the helm, engines and sound signalling apparatus.

4.5 Navigational duties and responsibilities

4.5.1 The officer in charge of the watch should:

(i) keep his watch in the wheelhouse;

(ii) which he should in no circumstances leave until properly

relieved;

(iii) continue to be responsible for the safe navigation of the vessel

(iv) despite the presence of the skipper in the wheelhouse until the skipper informs him specifically that he has assumed that responsibility and this is mutually understood;

(iv) notify the skipper when in any doubt as to what action to take in the interest of safety;

(v) not hand over the watch to a relieving officer if he has reason to believe that the latter is obviously not capable of carrying out his duties effectively, in which case he should notify the skipper accordingly.

4.5.2 On taking over the watch the relieving officer should satisfy himself as to the vessel's estimated or true position and confirm its intended track, course and speed and should note any dangers to navigation expected to be encountered during his watch.

4.5.3 Whenever practicable a proper record should be kept of the movements and activities during the watch relating to the navigation of the vessel.

4.6 Look-out

4.6.1 A proper look-out shall be maintained in compliance with Rule 5 of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972. It shall serve the purpose of:

(i) maintaining a continuous state of vigilance by sight and hearing as well as by all other available means, with regard to any significant changes in the operating environment;

(ii) fully appraising the situation and the risk of collision, stranding and other dangers to navigation, and;

(iii) detecting ships or aircraft in distress, shipwrecked persons, wrecks and debris;

The look-out must be able to give full attention to the keeping of a proper look-out and no other duties shall be undertaken or assigned which could interfere with that task.

4.6.2 In determining that the composition of the navigational watch is adequate to ensure that a proper look-out can continuously be maintained, the skipper shall take into account all relevant factors, including those described under paragraph 4.1, as well as the following factors:

(i) visibility, state of weather and sea;

(ii) traffic density and other activities occurring in the area in which the vessel is operating;

(iii) the attention necessary when navigating in or near traffic separation schemes and other routing measures;

(iv) the additional workload caused by the nature of the vessel's functions, immediate operating requirements and anticipated manoeuvres;

(v) rudder and propeller control and vessel manoeuvring characteristics;

(vi) the fitness for duty of any crewmembers on call who may be assigned as members of the watch;

(vii) knowledge of and confidence in the professional competence of the vessel's officers and crew;

(viii) the experience of the officer of the navigational watch and the familiarity of that officer with the vessel's equipment, procedures and manoeuvring capability;

(ix) activities taking place on board the vessel at any particular time and the availability of assistance to be summoned immediately to the wheelhouse when necessary;

(x) the operational status of instrumentation in the wheelhouse and controls, including alarm systems;

(xi) the size of the vessel and the field of vision available from the conning position;

(xii) the configuration of the wheelhouse, to the extent such configuration might inhibit a member of the watch from detecting by sight or hearing any external developments.

4.7 Protection of the marine environment

4.7.1 The skipper and the officer in charge of the watch should be aware of the serious effects of operational or accidental pollution of the marine environment and should take all possible precautions to prevent such pollution particularly within the framework of relevant international and port regulations.

4.8 Weather conditions

4.8.1 The officer in charge of the watch should take relevant measures and notify the skipper when adverse changes in weather could affect the

4.8.2 Safety of the vessel, including conditions leading to ice accretion.

5.1 Navigation with pilot embarked

5.1.1 The presence of a Pilot on board does not relieve the skipper or officer in charge of the watch from their duties and obligations for the safety of the vessel. The skipper and the pilot should exchange information regarding navigation procedures, local conditions and the vessel's characteristics. The skipper and the officer of the watch should co-operate closely with the pilot and maintain an accurate check of the vessel's position and movement.

6.1 Vessels engaged in fishing or searching for fish

6.1.1 In addition to the principles enumerated in paragraph 4, the following factors should be considered and properly acted upon by the officer in charge of the watch:

(i) other vessels engaged in fishing and their gear, own vessel's manoeuvring characteristics, particularly in stopping distance and the diameter of turning circle at sailing speed and with the fishing gear overboard;

(ii) safety of the crew on deck;

(iii) adverse effects on the safety of the vessel and its crew through reduction of stability and freeboard caused by exceptional forces resulting from fishing operations, catch handling and stowage, and unusual sea and weather conditions;

(iv) the proximity of offshore structures, with special regard to the safety zones; and

(v) wrecks and other underwater obstacles which could be hazardous for fishing gear.

6.2 When stowing the catch, attention should be given to the essential requirements for adequate freeboard and adequate stability and watertight integrity at all times during the voyage to the landing port taking into consideration consumption of fuel and stores, risk of adverse weather conditions and, especially in winter, risk of ice accretion on or above exposed decks in areas where ice accretion is likely to occur.

7.1 Anchor watch

7.1.1 The skipper should ensure, with a view to the safety of the vessel and crew, that a proper watch is maintained at all times from the wheelhouse or deck on fishing vessels at anchor.

8.1 Radio watchkeeping

8.1.1 The skipper should ensure that an adequate radio watch is maintained while the vessel is at sea, on appropriate frequencies, taking into account the requirements of the Radio Regulations.

