MCIB
Marine Casualty Investigation Board

Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.
Telephone: 01-678 3485/86.
Fax: 01-678 3493.
email: info@mcib.ie
www.mcib.ie

# REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE GROUNDING OF *MV "HUELIN DISPATCH"* ON PIERRE AU VRAIC 21st SEPTEMBER 2012



REPORT No. MCIB/226
(No.14 of 2013)

Report MCIB/226 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board.
Printed 25th November 2013.

# CONTENTS

## 1. SUMMARY

1.1 On 21st September 2012, the MV *"Huelin Dispatch"* was proceeding from St Peter Port in Guernsey towards Alderney Harbour, Island of Alderney. The vessel struck a charted rock, "Pierre au Vraic" located approximately 1.8 nautical miles southwest of Alderney, approximate position 49°41' N 002°16.9'W (see Appendix 7.1).

1.2 The crew were mustered on the bridge and assigned various tasks. Checks made showed that the vessel suffered water ingress in the bow thrust compartment. The vessel de-ballasted three ballast tanks, the no. 1 or Forepeak and the nos. 2 P & S, the foremost double bottom tanks.

1.3 The vessel was successfully refloated on the rising tide. Following further checks it was established that the Forepeak tank was also breached. The Master decided to proceed directly to Falmouth the nearest repair facility with a drydock.

1.4 The vessel arrived at Falmouth on 22nd September 2012 and entered drydock on 24th September 2012.

1.5 There were no crew injuries or reported cargo damage.

# 2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

## 2.1 Vessel Details

| | |
|---|---|
| Vessel Name: | MV *"Huelin Dispatch"* |
| Vessel Type: | General Cargo Ship (Damen Combi Coaster) |
| Flag: | Ireland |
| Port of Registry: | Dundalk |
| Construction: | Steel |
| Year Hull: | 2005, Ukraine |
| Year Commissioned: | 2012, Holland |
| I.M.O. Number: | 9518218 |
| Length Overall: | 88.900m |
| Beam: | 12.500m |
| Summer Draft: | 5.425m |
| Depth: | 7.000m |
| Summer Deadweight: | 3,748m.t. |
| Gross Tonnage: | 2,597 |
| Net Tonnage: | 1,460 |
| Service Speed: | 11 knots |
| Classification: | Lloyds Register of Shipping |
| Registered Owner: | Dundalk Shipping Co. DSC Ltd., The Moorings, Marlmount, Blackrock, Co. Louth |
| Managers: | Lee Shipping Company Ltd. |
| Safety Management: | Bureau Veritas |
| Master: | Capt. Frank Allen, Blackrock, Co. Louth |
| Safe Manning: | 8 persons as per Flag State stipulations |

2.1.1 The vessel is a coastal type general cargo ship, equipped for the carriage of containers. The vessel has a single cargo hold with accommodation and machinery spaces located abaft the hold. Weather deck protection is provided by steel pontoon type hatch covers, operated by travelling gantry crane, mounted on the hatch coamings.

2.1.2 The vessel is well equipped with a modern bridge layout. There is a centreline control console with two watch keepers chairs. Both watch keepers positions are fitted with ARPA Radar and ECDIS displays. The main engine, steering controls and VHF radios are set in an extension of the console between the chairs. The working chart table is on the extreme starboard side of the wheelhouse and the main radio station is on the port side (see Appendices 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4). All electronic navigation aids are by Furuno.

Electronic aids include items such as:

2 X ARPA Radar display units

2 X ECDIS chart plotters

Fluxgate compass – can be set to either gyro or magnetic headings

Autopilot with tiller steering

Bow thrust controls

Engine controls (bridge control) with instruments

Steering motor controls

2 X Furuno GPS 150 units, separate feed

Furuno Doppler speed log, set to read speed through the water

**2.2 Voyage Particulars**

2.2.1 The vessel had just entered service with Huelin Renouf Shipping Ltd. of Jersey. The vessel was to provide shipping services between Southampton, Jersey, Guernsey and Alderney.

2.2.2 The type of service is best described as a liner or perhaps feeder service.

2.2.3 On the date of the incident the vessel had called to St. Helier, St. Peter Port and was proceeding towards Alderney Harbour.

