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REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO
THE SINKING OF THE
MFV “*JEANETTE ROBERTA*” S58
OFF GLANDORE HARBOUR,
CO. CORK
ON
11th DECEMBER 2011

REPORT No. MCIB/209
(No.13 of 2012)

Report MCIB/209 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Printed 7th December 2012.

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1. SUMMARY

- 1.1 The fishing vessel MFV “*Jeanette Roberta*”, crewed by a Skipper and two crew, departed Union Hall, Co. Cork at 06:00hrs on 11th December 2011 for the prawn fishing grounds off Galley Head. Following a single shot, slack fishing conditions and in the face of deteriorating weather conditions, the trip was abandoned and the vessel set course for home.

Entering Glandore Harbour at 14:20hrs the vessel encountered electrical and navigation equipment problems and steamed onto and stranded on the south-eastern side of Adam’s Island at the entrance to the harbour. The vessel was holed and making water and a Mayday was issued at 14:32hrs.

A further Mayday was issued, the vessel’s 6 - person Inflatable Liferaft was deployed and the crew abandoned the vessel and boarded the liferaft. The vessel sank in some 15m depth of water shortly afterward and the crew were picked up out of the liferaft by MFV “*Sally Pamela*” at 14:50hrs and landed safely ashore at Union Hall at 16:23hrs. All three crew members were uninjured and did not require medical assistance. No pollution resulted other than miscellaneous floating debris, fishboxes etc.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1. General Particulars: MFV “*Jeanette Roberta*” S58

Construction:	GRP (glass reinforced plastic) hull with raised foredeck, inset wheelhouse and half-length GRP shelter aft. Raked stem and transom stern
Type:	Cygnus GM44 - Trawler
Call Sign:	EI 8691
Port of Registry:	Skibbereen
Length Overall:	13.21m (43.34ft)
Registered Length:	12.04m (39.5ft)
Breadth:	4.94m (16.21ft)
Depth:	1.89m (5.9ft)
GRT:	24.3 tonnes
Machinery:	Cummins, type N855 diesel rated 145kw/194 BHP
Builder:	Hull - Cygnus Marine Ltd., Penryn, Cornwall, UK Fitting out - Browne Bros., Fenit, Co. Kerry
Date of Build:	1990
Certification:	The vessel held a current valid Declaration of Compliance in accordance with the DTTAS Cop. Please see copy at Appendix 7.6
Owner:	Paul Deasy, Union Hall, Co. Cork Vessel was in present ownership since 2007 (4th Owner)

2.2. Voyage Particulars

The vessel was engaged in Prawn Fishing - daylight fishery - using towed gear consisting of 125 fathom warps and 50 fathom bridles i.e. bottom fishing using Trawl Doors.

Manning:	The vessel was manned by the Owner/Skipper, Paul Deasy and Alexscjs Konaebajevs - 25 yrs, Latvian national, crew member on/off 4/5 years. Andrey Patrakov - 40 yrs, Latvian national, crew member 2.5 years.
Crew Certification:	Vessel being less than 17m registered length does not require a Certificated Officer. The Skipper holds a Radio Operator’s Short Range

Certificate/Restricted Certificate of Competency in Radio Telephony (VHF) - Certificate No.4768.

Note: Certificate not sighted but details confirmed officially.

Both crew members are stated to have had equivalent training to Irish national - Basic Safety Training but their documentation was lost with the vessel.