8.6 Proposed Marine Notice No. 10 of 2002 – "Manning of Fishing Vessels".

Department of the Marine and Natural Resources

Roinn na Mara agus Acmhainní Nádúrtha

MARINE NOTICE NO 10 OF 2002

ATTENTION: ALL FISHING VESSEL OWNERS, SKIPPERS, MATES AND FISHERMEN

Manning Of Fishing Vessels

An investigation into a recent fishing vessel incident found that the person on watch at the time of the incident did not hold a certificate of competency or have any formal training in the use of navigational equipment.

The fishing vessel did not carry the correct number of qualified Deck Officers as required by the Fishing Vessels (Certification of Deck Officers and Engineer Officers) Regulations 1988 (S.I. No. 289 of 1988), as amended, the requirements of which are set out in Appendices I and II attached.

All fishing vessel owners and skippers are reminded that they are required to ensure that their vessels are correctly manned and that the proper number of certificated officers are carried for the appropriate fishing area, i.e. Limited or Unlimited.

Skippers are reminded that navigational watchkeeping duties must be carried out by properly qualified personnel at all times.

All watchkeeping personnel must be thoroughly familiar with all the electronic equipment they are expected to use.

The attention of fishing vessel owners and skippers is drawn to the following information, concerning the Fishing Vessels (Certification of Deck Officers and Engineer Officers) Regulations 1988, as amended.

1. The Regulations

The Fishing Vessels (Certification of Deck Officers and Engineer Officers) Regulations 1988, as amended, require:

(a) those fishing vessels of 17 metres in length and over, which operate in the Limited Area, and all fishing vessels that operate in the Unlimited Area to carry a specified number of deck officers, certificated in accordance with the Regulations. Existing certificates of competency issued under section 414 of the Merchant Shipping

Act 1894, will be treated as equivalent to specified certificates of competency issued under these Regulations.

(b) all fishing vessels of 750 kilowatt or more engine power to carry a specified number of engineer officers certificated in accordance with the Regulations.

2. Certificates of Competency (Deck Officer)

The Regulations require fishing vessels registered in the State (and Government fishery research vessels) to be manned by duly certificated Deck Officers and set out the minimum number of Deck Officers to be carried determined by the length of the vessel and by the area (Limited or Unlimited) in which the vessel operates.

Every ship registered in the State, being a sea-going fishing vessel or Government fishery research vessel:

(a) which operates in the Unlimited area, or
(b) which being of 17 metres length or more, operates in the Limited area, when going to sea,

shall carry such number of qualified Deck Officers as set out in Appendix 1.

Existing Deck Officer certificates of competency issued under section 414 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894, are to be treated as equivalent to specified certificates of competency issued under the Regulations.

3. Certificates of Competency (Engineer Officer)

The Regulations require fishing vessels registered in the State of 750 kilowatt registered power or more to be manned by duly certificated Engineer Officers, and lay down the minimum number of Engineer Officers and the level of their certificates related to the registered power in kilowatts (see Appendix II). The Regulations also specify that only duly certificated persons shall be employed in capacities, which require certificates.

4. Additional Information

The standards of competency which must be attained before a candidate will be issued with a certificate of competency under the Regulations together with examination syllabuses, specimen papers and requirements are set out in the Department of the Marine & Natural Resources publications entitled:

(1) Examination for Certificates of Competency for Fishing Vessels: Engineer Officer Requirements, Syllabuses and Specimen Papers

And

(2) Examination for Certificates of Competency for Fishing Vessels; Deck Officer Requirements, Syllabuses and Specimen Papers.

Copies of the Regulations and of the Department of the Marine & Natural Resources publications may be obtained from the Government Publications Sale Office, Sun Alliance House, Molesworth Street, Dublin 2.

5. Marine Notice No. 4 of 1995 is hereby withdrawn as this notice supersedes it.

Secretary-General
Department of the Marine and
Natural Resources
Dublin 2

13th May 2002

Any enquiries concerning Marine Notices should be addressed to:
Maritime Safety Division
Tel: 01-6199358 Fax: 01-6620774 email:
marine.notices@marine.gov.ie

Appendix 1

Column 1	Column 2	Column 3					Column 4
Fishing Area	Description of Length of Vessel	Minimum Number of Qualified Deck Officers to be Carried on Vessel					Number of other Officers to be carried on Vessel
		Skipper Full	2nd Hand Full	Skipper Limited	2nd Hand Limited	2nd Hand Special	
Unlimited	> 100 Metres	**1**	**3 or**	**3**			**3 Officers required in addition to Skipper**
Unlimited	50 Metres to <100 Metres	**1**	**2 or**	**2**			**2 Officers required in addition to Skipper**
Unlimited	< 50 Metres	**1**	**1 or**	**1**			**1 Officer required in addition to Skipper**
Limited	>100 Metres	**1**	**1or**	**1**	**1 or**	**1**	**2 Officers required in addition to Skipper**
Limited	50 Metres to <100 Metres			**1**	**2 or**	**2**	**2 Officers required in addition to Skipper**
Limited	24 Metres to <50 Metres			**1**	**1 or**	**1**	**1 Officer required in addition to Skipper**
Limited	17 Metres to <24 Metres					**1**	

Appendix 2

COLUMN 1	COLUMN 2		
Registered Power (Kilowatts)	Required Classes of Certificate		
	Chief Engineer Officer	Senior Engineer Officer	Third Engineer Officer
3,000 and over	1	2	3
2,000 or more but under 3,000	1	3	___
750 or more but under 2,000	2	3	___

NOTES