2.2.4 There was a crew of 8 on board.

**2.3 Type of Casualty**

2.3.1 The vessel grounded on a charted rock.

2.3.2 The incident occurred on 21st September 2012 at approx. 18:40hrs, BST.

2.3.3 The position of the incident was approx. 1.8 nautical miles south west of Alderney Island, in position 49°41’ N 002°16.9’W.

2.3.4 Weather conditions were good with daylight, good visibility and weather was not a significant factor. However, there is a very strong tidal current in the area.

2.3.5 The vessel's ECDIS system was malfunctioning and the Master was navigating using paper charts and GPS for positions.

2.3.6 The incident occurred towards the end of a long day, with the Master effectively on duty from 03:30hrs until the incident occurred. The vessel was heading for its third port of the day.

2.3.7 The Master was on watch and navigating the vessel. He was also the owner of the vessel.

2.3.8 The vessel had to be withdrawn from service pending hull repairs. A replacement vessel had to be chartered in for the duration of the repairs.

2.3.9 There were no crew injuries or reported cargo damage.

2.3.10 There were no reports of pollution.

**2.4 Emergency Response**

2.4.1 Approx. 5 minutes after the grounding the Master contacted Alderney Coastguard to notify them of the incident, by making a "PAN PAN" call on VHF channel 74.

2.4.2 23 minutes later, Alderney Coastguard tasked the Alderney Lifeboat (Royal National Lifeboat Institution).

2.4.3 The lifeboat was on scene in 9 minutes.

2.4.4 When the vessel refloated and checks made to establish the damage were completed, the lifeboat was stood down by Alderney Coastguard, approx. 54 minutes later.

2.4.5 With the decision to proceed towards Falmouth, Alderney Coastguard advised Brixham Coastguard of the situation. The vessel was instructed to make regular contact with Brixham Coastguard until it arrived safely at Falmouth (see Appendix 7.5).

## 3. NARRATIVE

**Note:**For the purposes of this report, all times are stated in British Summer Time, which is UTC/GMT + 1 hour.

3.1 The vessel was delivered to her owners in or around 14th September 2012 in Holland. The vessel proceeded to Southampton where it was due to enter service with Huelin Renouf Shipping Ltd. There were a total of 8 crew on board, as stipulated by the Flag State.

3.2 At Southampton the vessel spent some time preparing for service, including undergoing training of the crew. The vessel was inspected by the Maritime and Coastguard Agency during this time, under the auspices of the Paris Memorandum of Understanding, commonly referred to as Port State Control. Some deficiencies with respect to familiarisation were noted and rectified during this time.

3.3 The following time line was developed, taking information from the vessel's charts, Deck Log Book and a report issued by Alderney Coastguard.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| 20.09.2012 | 08:00hrs | Commence work. Spent day training new crew and loading cargo and rectifying deficiencies noted by MCA. |
| | 17:55hrs | Depart Southampton. Pilotage and watch duties. |
| | 21:00hrs | Master off watch. |
| 21.09.2012 | 03:30hrs | Master called for approach to St. Helier. |
| | 06:50hrs | Vessel berths at St. Helier. |
| | 07:18hrs | Assisting shore technician with repairs to hatch cover gantry crane. |
| | 11:18hrs | Complete crane repairs. |
| | 11:55hrs | Complete loading cargo. |
| | 12:10hrs | On bridge for departure. |
| | 14:15hrs | On bridge for arrival St. Peter Port. |
| | 16:45hrs | On bridge for departure from St. Peter Port. Remained on watch. |
| | 17:55hrs | Vessel clears the "Roustel" channel, heading north east from St. Peter Port. The course is set at 033°T, the autopilot is engaged. |
| | 18:05hrs | Position plotted on chart. |
| | 18:15hrs | Position plotted on chart. |
| | 18:22hrs | Position plotted on chart, change of chart in use. |
| | 18:30hrs | Position plotted on chart. |
| | 18:35hrs | Last position plotted on chart. |
| | 18:40hrs | Vessel strikes Pierre au Vraic and becomes fast. Crew mustered on bridge. Position 49°41' N 002°16.9'W. |
| | 18:45hrs | Alderney Coastguard notified of incident. |