2.3. Incident Information

- 2.3.1 On the 11th December 2011 the vessel departed Union Hall at 06:10hrs and proceeded to the fishing grounds off Galley Head. The weather was stated to have been good, with winds WNW'ly force 3~4 and gusting.
- 2.3.2 The gear was shot away at 07:45hrs off Galley Head and the vessel towed in an easterly direction until 11:30hrs when the gear was hauled. The fishing was slack and with the weather deteriorating, the Skipper decided to abort the trip and head for home.
- 2.3.3 The incident occurred when the vessel was making her approach to clear Adam's Island on her port hand and entering the main channel. Adam's Island which divides the entrance into two channels is 27m (88.5ft) in height and steep on the southern side. Refer to Chart No.2092 - Toe Head to Old Head of Kinsale - inset extract Glandore Harbour and aerial view in Appendices.
- 2.3.4 The vessel had made the approach on auto-pilot and the Skipper encountered a problem when he went to change over to manual, the gear appeared to be 'stuck' in auto. This problem had been experienced previously at irregular intervals and had been attributed to "sticky solenoids".
- 2.3.5 While engaged in attempting to address the problem and with vessel still on Auto-Pilot and steaming at 6.5/7 knots, the vessel altered course to port without warning and stranded on the rocks on the southern side of Adam's Island at approximately 14:28hrs. The vessel was fast on the rock, holed and making water. The Skipper issued a Mayday at 14:32hrs and this was picked up by MRSC Valentia who initiated assistance - see Section 2.4.
- 2.3.6 The Skipper instructed the two crew to remove the craft's 6-person Inflatable Liferaft from the crown of the shelter to the deck, deploy it into the water and then inflate it using the painter.
- 2.3.7 Meantime, the Skipper decided to attempt to refloat the vessel by going astern off the rocks.
- 2.3.8 The bilge alarm in the Fish Room was operating at this stage and a second Mayday was transmitted.
- 2.3.9 With smoke and fumes emanating from the Machinery Space (Forward Machinery Space) deck hatch, the vessel came off astern for some 3m, but noticeably

flooding. The Main Engine was shut down, the two crew bundled the Skipper into the liferaft and then followed suit.

- 2.3.10 The vessel was observed to go by the stern initially, then vertical, rolled to port and sank in about 15m of water. Time of sinking stated to be 14:43hrs.
- 2.3.11 The Skipper stated that while he lay in the liferaft he heard an ‘explosion’ and attributed this to the possible automatic release of the EPIRB. This is confirmed by the MRCC Dublin that an EPIRB activated in the same location.
- 2.3.12 A local fishing vessel “SALLY PAMELA” owned by Tadg O’Regan was close by and responded, came alongside and took the three men on board but with difficulty, as the vessel was rolling heavily in the swell.
- 2.3.13 Having taken and landed the men ashore at Union Hall pier, she was requested by MRSC to track down and recover the EPIRB. The latter was recovered at 15:03hrs and switched off.
- 2.3.14 While the casualty had a reported 1,000 litres of gas oil on board, no subsequent pollution was observed when the area was overflown by SAR - Helicopter R115 on the 12th December 2011.

2.4. Weather and Tidal: 11th December 2011

The weather conditions attending were estimated by Met Eireann for the period between 12:00 - 18:00hrs on the 11th December 2011 were as follows:

- Wind W to NW’ly force 5 to 6 but ranging 4 to 7 with stronger gusts.
- Visibility was moderate to good with sea state moderate at first, later rough.

Spring tides were applicable.

Tidal Data taken for Castletownshend 11th December 2011

State	Time	Height
High Water	05:16	3.7m
	17:31	3.6m
Low Water	11:16	1.0m
	23:28	1.0m

Note: The stranding occurred in tidal conditions of half flood.

2.5. Shore Authority Involvement and Emergency Response

- 2.5.1 The rescue was organised and co-ordinated by MRSC Valentia.
- 2.5.2 Following receipt of the Mayday at 14:25hrs the following emergency services were tasked:

- RNLI Baltimore - All-Weather Lifeboat & Inshore Lifeboat.
- Toe Head Coast Guard.
- Requested assistance of SAR - Helicopter R115.

Note: There is an apparent discrepancy between the times recorded by MRSC Valentia and RNLI Baltimore.

- 2.5.3 The Irish Coast Guard has confirmed that the mayday call was received at 14:25hrs. However, due to very poor signal strength (fading) it took five minutes to decipher the mayday call in full, making it 14:31hrs before distress procedures were put in place.
- 2.5.4 Baltimore Lifeboat record their first advice as 14:19hrs, this received ex Coast Guard.
- 2.5.5 While both Baltimore Lifeboats were enroute to the casualty they heard the message ex MFV *“Sally Pamela”* at 14:50hrs that the vessel had sunk and that the three crew had been picked up. The All-Weather Lifeboat was stood down at 14:55hrs and Inshore Lifeboat continued on in order to render assistance with the recovery of casualties and attempting to locate the EPIRB.
- 2.5.6 Following receipt of the information that the EPIRB had been recovered and switched off by *“Sally Pamela”*, the craft was stood down, one mile from the scene at 15:20hrs.

