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**REPORT INTO THE SINKING OF  
FV “LADY EILEEN”  
ON  
13th AUGUST 2012**


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**REPORT No. MCIB/223  
(No.8 of 2013)**



Report MCIB/223 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board  
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## 1. SUMMARY

**Note: All times are in IST**

- 1.1 The FV “*Lady Eileen*” departed Quilty Pier, Co. Clare at approximately 07:00hrs on 13th August 2012, on a fishing trip with two crewmembers onboard. The vessel failed to return at its expected time of 17:00hrs - 19:00hrs.

Initially the alarm was raised locally and when no sighting of the vessel could be seen the Coast Guard was alerted at 20:56hrs. Rescue Helicopter R115, Doolin Coast Guard Unit, Kilkee Coast Guard Unit, Kilkee Rescue Unit and Aran Island Lifeboat were tasked for the search operation.

At 22:45hrs Doolin Coast Guard located debris 0.25 miles west of Spanish Point. At 23:08hrs Doolin Coast Guard spotted fish boxes and other debris and detected a strong smell of diesel between Spanish Point and Cream Point.

The search was called off for the night at 01:20hrs on 14th August 2012 and resumed at first light on 14th August 2012.

At 05:46hrs on the 14th August a fishing vessel came across four net marker buoys believed to be from the “*Lady Eileen*”.

Shortly before 12:00hrs on the 14th August 2012 members of the Burren Rescue team dived on to the “*Lady Eileen*” and located two bodies in the vicinity of the wheelhouse of the vessel. The bodies were brought to the surface and removed from the scene by members of the Kilkee Rescue Unit.

A Post Mortem examination confirmed that both men died from drowning.

## 2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

### 2.1 Particulars of the Vessel

Name of Vessel:	<i>“Lady Eileen”</i>
Builder:	Neil Watson, Wicklow
Year of Build:	1977
Overall Length:	10.85m
Breadth:	3.46m
Depth:	0.91m
Engine:	Ford C Power, 6 cylinder four stroke, diesel engine of 83.56 KW Capacity.
Name and address of Owner:	Mr Michael Galvin Quilty Co. Clare
General Description of Craft:	Traditionally built craft of fibre reinforced plastic, of carvel form, with a raked stem and transom Stern. Craft was of decked design (raised foredeck, open sealed aft deck with freeing ports).  Craft powered by a Ford C Power six cylinder, four stroke, diesel engine of 83.56 KW Capacity.  A small wheelhouse fitted at the forward end of the vessel.  Fitted on starboard aft end of wheelhouse superstructure, Pot/Net Hauler.



General View of the F/V “LADY EILEEN”

- 2.2. Code of Practice Declaration of Compliance for the “*Lady Eileen*” was carried out on the 26th June 2010 and was valid until 25th June 2014.
- 2.3 The crew of the “*Lady Eileen*” on the 13th August 2012 were:  
Michael Galvin aged 64 years  
Noel Dickinson aged 35 years
- 2.4 The Met Éireann estimate of weather conditions in the Spanish Point Area of Co. Clare between 12:00hrs and 18:00hrs on the 13th August 2012 was as follows. Winds: south to southwest, Force 4 to 5. Sea state: Slight to Moderate, (1 to 1.5 metre significant wave height), from a southwest to west direction. (See appendix 7.1)
- 2.5 The vessel carried out a variety of different types of static gear fishing around the Irish coastline. The boat was rigged for static gear tangle net fishing at the time of the incident.
- 2.6 The tangle nets were stored in a purpose built pound fitted at the aft starboard side of the deck. The boat also carried a portable seawater tank on the deck for storage and to keep crustaceans alive.

### **3. NARRATIVE**

#### **3.1 EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT**

- 3.1.1 On the 13th August 2012 at approximately 07:00hrs the FV “*Lady Eileen*” departed Quilty, Co. Clare with a crew of two onboard, Skipper/Owner Michael Galvin and Crewman Noel Dickinson.
- 3.1.2 They then proceeded to sea to tend to tangled nets.
- 3.1.3 The boat was sighted at approximately 13:00hrs in the vicinity of Kilstiffin Rocks heading south.
- 3.1.4 The boat was sighted again from the shore at approximately 14:30hrs North East of Spanish Point. This was the last known sighting of the craft. (See appendix 7.2)

#### **3.2 THE INCIDENT**

- 3.2.1 There were no witnesses to the incident.