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| | 18:50hrs | Alderney Coastguard placed Alderney Lifeboat on notice for immediate readiness. |
| | 19:00hrs | Vessel notifies Alderney Coastguard that no water ingress found. |
| | 19:07hrs | Lifeboat tasked to position of incident. |
| | 19:16hrs | Vessel reports bow thruster room flooded. |
| | 19:22hrs | Alderney Lifeboat alongside casualty. |
| | 19:43hrs | Vessel completes de-ballasting operation and reports no further ingress noted. |
| | 19:52hrs | Coastguard radar shows vessel movement. |
| | 19:55hrs | Vessel confirms it is safely afloat and clear with no further ingress noted. |
| | 20:05hrs | Vessel confirms bow thruster compartment flooded, area isolated and of decision to proceed to Falmouth at reduced speed. |
| | 20:10hrs | Alderney Lifeboat stood down. |
| | 20:35hrs | Vessel gives ETA for Falmouth of 06:00hrs, on 22nd September 2012. |
| | 20:40hrs | Alderney advises Brixham of situation. |
| 22.09.2012 | 07:50hrs | Vessel berths at Falmouth. |
| 24.09.2012 | | Vessel enters drydock. |

3.4 The vessel had two navigating officers, in addition to the Master. Neither of these officers were available for interview. As the Master was on watch at the time of the incident, it is considered they would have little to contribute. The Mate is described as Mate/Relief Master. He has local knowledge and Pilotage Licences for the Channel Island Ports (Alderney Harbour is vessel specific so Licence was not valid for this voyage).

3.5 The Master was interviewed on board the vessel in Falmouth on 1st October 2012. The Master held an Irish Certificate of Competency, number COCO 5687, issued by the Marine Survey Office, with a date range of 20.04.2004 to 19.04.2009. The Certificate was revalidated on 19.04.2009 and valid until 18.04.2014. The Master also held a Certificate of Competency as a GMDSS General Operator, number 724, issued by the Marine Survey Office and valid from 08.03.2004 until 07.03.2009. The Certificate was revalidated and valid until 06.03.2014.

3.6 The vessel departed St. Peter Port with a forward draft of 2.70m and an after draft of 3.7m. On clearing the "Roustel" the autopilot was engaged.

3.7 Although fitted with ECDIS, the vessel was relying on British Admiralty paper charts. The charts for the route had been transferred from another vessel in the fleet, MV *"Huelin Endeavour"*, the vessel serving the route prior to the MV

*"Huelin Dispatch"*. The paper charts in use were British Admiralty Charts nos. BA 3653 and BA 60. The charts were corrected to date. The rock was clearly marked on the chart and that it dries at 1.2 metres above chart datum. The height of the tide at the time of the incident was about 1.67m and there was less than 0.6m of water over the top of the rock. In addition, the rock was encircled in pencil on the chart and was highlighted. Courses were marked permanently on the charts (see Appendices 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8).

3.8 Tidal flows for the area are based on High Water Dover. There are very strong currents in the area, generally running NE or SW with a maximum rate of approx. 6.8 knots. The predicted tides for the period show that they were close to spring tides:

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| HW | 15:15hrs | 6.7 metres |
| LW | 22:40hrs | 1.0 metres |

3.9 The course laid out was 033°T with the vessel passing approx. 3 cables to eastward of the rock. The intention was to approach Alderney Harbour from the west passing through a strait called the Swinge.

3.10 The current edition of the Admiralty Sailing Directions, NP 27, was on board and examined. In Chapter 11, the approaches to Alderney from south-south-west are covered in section 11.157. The recommended course to clear Pierre au Vraic to eastward is wait until a line of bearing of 057°T is established between the SE side of Fort Clonque and the Tourgis beacon (see Appendix 7.9).

3.11 The vessel's ECDIS was not performing correctly and the Mate/Relief Master was attempting to rectify the problem. Positions were plotted by transposing data from the GPS display to the chart. No secondary checks such as radar observations, or visual bearings were used.

3.12 The vessel was being conned from the starboard side of the bridge, using the starboard radar unit and a chart set out beside him on a chart table set against the fore part of the wheelhouse (see Appendix 7.10).

3.13 The vessel suffered structural damage in way of the no. 1 ballast tank (Forepeak) and the bow thruster compartment. It is understood that approximately 10 tonnes of steel had to be replaced.

## 4. ANALYSIS

4.1 The Mate/Relief Master was employed because he held Pilots Licences for all three Channel Island Ports.

4.2 Alderney Harbour issues two types of Pilots Licence, one is called a General Pilots Licence and the other is called a Special Pilots Licence. The Harbour Master has confirmed that the Mate/Relief Master held a Special Pilots Licence, but that it was vessel specific. He had not been issued with a Licence for the MV *"Huelin Dispatch"*. It was further confirmed that the incident occurred outside the "Compulsory Pilotage Zone" (see Appendix 7.11).