Noted that RNLI Baltimore All-Weather Lifeboat launched at 14:25hrs and the Inshore Lifeboat at 14:35hrs.

3. NARRATIVE

- 3.1 During the investigation and interview of the Skipper, Mr Paul Deasy, and the crewman, Mr Alex Konarbaseus, Mr Alex Konarbaseus stated that:

Once the fishing was aborted and the decision made to return to Union Hall, he turned in. He was awakened subsequently by a “bang”. He got up, came to the Wheelhouse where he found the Skipper and realised that they had stranded. The third crew member was also present and they were instructed to deploy the liferaft from its location on the crown of the shelter to the deck and thence over the side into the water where it was inflated using the painter and made fast. He had looked down into the machinery space and noted it was flooding quickly.

He confirmed that the crew always wore their PFDs and that their individual lifejackets were stowed by their berths. When it came to boarding the liferaft, they ‘bundled’ the Skipper in first, he lay on his back in the raft and then they boarded themselves and cut the painter.

- 3.2 MFV “*Sally Pamela*” (Tadg O’Regan) came alongside shortly afterwards and despite the heavy rolling got the Skipper aboard with some difficulty, followed by the two crew and took them to Union Hall Pier.
- 3.3 The Skipper when questioned with regard to the circumstances attending the stranding was initially at a loss to account for the change of course alleged to have occurred with the vessel making a course to leave Adam’s Island on her port side.
- 3.4 It emerged that there were two separate equipment problems that while experienced separately on previous occasions, occurred together on this occasion.

These problems were:

1. Difficulty experienced when changing over from auto to manual control on the Auto Pilot. This would appear to require a pair of solenoids to operate to disengage from the auto side to the manual side. This equipment is located forward in the machinery space beneath the wheelhouse. In the past when this occurred the Skipper would attend the equipment and manually assist the ‘sticky’ solenoids to release. When questioned as to the frequency of this occurring he stated that it had last been experienced in May 2011.
2. The second problem was also Auto Pilot related and would appear to have been a random fault with the heading sensor located on the mast. This

would manifest itself without warning and would result in the vessel altering course and making a large circle. While repairs had been undertaken on a number of occasions, the problem had never been fully resolved. The frequency of this occurring was minimised by the Skipper, but Mr Alex Konarbaseus, when questioned on this matter, stated that it occurred frequently.

- 3.5 In the context of the known circumstances of the casualty, it would appear that while the vessel was making course to clear Adam's Island and the Skipper was in the process of changing over from auto to manual on the Auto Pilot, he encountered the 'sticky' solenoid problem.
- 3.6 While his concentration was focused on resolving this problem, he did not leave the wheelhouse, he allowed the vessel to get too close to the Island and it was at this juncture that the heading sensor problem manifested itself. The vessel took a turn to port and steamed onto the rocks at 6.5/7 knots. Speed had not been reduced throughout the sequence.