#### **3.3 EVENTS AFTER THE INCIDENT**

- 3.3.1 When the vessel had not returned to the pier by 19:00hrs a local fisherman became concerned. He looked for the boat from the shore and could not see it. He also tried contacting the boat by mobile phone and VHF radio without success.
- 3.3.2 The Coast Guard were alerted at 20:56hrs on 13th August 2012 that the “*Lady Eileen*” was missing and overdue.
- 3.3.3 Rescue Helicopter R115, Doolin Coast Guard Unit, Kilkee Coast Guard Unit, Kilkee Rescue Unit and Aran Island Lifeboat were tasked for the search operation.
- 3.3.4 At 22:45hrs Doolin Coast Guard located debris 0.25 miles west of Spanish Point. At 23:08hrs Doolin Coast Guard spotted fish boxes and other debris and detected a strong smell of diesel between Spanish Point and Cream Point.
- 3.3.5 The search was called off for the night at 01:20hrs on 14th August 2012 and resumed at first light on 14th August 2012.
- 3.3.6 At 05:46hrs on 14th August a fishing vessel came across four marker buoys at position 52.51.29N : 09.27.48W believed to be from the “*Lady Eileen*”. Three sets of buoys were clumped together and one buoy was approximately 300m south of the other buoys.

- 3.3.7 Local fishing boats hauled the nets from the scene. The string of nets that had the marker buoy 300m away from the other buoys, was most likely to have been in the process of being shot.
- 3.3.8 Shortly before 12:00hrs on the 14th August 2012 members of the Burren Rescue team dived on to the “*Lady Eileen*” and located two bodies in the vicinity of the wheelhouse of the vessel. The body of Michael Galvin was found inside of the wheelhouse and the body of Noel Dickinson was found to be partially in the wheelhouse. (see appendix 7.3)
- 3.3.9 When the bodies were recovered neither crewmember was found to be wearing a lifejacket or PFD (personal flotation device). It was reported that both men were wearing gloves.
- 3.3.10 The bodies were brought to the surface and removed from the scene by members of the Kilkee Rescue Unit and brought to Quilty Pier, where they were received by a Garda Superintendent and pronounced dead by a doctor. Post Mortem examinations later confirmed that both men died as a result of drowning.
- 3.3.11 On the 14th August a dive team dived on the wreck and noted the wreck to be lying at an angle of approximately 30° to starboard, no apparent damage was noted on the hull. The dive team recovered the vessel’s EPIRB, which was still attached to its holder in the wheelhouse. When the EPIRB was brought to the surface the battery commenced to give off fumes.
- 3.3.12 The dive team found the engine throttle in the full ahead position and the rudder hard over to starboard.
- 3.3.13 The dive team noted that a flush timber deck hatch approximately 0.5m x 1.2m situated at the back of the engine casing was missing. Sections of deck planking were missing and the engine casing cover was missing. They also noted that the tailshaft could turn easily with no apparent damage to the vessel’s sterngear.
- 3.3.14 The nets recovered from the “*Lady Eileen*” were subsequently weighed and found to weigh 1,060 Kgs. This weight did not include anchors and buoys.
- 3.3.15 On the 14th August there were sixteen boats of various types involved in the search operations for the “*Lady Eileen*”.
- 3.3.16 One of these boats was an O’Sullivan Marine 17’ L.O.A. Open Boat, fitted with a 20 H.P. outboard engine. The boat had three persons onboard all wearing inflatable type PFDs.
- 3.3.17 At approximately 12:30hrs on the 14th August whilst the vessel was proceeding in the area of Freagh Point the vessel was caught and swamped by two waves,



the first wave causing the outboard engine to fail. The second wave capsized the boat, tipping the three occupants into the water.