4.3 The procedures followed after the incident were taken directly from the vessel's ISM manual. The training worked and there were no personal injuries incurred. The Mate was tasked to sound all compartments on the vessel, including the cargo hold. The Engineer was tasked to check the Engine Room for signs of water ingress. It was established the Bow Thrust Room was flooded and it was sealed off. The ISM manual refers to using VHF channel 16, the distress channel or channel 74 under the DSC system (see Appendix 7.12 and 7.13).

4.4 Once the situation was properly assessed, the vessel issued a "PAN PAN" message on VHF channel 74. Alderney Coastguard was alerted. It was considered that, with a rising tide, the vessel could float off. The Master de-ballasted the nos. 1 (Forepeak) and 2 port & starboard double bottom tanks to lighten the vessel at the bow. At this stage it was found that the no. 1 or Forepeak tank was also breached.

4.5 In accordance with the ISM procedures, the Master was the Designated Person Ashore. However, as he was actually in command of the vessel, the Deputy Designated Person Ashore was notified of the incident.

4.6 The failure of the ECDIS system meant that the data was not recorded and available to the investigator.

4.7 The Master's period of rest was interrupted at St. Helier, when he worked with a shore technician solving a problem with the ship's travelling gantry crane. He was on duty from 03:30hrs until the time of the incident, some 13 hours later.

4.8 The passage through the "Swinge" (the western side of Alderney) is subject to a strong tidal flow. There are very few navigation aids, such as buoys or lighthouses. The vessel has a service speed of 11 knots. The current, at 6.8 knots, would have considerable effect on set and drift experienced. There was insufficient attention paid to this fact. There are no lighted marks or other aids to assist a Master in determining a vessel's position.

4.9 The person with the best knowledge of the area through which the vessel was travelling was engaged in non-navigational duties.

4.10 Taking the eastern route would have added approx. 7 miles to the voyage between St. Peter Port and Alderney Harbour. However, there is more sea room and the tidal currents are not as strong. Both the owner and charterer will have to consider if the time saving benefits are worth the risk to the vessel and crew.

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

5.1 The incident occurred due to an error in navigating the vessel. In considering the causes the investigator has noted:

5.1.1 Operational pressures on the Master, the owner of a new vessel, a new crew and planning a first voyage.

5.1.2 There was an electrical failure that used part of the Master's rest period in St. Helier.

5.1.3 There was an electronic failure of the vessel's ECDIS system.

5.2 For a vessel that is not familiar with the waters it would be better to approach the Island from the eastern side, as there is more open water.

5.3 Insufficient consideration was given to the effect of set and drift in an area where it is known that there are strong tidal currents.

5.4 The change from one chart to another prevented a long term assessment of the course made good. The last three positions plotted were to the west of the course line.

## 6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1 The bridge team for the MV *"Huelin Dispatch"* should receive bridge resource management training and training in the use of ECDIS.

## 7. LIST OF APPENDICES

**Appendix 7.1** Large scale print from electronic chart showing “Pierre au Vraic”.







**Appendix 7.2** Photograph of chart table on bridge, faces forward.

**Appendix 7.3** Photograph of control console section being used by Master.



**Appendix 7.4** Photograph of control console in centre of wheelhouse

**Appendix 7.5** Photograph of vessel in drydock, Flamouth.

**Appendix 7.6** Photograph of chart BA 60, showing course line and last two positions of vessel before incident.

**Appendix 7.7** Tidal stream diagram on chart BA 60 for 2 hours after HW Dover.



**Appendix 7.8** Tidal stream diagram on chart BA 60 for 3 hours after HW Dover.



**Appendix 7.9** Photocopy of NP 27, The Admiralty Sailing Directions, page 364, section 11.157.



SSE of Ortac (49°43′·40N 2°17′·44W) (11.148), thence:

2 SSE of Boues des Kaines (49°43′·27N 2°16′·33W) lying 2¾ cables S of the SW extremity of Burhou Reef (11.152), thence:

NNW of South Rock (49°43′·02N 2°14′·88W), thence:

SSE of North Rock (49°43′·57N 2°14′·92W) passing clear of a 9·4 m rocky patch (49°43′·28N 2°14′·71W), thence:

3 NNW of Corbet Rock (49°43′·30N 2°14′·05W), the NW-most danger off the NW coast of Alderney, thence:

SSE of Nannels (49°44′·32N 2°15′·00W) (11.157), thence:

NNW of Alderney Harbour breakwater (49°43′·82N 2°11′·67W).