4. ANALYSIS

- 4.1 The two main contributory factors to this casualty appear to be both Auto-Pilot centred but separate i.e. the 'sticky' solenoid problem encountered when changing over from auto to manual operation and the phenomenon where the vessel would suddenly and without warning alter course and describe a circle.
- 4.2 In the absence of the vessel it is impossible at this juncture to pursue these matters to a conclusion. They had manifested themselves previously albeit separately and the condition was known to the Owner/Skipper. Notwithstanding that, repairs were undertaken on various occasions to address the issues with what at the time appeared to have been favourable results, the fact that the problems remained, even randomly, was accepted and the vessel continued to operate in that condition. This condition had ramifications for seaworthiness and crew safety.
- 4.3 The vessel should have been withdrawn from service until these problems had been addressed and eliminated. If the permanent solution required existing equipment to be removed and replaced with newer equipment, then that is the course of action that should have been followed. On this occasion, the three crew were fortunate that the stranding occurred in daylight hours and that another vessel was relatively close at hand to take them off.
- 4.4 On the positive side:
- All three crew wore their PFDs as a matter of course in the course of their working day.
 - They all knew where their lifejackets were stowed.
 - They were familiar with the drill for successfully launching the 6-person Inflatable Liferaft.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- 5.1 It would appear that the Owner/Skipper had ‘lived’ with the two Auto-Pilot centred problems that manifested themselves in this incident and had become somewhat complacent in that regard. Despite various attempts to rectify these problems, they persisted in exhibiting themselves suddenly and without warning in a random fashion.
- 5.2 Putting the discrepancy between the Skipper’s and the crewman’s account in relation to frequency of occurrence to one side for the present, one could see that occurring infrequently and separately, a false sense of security developed over time and no ‘near misses’ were admitted to.
- 5.3 On this occasion the circumstances with both problems coinciding where the vessel was probably too close to the Island in any event given the state of the tide, the lack of sea room and the ‘perversity’ of the vessel making her turn to port rather than starboard, left a casualty inevitable.
- 5.4 The Skipper’s decision to attempt to get the vessel off the rocks under power appeared initially to be potentially troubling as she was fast, holed, making water and likely to sink. Had she sunk in that position, getting the liferaft clear of the vessel may have been difficult if not impossible. In the event, she did come off under power and went astern for some 3m clear of the rocks and allowed the liferaft to be boarded successfully before she sank and also allowed “*Sally Pamela*” to close up and pick up the survivors.
- 5.5 In the final analysis, while the incident resulted in the loss of the vessel, the crew survived uninjured. Their strengths were they stayed calm and organised and carried out the abandon ship drill that they had been taught. The safety equipment, lifejackets, liferaft, EPIRB and communications, all functioned as required and the incident occurred in daylight hours with the prospect of assistance close at hand.


6. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1 It is recommended that the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport issue a Marine Notice reminding skippers and owners of the need to ensure that deficiencies with their vessels are rectified without delay and that in accordance with the Code of Practice they have an obligation to maintain their vessel in a seaworthy condition.

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Appendix 7.1 Chart Extract - Chart No.2090.



APPENDIX 7.2

Appendix 7.2 Tidal Data - Castletownshend.

0744 Castletownshend
 51°32'N 9°10'W Ireland 11 December 2011 +0000
 Data Area 1-4. Europe, Northern Waters & Mediterranean Version 11
 Predictions are based on COBH

11/12/2011			12/12/2011			13/12/2011			14/12/2011		
	Time	Height		Time	Height		Time	Height		Time	Height
High	05:16	3.7 m	High	05:51	3.7 m	High	06:26	3.7 m	High	07:04	3.7 m
	17:31	3.6 m		18:04	3.6 m		18:40	3.6 m		19:18	3.6 m
Low	11:16	1.0 m	Low	11:54	1.0 m	Low	00:07	1.0 m	Low	00:50	1.0 m
	23:28	1.0 m					12:35	1.1 m		13:18	1.1 m
15/12/2011			16/12/2011			17/12/2011					
	Time	Height		Time	Height		Time	Height		Time	Height
High	07:45	3.6 m	High	08:30	3.6 m	High	09:20	3.5 m			
	20:01	3.5 m		20:48	3.5 m		21:41	3.4 m			
Low	01:35	1.1 m	Low	02:26	1.1 m	Low	03:20	1.2 m			
	14:06	1.1 m		14:57	1.2 m		15:53	1.3 m			

ML inferred
 Predicted heights are in metres above Chart Datum
 British Crown Copyright © 2010

Appendix 7.3 Extract - Irish Coastal Pilot, Glandore Harbour.

CHAPTER 3

GLANDORE BAY

General information

Chart 2092

3.325

Glandore Bay, which lies between Sheela Point (51° 32' 2N, 9° 06' 5W) and Galley Head, 5½ miles E, embraces Glandore Harbour, Rosscarbery Bay and some small inlets.

Aspect

3.326

The W half of its N shore consists of steep barren cliffs rising to considerable hills inland. The shore of Rosscarbery Bay, (the E half of Glandore Bay) consists of two sandy beaches separated midway by the rugged cliffs of Cloghna Head (51° 33' 7N, 8° 58' 7W). The Long Strand, (the SE beach) is a remarkable feature: from its S end the coast is bold and rocky for 1 mile to Galley Head.

For Galley Head, on which there is a light (3.308), see 3.305.

Rescue

3.327

Life-saving equipment is maintained on this coast at: Glandore (51° 34' N, 9° 07' W). Line-throwing apparatus.