- 3.3.18 Whilst all three persons were wearing PFDs, only one inflated. Fortunately the three persons were quickly rescued and brought ashore, where one person received oxygen from the Garda Divers who were in the vicinity.
- 3.3.19 The boat was later washed up on rocks in the vicinity of Cream Point, where it broke up. (see appendix 7.4)
- 3.3.20 The two PFDs that did not inflate were not available to the MCIB Investigator; therefore it was not possible to establish why the PFDs failed to operate.

## 4. ANALYSIS

- 4.1 On the day of the incident it is understood that it was the intention of the crew of the “*Lady Eileen*” to carry out additional work over and above what would normally be carried out during one day. This was to shift fishing gear, as there was a bad forecast predicted for the 15th August and they would not be going to sea on the 14th August as they were going to attend a local man’s funeral.
- 4.2 There were no witnesses to the incident.
- 4.3 Both men were active able-bodied experienced individuals. The evidence would suggest that the incident happened very suddenly and that neither Mr. Galvin nor Mr. Dickinson had any time to react to the situation and access the emergency equipment.
- 4.4 The boat was of decked design (raised foredeck, open sealed aft deck with freeing ports), the deck being constructed of timber planking, which is believed to have been caulked and payed with pitch to ensure its watertight integrity.
- 4.5 It was reported to the MCIB Investigator that in June 2012 the owner effected work on the boat’s sterngear that involved the removal of a deck panel abaft of the engine casing for access to the repairs. It is unknown if this panel was re-secured, caulked and payed on completion of the repairs. The circumstantial evidence would suggest that it had not been re-secured as the dive team noted it to be missing.
- 4.6 The vessel had a current Code of Practice for small fishing vessels of less than 15m in length. The Code shows that the vessel in the unladen condition had a freeboard of 0.27m. In the unladen condition the vessel would only have to heel to 8.87° to allow water to flow across the deck. Once additional weight in excess of 1,000Kgs plus the weight of the net pound constructed on the starboard side of the boat, and the weight of the seawater tank, the freeboard would be further significantly reduced. The low original freeboard, which was reduced by the additional weights, would allow water to flow freely on to the deck even in very calm weather conditions.
- 4.7 If water in any quantity gets onto the deck of a boat and cannot be quickly released, it will have an adverse effect on the stability and buoyancy of the craft.
- 4.8 The net pound and seawater tank would restrict the flow of any water getting on deck finding its exit via the craft’s freeing ports.
- 4.9 From the positioning of the nets found it would appear that one string of nets was in the process of being shot in a north-westerly direction at the time of the incident. The wind and swell would have been on the port aft quarter of the boat.

- 4.10 It would appear that whatever happened to the craft it transpired exceedingly quickly as no VHF distress message was transmitted, no telephone call made, or EPIRB activated. In addition both bodies were found within the vicinity of the wheelhouse.
- 4.11 The engine throttle was found in the full ahead position with the helm hard over to starboard. During the shooting of nets it would be unusual to be proceeding at full speed.
- 4.12 Neither crewmember was found wearing a lifejacket, the wearing of lifejackets would increase the chances of survival.
- 4.13 The EPIRB fitted to the craft was of the manual activated type and was stored as permitted by the Code of Practice inside the wheelhouse. The EPIRB was not activated suggesting that the crew did not get time to activate it. If an automatic EPIRB had been fitted the alarm would have been raised quicker, but in this case it is unlikely to have resulted in a different outcome.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

- 5.1 It is probable that the “*Lady Eileen*” encountered wind or wave action or a combination of both. This caused the vessel to be swamped and lose reserve of buoyancy beyond which it was able to recover for its loaded condition, resulting in its sinking.
- 5.2 If the hatch abaft of the engine casing, that had been removed for repairs to the sterngear, had not been re-secured and sealed properly, this could have permitted water to enter the hull of the boat over its deck in the heavily laden condition, contributing to the catastrophic loss of buoyancy.
- 5.3 During searches, taking into account the good intentions of local help available, there is a need for a managed and co-ordinated approach.

## **6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS**

The Board notes that there have been a number of incidents caused by overloading boats thus affecting buoyancy and stability.