4 If making for Alderney Harbour bear in mind that the outer part of the breakwater has been destroyed and the remains extend 3 cables farther NE, for details see 11.164.

**Clearing bearings:**

The alignment (063°) of the NW side of Fort Clonque with Tourgis Beacon (white cone) (49°43′·10N 2°13′·18W) clears NNW of Pierre au Vraic.

5 The alignment (080°) of the N end of Alderney Harbour breakwater (49°43′·82N 2°11′·67W) with the N side of Château à L'Étoc (49°43′·91N 2°10′·65W) clears N of all dangers between Corbet Rock and the breakwater.

The line of bearing 259° of Ortac (49°43′·40N 2°17′·44W) seen between Burhou and Noir Houmet (49°43′·65N 2°15′·21W) clears N of the submerged end of Alderney Harbour breakwater.

11.157

**From south-south-west passing south-east of Pierre au Vraic — leading marks:**

Front mark. W extremity of the largest of Les Étacs (49°42′·28N 2°14′·40W) (11.152).

Rear mark. Fort Clonque (49°42′·82N 2°13′·95W).

From a position SSW of The Swinge the alignment (032°) of these marks leads in the approach, passing:

ESE of Richards Rock (49°41′·30N 2°15′·89W) to a position on the line of bearing 074° of S Coque Lihou (49°41′·75N 2°12′·62W) (11.300) open a little N of the highest of the Noires Putes (49°41′·55N 2°13′·60W) (11.300).

**Leading marks:**

Front mark. E side of Burhou (49°43′·84N 2°15′·08W).

Rear mark. Great Nannel (49°44′·26N 2°14′·77W), a steep-sided rock the largest of several above-water rocks standing on Nannels Reef.

The alignment (009°) of these marks then leads in the channel, passing:

4 W of Les Étacs Bank (49°42′·30N 2°15′·15W), thence:

Between Hope Rock (49°42′·84N 2°14′·87W) and a 9·7 m rocky patch (49°42′·87N 2°15′·22W), thence:

W of South Rock (49°43′·03N 2°14′·88W) to a position NNW of the same rock when the track then leads generally ENE joining the route (11.156) which passed NNW of Pierre au Vraic.

5 **Clearing bearings.** The alignment (057°) of the SE side of Fort Clonque with Tourgis Beacon (49°43′·10N 2°13′·18W) (11.156) clears SE of Pierre au Vraic.

## Anchorages

### The Swinge north side

**11.158**

1 Anchorage during the SW-going stream. Shelter from winds between NNW and NE, can be obtained from 1 to 2½ cables S of Little Burhou (49°43′·4N 2°15′·58W) (11.152), as shown on the chart. Depths of 9 to 15 m.

### Casquet SSE Bank

**11.159**

**General information.** Casquet SSE (49°40′·89N 2°19′·31W), with Casquet SSW about 2 miles W, are two steep sided banks of which lie in the SW approach to Ortac Ch (11.147); there are strong overfalls over the and the latter bank.

**Good anchorage,** in moderate weather can be obtained on Casquet SSE bank.

**Clearing bearings,** see 11.150.

## Alderney Harbour

*Charts 2845, 60*

### General information

**11.160**

**Position and function.** Alderney (49°43′·74N 2°11′·56W) is situated about along the N coast of the island.

**Topography.** The coast between Bibette Head E entrance point of the harbour, and Roselle 2 cables SW is rocky. Fort Albert, which stands on the crest of a hill behind Roselle Braye Bay, sandy with rocky ledges, lies at the of Alderney Harbour between Roselle Point and Jetty, 5 cables WSW. The town of Saint Anne situated at the top of a steep hill, about 5 cables Braye Jetty.

2 **Harbour Authority.** Alderney Harbour Authority Harbour Office, Alderney, Channel Islands

### Limiting conditions

**11.161**

**Controlling depth.** The controlling depth Alderney Harbour is 4·3 m, the least depth in fairway.

**Tidal levels.** Mean spring range about 5·3 m, neap range about 2·2 m. For further information *Admiralty Tide Tables*.