Castle Freke (close inland of Cloghna Head). Line-throwing apparatus and cliff ladder equipment.

Tidal streams

3.328

The E-going stream runs fairly strongly S along the E shore of Rosscarbery Bay; the W-going stream is not appreciable.

Off Galley Head (51° 32' N, 8° 57' W) and Doolic Rock (5 cables SW) the streams are strong; there are probably S-going eddies on both sides of Galley Head from which the streams run nearly continuously towards Doolic Rock.

Principal mark

3.329

Major light:

Galley Head Light (51° 31' 7N, 8° 57' 1W) see 3.308.

Directions

(continued from 3.314)

Approaches

3.330

From SW or S the approaches to Glandore Bay are deep and clear, except for the 12.8 m rocky shoal (51° 29' N, 9° 06' W), and a wreck with a depth of 11.9 m over it (approximately 1 mile NNE of the shoal).

From E or SE it is advisable to keep at least 7½ cables S of Galley Head (51° 32' N, 8° 57' W) (3.305) in order to avoid Doolic Rock (5 cables SW), and Sunk Rock (1½ cables farther S).

Robber Bank (2¼ miles SW of Galley Head) also lies in the approach from SE.

Passage inside Doolic Rock

3.331

Under favourable weather conditions, small vessels can use the channel between Doolic Rock and Galley Head,

but it is inadvisable to do so with the wind against the tidal stream when there can be a heavy sea close to the head.

The recommended approach to the passage from SE passes (with positions given from Galley Head Light): SW of Clout Rock and Inner Clout Rock (within 5 cables SE), thence:

Between Galley Head and the foul ground extending 1 cable from Doolic Rock.

3.332

Clearing bearing: the line of bearing 320° of Rosscarbery Cathedral (51° 34' 6N, 9° 01' 7W) open SW of Creggane Point (1 mile SE of the cathedral) passes 1½ cables NE of Doolic Rock in a depth of 20 m.

Rosscarbery Bay

3.333

The clearing bearing (3.332) also passes 3 cables SW of Cloghna Rock (5 cables S of Cloghna Head), a pinnacle which is the outer danger within Rosscarbery Bay.

Useful marks

3.334

The ruins of Dundeady Castle (3 cables N of Galley Head Light) standing on the low isthmus connecting the head to the mainland.

Castle Freke (51° 34' 2N, 8° 58' 7W) which is a prominent roofless ruin.

Glandore Harbour

General information

3.335

Glandore Harbour, situated at the W end of Glandore Bay, is entered between Sheela Point (51° 32' 3N, 9° 06' 5W) and Goat's Head, known locally as Foilnashark, a bluff headland 79 m high, (1 mile ENE).

It is used by fishing vessels and is much frequented by small craft, being the first inlet of any consequence W of Kinsale Harbour (24 miles ENE) (3.395).

Although open to the S, it affords better shelter to small craft than Castlehaven (3½ miles SW) (3.315) as it is protected by the islets and rocks that lie in the entrance.

3.336

Glandore (51° 34' N, 9° 07' W), the village at the head of a shallow cove on the N shore, is a popular resort.

Depths. The least charted depth in the fairway of the entrance, is 18.9 m, whence the harbour gradually shoals to 5 m and less within 1¼ miles of the entrance.

Local weather. The head of the harbour, which lies between steep hills on both sides, is subject to a funnelling effect during NW winds.

Tidal streams in Glandore Harbour are very weak.

Directions

3.337

Main entrance. The main entrance to Glandore Harbour lies E of Adam Island (4 cables ENE of Sheela Point) between the island and Goat's Head (6 cables ENE of the island).

Alternative entrance. An alternative entrance, W of Adam Island, is between Sheela Point and a rock, with a depth of 3.5 m over it, which lies midway between the point and the W side of Adam Island. It is deep but very narrow and requires local knowledge.

Appendix 7.3 Extract - Irish Coastal Pilot - Glandore Harbour.

CHAPTER 3

3.338

Entering harbour. The recommended approach is with Eve Island (6½ cables N of Sheela Point) ahead, bearing 295°, passing (with positions given from Eve Island):

- 2 cables S of Goat's Head, thence;
- 2½ cables N of Adam Island, thence;
- 1½ cables S of Grohoge Point (5 cables ESE).