- 6.1 It is recommended that the Minister for Transport, Tourism & Sport review the requirements of the Code of Practice for fishing vessels under 15m, with a view to establishing revised stability criteria, with particular reference to freeboard and freeing ports in small decked vessels.
- 6.2 It is recommended that the Minister for Transport, Tourism & Sport introduce legislation to require fishing vessels to have a fixed loadline on both sides, giving owners an indication of the point of which the vessel can be safely loaded to and hence reduce the possibilities of overloading.
- 6.3 It is recommended that EPIRBs fitted to fishing vessels are mounted outside the wheelhouse and are of the automatic float free type.
- 6.4 It is recommended that for this type of vessel all crew should wear lifejackets/PFDs conforming to SOLAS/MED requirements at all times, as specified in S.I. No. 586 of 2001 and amendments.
- 6.5 The Board has noted that in large scale search and rescue operations, volunteers and their boats arrive at the incident scene. These volunteers should report to the appointed on scene SAR co-ordinator in order to be co-ordinated and managed in accordance with the needs of the SAR operation.

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Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Information.




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*The Irish Meteorological Service*

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*Our Ref.* WS3018/2\_14737  
*Your Ref.* MCIB/12/223



3/9/2012

**Estimate of weather conditions in the sea area off Spanish Point, Co. Clare, between 6 hours and 18 hours on the 13/8/2012**

13/8/2012  
6 to 12 hours

Winds: south-to south-west, Force 4 to 5

Weather: patches of rain and drizzle and occasional showers. As there was high thunderstorm activity over the land that day, an isolated thunderstorm in the area cannot be ruled out.

Visibility: good, moderate in showers

Seastate: Slight to Moderate, from a south-west to west direction

12 to 18 hours

Winds: South to south-west Force 3 to 5

Weather: spells of rain and drizzle, isolated heavy showers

Visibility: mostly good, moderate in showers

Seastate: Slight to Moderate, from a west-south-west direction.

**Evelyn Murphy B.Sc. M.Sc. Meteorologist**  
Research, Environment & Applications Division  
Met Éireann



## Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Information.

**MET ÉIREANN**  
*The Irish Meteorological Service*Glasnevin Hill,  
Dublin 9, Ireland.Cnoc Ghlas Naíon  
Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire.  
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Fax: +353-1-806 4247  
E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie**28/8/2012****Our Ref.** WS3018/2\_14725  
**Your Ref.** MCIB/12/223**Estimate of weather conditions in the sea area off Spanish Point, Co. Clare, between 18 hours on the 13/8/2012 and 12 hours on the 14/8/2012**

13/8/2012

18 to 24 hours

Winds: Light to Moderate, occasionally Fresh winds, Force 3 to 5, from a southerly direction

Weather: mostly dry, but there were isolated showers in the area

Visibility: mostly good, greater than 10 km, but moderate in showers

Temperatures: both air and sea temperatures were about 16°C

Seastate: Slight to Moderate, (1 to 1.5 metre significant wave height), from a west-south-west direction

14/8/2012

00 to 6 hours

Winds: Moderate to Fresh, Force 3 to 5, from a south to south-west direction.

Weather: occasional showers, some heavy

Visibility: good

Temperatures: air were 15°C to 16°C and sea temperatures about 16°C

Seastate: Slight to Moderate, (1 to 1.5 metre significant wave height), from a west to west-south-west direction.

6 to 12 hours

Winds: Light to Moderate, Force 3 to 4, from a south to south-west direction

Weather: frequent showers at first, became isolated later.

Visibility: good


Temperatures: air 16°C to 18°C and sea 16°C

Seastate: Slight to Moderate, (1 to 1.5 metre significant wave height), from a westerly direction.

**Evelyn Murphy B.Sc. M.Sc. Meteorologist**  
Research, Environment & Applications Division  
Met Éireann



Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Information.



**MET ÉIREANN**  
*The Irish Meteorological Service*

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**Beaufort Scale of Wind**

Force	Description	Speed*		Specification	Wave height**
		knots	km/hr	-sea	(metres)
0	Calm	<1	<1	Sea like mirror	
1	Light air	1-3	1-5	Ripples	0.1 (0.1)
2	Light breeze	4-6	6-11	Small wavelets	0.2 (0.3)
3	Gentle breeze	7-10	12-19	Large wavelets, crests begin to break	0.6 (1)
4	Moderate breeze	11-16	20-28	Small waves becoming longer, frequent white horses	1 (1.5)
5	Fresh breeze	17-21	29-38	Moderate waves, many white horses, chance of spray	2 (2.5)
6	Strong breeze	22-27	39-49	Large waves, white foam crests, probably some spray	3 (4)
7	Near gale	28-33	50-61	Sea heeps up, streaks of white foam	4 (5.5)
8	Gale	34-40	62-74	Moderately high waves of greater length	5.5 (7.5)
9	Strong gale	41-47	75-88	High waves, dense streaks of foam, spray may reduce visibility	7 (10)
10	Storm	48-55	89-102	Very high waves, long overhanging crests, visibility affected	9 (12.5)
11	Violent storm	56-63	103-117	Exceptionally high waves, long white foam patches cover sea	11.5 (16)
12	Hurricane	64+	117 & over	Air filled with foam and spray, sea completely white	14 (-)

\*Speed = mean speed at a standard height of 10 metres  
\*\*Wave height is only intended as a guide to what may be expected in the open sea.  
Bracketed figures indicate the probable maximum wave height

**Wave Heights / State of Sea**

The wave height is the vertical distance between the crest and the preceding or following trough. The table below gives a description of the wave system associated with a range of significant wave heights.

Sea State (Descriptive)	Significant Wave height in meters
Calm	0 – 0.1
Smooth (Wavelets)	0.1 – 0.5
Slight	0.5 – 1.25
Moderate	1.25 – 2.5
Rough	2.5 – 4
Very rough	4 – 6
High	6 – 9
Very high	9 – 14
Phenomenal	Over 14

Individual waves in the wave train will have heights in excess of the significant height. The highest wave of all will have a height about twice the significant height.


**Visibility**

Descriptions of visibility mean the following:


Visibility (Descriptive)	Visibility in nautical miles (kilometres)
Good	More than 5 nm (> 9 km)
Moderate	2 – 5 nm (4 – 9 km)
Poor	0.5 – 2 nm (1 – 4 km)
Fog	Less than 0.5 nm (< 1 km)

# APPENDIX 7.2

Appendix 7.2 Map showing last sighting of Lady Eileen.




Appendix 7.3 Map showing position of wreck of Lady Eileen.



# APPENDIX 7.4

Appendix 7.4 Map showing area where small boat capsized during search operations.




**8. CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED**

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## Correspondence 8.1 An Garda Síochána and MCIB Response.

*An Garda Síochána*

An Cheannfort  
An Garda Síochána  
Inisíomáin  
Co. An Chláir



Tel/Teileafón: 065-7072187  
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Please quote the following ref.  
Number ET046.16/12

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MCIB/12/223  
WR\_11-57526/12

Ms. Cliona Cassidy,  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board,  
Leeson Lane,  
Dublin 2.

GARDA SÍOCHÁNA  
SUPERINTENDENT

ENNISTYMON  
CO. CLARE

**Re: Draft report of the Investigation into fatal incident involving the FV Lady Eileen, Co Clare on 13 August 2012.**

---

Dear Ms Cassidy,

I wish to express my thanks to you and your investigator, Mr Michael Connolly for the thorough investigation and detailed report completed on this tragedy.

While I have no submissions to make on the report and its findings I would like to take the opportunity of supporting the Safety Recommendation at point 6.4

*Co-ordination of search and rescue volunteers needs to be managed in order to avoid further incidents during search operations*

On the morning of the 14<sup>th</sup> August 2012 I was present at the coordination centre in Quilty, Co Clare. It was obvious from my position that there were numerous local boats on the scene endeavouring to provide assistance in the search and recovery of the crew of the Lady Eileen.

Conscious of the imminent arrival of the official Garda divers and troubled by a lack of knowledge of the experience levels of those amateur divers already on the water, I requested that Valencia impose an exclusion zone around the wreckage so as to ensure the scene was not encroached by less qualified divers who may have themselves become victims of the tragedy.