3.339

Route to inner harbour. Having passed close E of Eve Island, which is steep-to on its E side, the route to the inner harbour lies between Long Point (2½ cables NNW of Eve Island) on the W shore, and The Dangers. These consist of a chain of three drying rocky patches, marked by perches, which lie in mid channel between 2 and 4½ cables NNW of Eve Island.

3.340

The track leads NNW on the alignment (153°), astern, of the E side of Eve Island and the W side of Adam Island, passing:

- SW of Outer Danger (lying across the fairway) marked at its W end by Glandore SW Perch (green mast, cone topmark) and at its E end by Glandore SE Perch (red mast, can topmark), thence;
- SW of Middle Danger, marked at its N end by a perch (black with white bands), thence;
- SW of Inner Danger, marked by a perch (black and white bands; topmark 2 cones base to base), thence;
- SW of Sunk Rock (5½ cables NNW), a dangerous below-water rock marked on its N side by Danger Light-buoy (N cardinal).

3.341

Caution. If proceeding to anchorages in the W arm of the harbour, it is advisable to pass at least 1½ cables N of Coosaneigh Point (1¼ miles NNW of Sheela Point) in order to avoid a mud bank which extends 1 cable from its S shore.

Anchorages

3.342

Anchor berths recommended are (with positions given from Eve Island):

- On the alignment (153°) of the E side of Eve Island with the W side of Adam Island, and Kilfinnan Castle (7½ cables N, on the NE shore) bearing 045°, in a depth of 4 m. A vessel may lie here safely in any weather.
- Off Coosaneigh Point (6½ cables NNW), in depths of 3 m to 5 m.

Small craft

3.343

Directions. Small craft may pass E of The Dangers (2

to 4½ cables NNW of Eve Island), and when beating, can pass between them but local knowledge is necessary.

Anchorages. The following additional anchor berths can be used by small craft (positions are given from Eve Island):

- SW of the pier (below) at Glandore (1 mile NNW).
- Between Ballincolla House (8 cables NW) and the bluff on the N side of the harbour, in depths of 2 to 2.5 m.
- Close off the bluff on the N side, which gives good all round shelter but without access to the shore.

3.344

Piers. There is a landing pier at Glandore, which dries alongside. In 1980 it was reported that a light was to be established on the pierhead.

A pier at Union Hall (1¼ miles NW of Eve Island) is situated 2 cables W of Ballincolla House. There is a flagstaff close S of the root of the pier. An 150 m extension to this pier is due for completion in 1994.

Supplies. Provisions and fresh water are available at Glandore and at Union Hall.

Small craft anchorages**Inlets on the north shore of Glandore Bay**

3.345

There are three inlets on the N shore of Glandore Bay, between Goat's Head (51° 33' N, 9° 05' W) and Galley Head (5 miles ESE). They are all exposed to S winds but afford varying degrees of shelter for small craft in offshore winds; (positions are given from Goat's Head):

- Tralong Bay (1 mile ENE). Tralong Rock, on the W side of the entrance should be given a good berth. The anchorage is in a depth of 2.5 m in the middle of the inlet.
- Mill Cove (1¼ miles ENE). Very narrow. The anchorage is W of the quay. Water is available but no provisions.
- Rosscarbery (2¼ miles ENE). The inlet dries out inside Downeen Point and is mainly used by coasters which lie aground. Small craft can berth temporarily alongside a small pier on the N side of Downeen Point.

Other names

3.346

- Carrigbudhaun (51° 32' 8N, 8° 58' 1W), a shoal.
- Castle Bay (51° 33' 4N, 9° 01' 7W).
- Cormack Rock (51° 33' 9N, 9° 00' 2W).
- Iron Rock (51° 33' 7N, 9° 00' 0W).
- Siegecove Rock (51° 32' 8N, 9° 04' 3W).
- The Black Rocks (51° 33' 0N, 9° 02' 8W).

GALLEY HEAD TO OLD HEAD OF KINSALE**General information**

Charts 2081, 2092

Coastal route

3.347

For the coastal route from Galley Head (51° 32' N, 8° 57' W) to Old Head of Kinsale (17½ miles ENE) on which there are no dangers, see Directions (3.353).