Valencia agreed to this request and all boats were contacted and asked to confine their search activities to an area at least 100 meters outside of the wreckage site.

**Correspondence 8.1 An Garda Síochána and MCIB Response.**

However at approximately 12 noon on the 14<sup>th</sup> August 2012, as the Garda divers were preparing to launch from White Strand, members of the Burren Divers Association moved into the exclusion zone, dived to the wreckage and recovered the bodies of both fishermen. This recovery was without incident.

Enforcement of exclusion zones.

The function which needed to be clarified at this particular scene, is that of enforcement when an exclusion zone has been authorised on the water.

As stated, numerous boats attended the scene, having come from their harbours in Doolin, Kilkee and Quilty as well as smaller boats launched from Whitestrand. These boats were manned by volunteers who all came with best intentions to assist in the recovery operation.

I submit that the Irish Navy are in the best position to control scenes off shore but in their absence the Irish Coast Guard should be empowered to enforce any necessary exclusions.

Recommendations.

As stated, the Co-ordination of search and rescue volunteers needs to be managed in order to avoid further incidents during search operations.

Where exclusions zones are required they need to be enforced.


Forwarded for your information.

 Superintendent  
(DEREK SMART)

**MCIB RESPONSE:**  
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence and suggests that An Garda Síochána direct their concerns and comments regarding section 6.4 of this report to the Irish Navy and the Coast Guard.

Note: The reference to point 6.4 above refers to a point from the draft report. In the final report this corresponds to point 6.5.

### Correspondence 8.2 Irish Coast Guard and MCIB Response



Cliona Cassidy, B.L.,  
Chairman  
MCIB

Dear Cliona,

Thank you for a copy of the draft MCIB report into the tragic fatal loss of two persons off the FV 'Lady Eileen' on the 13<sup>th</sup> August 2012.

At 6.3 the Coast Guard strongly endorses the fitting of externally mounted EPIRB's to all craft that go to sea, whether statutorily required or not.

We would also recommend that the EPIRB is supplied with location information because if the unit is equipped with a GPS receiver, the exact location of the sinking is immediately conveyed in the signal as well.

It is also critical that the EPIRB is properly registered as the serial number lets the Coast Guard know who owns the EPIRB and therefore instigate a more effective search.

At 6.4 the Coast Guard would request a more exact recommendation as we are unsure how to proceed with the given wording. During an actual search and rescue (SAR) mission the Coast Guard Marine Rescue Coordination Centre will assume overall coordination of the response and may appoint an at sea On-Scene SAR Coordinator. This authority comes from government decision and international practice and not by statute. The onshore authority is An Garda Síochána in accordance with the Multi-Agency Protocol (7) 'Land Based Response to Marine Emergencies' of the Framework for Emergency Management.

During prolonged searches the SAR phase becomes a search and recovery operation for which the responsibilities of the various agencies are less defined. Often, as in this case, a large variety of craft put to sea with the best of intent but from past experience some of these craft may be unsuitable, improperly equipped or their crews lack experience and training. These craft do not need to engage with any formal search organised by the Coast Guard and may carry on as they wish. This has been a regular difficulty for the Coast Guard in the past and it is not unknown for these craft to get into difficulty. A clearer recommendation is therefore requested.

*Director's Office, Irish Coast Guard, Department of Transport, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2, Ireland.  
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


**Correspondence 8.2 Irish Coast Guard and MCIB Response**

Finally the Coast Guard would like to stress the importance of maintaining a competent person ashore for every craft that goes to sea including small fishing vessels regardless of whether an EPIRB is carried or not. All boat skippers should tell a responsible person ashore – in effect an emergency contact – where their craft is going, when its leaving, from what port or slip, time due back and where, who is onboard, what safety and communications equipment is carried, what the craft looks like, its name/call-sign and most importantly what action to take when this estimated time of arrival passes. This emergency contact ashore must take on this duty vigilantly and contact the Coast Guard immediately once they become concerned.

This tragedy occurred the same day as the tragic loss off Cods Head in which a life may have been easily saved if an emergency contact person ashore or an EPIRB had been used. This is not the case in this event as both lives appear to have been lost suddenly. However had lifejackets been worn there may have had a different outcome. Irish waters are generally warm enough even in the winter for persons in the water to survive long enough until a lifeboat or helicopter rescues them.

It is regularly not until late evening that the Coast Guard is informed of missing or overdue craft and then must launch a search into darkness with all the difficulty that brings. So it essential to stay alive in the water by wearing a lifejacket and inform the Coast Guard early either on VHF, by the use of an emergency contact ashore or my automated electronic means to give yourself the best chance of surviving an event that may only happen once in a lifetime.



Chris Reynolds

Director

Irish Coast Guard

28<sup>th</sup> January 2013




**MCIB RESPONSE:**  
The MCIB notes the Coast Guard's comments in relation to 6.3 and 6.4. The MCIB notes the points made and would refer to 6.5 of this report.



Note: The reference to point 6.4 above refers to a point from the draft report. In the final report this corresponds to point 6.5.

## CORRESPONDENCE 8.3

### Correspondence 8.3 RNLI and MCIB Response.



**Royal National Lifeboat Institution**  
Chairman: Admiral the Lord Boyer KC CB CBE DL  
Chief Executive: Paul Selinger  
RNLI Trading Ltd (10777377) RNLI (Ireland) Ltd (22274144) RNLI (Scotland) Ltd (177407)  
All UK employees registered at their local RNLI office. SH 12 142

**From:**  
Divisional Base Ireland  
Airside, Swords, Co. Dublin, Ireland  
Tel (01) 8900460  
Fax (01) 8900458

**To:**  
Ms. Cliona Cassidy BL  
Chair  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board  
Leeson Lane  
Dublin 2

19<sup>th</sup> February 2013

Dear Ms. Cassidy


**DRAFT REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO FATAL ACCIDENT INVOLVING  
FV "LADY EILEEN", COUNTY CLARE ON 13TH AUGUST 2012**

Reference: MCIB 12/223


Thank you for inviting the RNLI to comment on the report into the incident that resulted in the loss of Mr. Michael Galvin and Mr. Noel Dickinson. The thoughts of all those involved in the RNLI are with the families and friends of both men.

It is heartening to note that there were so many from the local community who were willing to put to sea to assist in the search but it should be recognised that management of so many additional vessels presents quite a challenge to search and rescue mission co-ordinators and on scene co-ordinators. Ultimately the safety of a vessel and all those on board rests with the individual in command of that vessel.

Kindest regards




Martyn Smith  
RNLI Regional Operations Manager  
(Ireland and the Isle of Man)



The RNLI is the charity that saves lives at sea  
Charity number: CRF 2678. In the Republic of Ireland and registered in England and Wales (205605) and Scotland (SC037788)

**MCIB RESPONSE:**  
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.


Correspondence 8.4 Óglaigh na hÉireann and MCIB Response.

 **Óglaigh na hÉireann**  
DEFENCE FORCES IRELAND

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Ceanncheathrú Chabhlaigh  
Naval Service Headquarters

NHQ/A/OPS/1

 12 February 2013


Assumpta Dowd,  
Secretariat,  
Marine Casualty Investigation Board,  
Leeson Lane,  
Dublin 2.

*Dear Ms Dowd*

**NAVAL SERVICE OBSERVATION MCIB DRAFT REPORT – LADY EILEEN**


Reference A “Draft Report of the Investigation into fatal incident involving FV Lady Eileen, Co Clare on 13 August 2012” dated 25 January 2013.

1. The Naval Service has no observations on the report found at Reference A.
2. Submitted as requested.

*Yours Sincerely*  


**M MELLETT**  
**COMMODORE**  
**FLAG OFFICER COMMANDING NAVAL SERVICE**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

 Ceanncheathrú Chabhlaigh, Bunáit Chabhlaigh, Inis Sionnach, Co. Chorcaí  
Naval Service Headquarters, Naval Base, Haulbowline, Cobh, Co Cork  
t: +353 (0) 21 486 4801  
www.military.ie

**MCIB RESPONSE:**  
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.