For route to Clonakilty Bay, lying between Galley Head and Seven Heads (9 miles ENE), see 3.357.

For Courtmacsherry Bay, E of Seven Heads, see 3.367.

Aspect

3.348

From Toe Head the coast continues generally high and cliffy backed by moderately high hills inland.

Appendix 7.4 Illustration - Adam's Island, viewed from southern side.



Appendix 7.5 Weather and Sea Condition Report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill,
Dublin 9, Ireland.

Cnoc Ghlas Naíon
Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire.
www.met.ie

Tel: +353-1-806 4200
Fax: +353-1-806 4247
E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie

**Ms Eve Reddin
MCIB
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2**

16/12/2011

**Our Ref. WS3018/2_14396
Your Ref. MCIB/13/21**

Re: Estimate of weather conditions in the sea area of Glandore Bay, at 51° 32'N and 9° 05'W, on the 11th December 2011, between 12 and 18 hours.

Dear Ms Reddin,

Please find enclosed the above report. Note the longitude.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read 'Evelyn Murphy'.

Evelyn Murphy B.Sc. M.Sc. Meteorologist
(Research & Applications Div)
Ph 01- 8064290 Fax 01 - 8064247
Email: evelyn.murphy@met.ie



Appendix 7.6 Skipper's Short Range Certificate.

Customer Reference No. :

VSE5769

Paul Deasy.

#Name?

**Re : Short Range Certificate / Restricted Certificate of
Competency in Radio Telephony (VHF)**

Dear Paul Deasy,

With reference to the above indicated certificate exam, I am pleased to enclose the corresponding certificate.

Cert No: 4768

Please note that if you are the owner of a ship/boat, you must also obtain a Ships Radio Licence. An application form can be requested from the Maritime Radio Affairs Unit at telephone number below or radiosurveyors@transport.ie.

Yours Sincerely,

SHEIL Karen
Department of Transport
Tel : 016783403
Fax :
Email : KarenSHEIL@dtas.ie

8. CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

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Royal National Lifeboat Institution

Chairman: Admiral the Lord Boyce KC GCB OBE DL
Chief Executive: Paul Bossier

RNI (Trading Ltd 01072377, RNI (Sales) Ltd 2202240 and RNI (Enterprises) Ltd 1784500
are all companies registered at West Quay Road, Poole, Dorset, BH15 1JZ

From:

Divisional Base Ireland

Airside, Swords, Co. Dublin, Ireland

Tel (01) 8900460

Fax (01) 8900458

Mr. John G O'Donnell B.L.
Chairman
Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Leeson Lane
Dublin2

11th September 2012

Sir,

**DRAFT REPORT INTO THE SINKING OF F/V JEANETTE ROBERTA
11TH DECEMBER 2011**


Reference: Yr letter MCIB/12/209 dated 23RD August 2012

Thank you for affording the RNLI the opportunity to view the draft report into
the loss of *F/V Jeanette Roberta*.

The RNLI has no comment to make in relation to the incident.

Yours faithfully,

Martyn Smith
**RNLI Divisional Inspector of Lifeboats
Ireland**



The RNLI is the charity that saves lives at sea

Charity number CHY 2676 in the Republic of Ireland and registered in England and Wales (209603) and Scotland (SC037736)

MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.

DOWD Assumpta

From: MOORE Stephen
Sent: 18 September 2012 10:22
To: CONWAY Helen
Cc: DOWD Assumpta
Subject: Draft Report of the investigation into the sinking of the FV Jeanette Roberta off Glandore Harbour, Co. Cork on 11th December 2011

Hi Helen,
Regarding the above investigation, the Irish Coast Guard has the following comment to make on section 2.5.3 of the report:

The Irish Coast Guard has checked the records for the above incident and can confirm that the mayday call was received at 1425hrs. However, due to very poor signal strength (fading) it took 5 minutes to decipher the mayday call in full, making it 1431hrs before full distress procedures were put in place.

Kind regards,

Stephen Moore
Irish Coast Guard Administration
Department of Transport, Tourism & Sport,
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2

☎ : + 353 (0)1 678 3454
☎ : + 353 (0)1 678 3459

♻ Please consider the environment before printing this email.



MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence and have made the necessary amendments.