2 **Local weather.** The value of Alderney Harbour an anchorage is impaired by the partial destruction the breakwater but it is sheltered from all but NE winds. There is often an uncomfortable sea the harbour especially during W gales.

### Arrival information

**11.162**

**Pilotage.** Pilotage is compulsory for commercial vessels over 60 gt. Send ETA not less than 24 hours in advance, for details see *Admiralty List of Radio Signals Volume 6(1)*.

Pilot boards about 3 miles NE of the breakwater head as shown on the chart, or for small vessels about 1 mile NE of the breakwater head.

2 **Local knowledge** is recommended for entering on account of the rates of the tidal streams across entrance.

### Harbour

**11.163**

**General layout.** Alderney Harbour (49°43′ 2°11′·56W) is formed by Admiralty Breakwater which extends 5 cables NE from Grosnez Point

**Appendix 7.10** Photocopy of chart in use, taken on board vessel.



## Appendix 7.11 E-mail message from the Harbour Master Alderney Harbour Authority.

&w&bPage

**Info - Curry Marine**

**From:** Gaudion, Mark
**Sent:** 15 October 2012 10:47
**To:**
**Subject:** RE: Marine Casualty Investigation 12/226
**Attachments:** ACG Huelin Dispatch.docx; AL 2312.docx

Good Morning Eugene,

Thank you for your email, please see attached sitrep's.

To appraise you of the situation regarding the Channel Islands Coast Guard Service. The Channel Islands are divided into two Bailiwicks with Jersey Coastguard covering the south of the area and Guernsey covering the north of the area. Alderney Coastguard covers the northern section of the Guernsey area. The whole is styled as Channel Island Coastguard.

The States of Alderney issue General Pilots Licenses and Special Pilots Licenses. The General licence permits a resident Pilot to provide his service to any vessel requiring Pilotage, the Special Pilots Licence permits the Master or Mate, once qualified to conduct Pilotage of a named vessel.

The Pilotage area comprises of Compulsory and Non-Compulsory zones. At the time of the incident with the Huelin Dispatch the vessel was within the Non-Compolsory zone.

I can confirm that Captain William Woodard of Huelin Renouf Shipping Ltd holds valid licenses to practice as a Special Pilot in the compulsory Pilotage Zone of Alderney's territorial waters for the following vessels:

MV Huelin Dispatch. (Previously owned vessel of the same name, not the vessel currently under investigation)
MV Huelin Endeavour
MV Jan V
MV Verity

However at the time of the incident he had not been issued a Special Pilots Licence for the new Huelin Dispatch. At the time of the incident the Alderney General Pilot was due to board the vessel on arrival at the pilot boarding station in the compulsory pilotage zone.

I am unaware of the position held by Captain Woodard onboard the Huelin Dispatch at the time of the incident.

Kind Regards,

***Mark Gaudion***
Harbour Master, PFSO
Alderney Harbour Authority

**Appendix 7.12** ISM Incident Report Form.

**Lee Shipping Company Ltd.**

# INCIDENT REPORT FORM

**If an incident occurs on board the ship which the Master considers of importance to the Company, this form must be completed and returned to the office as soon as practical.**

Please TICK 1 (one) Box ☐ Non-Conformance ☒ Accident ☐ Hazardous Occurrence

| | |
|---|---|
| SHIP<br>HUELIN DISPATCH | DATE<br>21/09/2012 |
| LOCATION<br>OFF ALDERNEY | DATE/TIME OF INCIDENT<br>21/09/2012 18-50 |
| PERSONS/VESSELS INVOLVED<br>HEULIN DISPATCH | |
| WEATHER / SEA STATE<br>GOOD CALM SEA | VISIBILITY<br>GOOD |

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENTON

Prior to the grounding, the Chief Officer was working on the Port Chart Plotter trying to rectify a fault. Vessel was navigating using standard paper charts. Master was navigating using GPS , constantly checking ship's position. In position 49-41N 2-16.9W, (checked immediately after incident) vessel stuck submerged rock. Engine controls immediately set to neutral and alarms raised. Crew mustered , and sent forward to sound all compartments. Water found entering Bow Thrust Compartment via lifted deck in way of Fire POump Suction pipe. Rock identified as Pierre de Vroc.

K[illegible] C — 2nd officer.

CAUSE OF INCIDENT (IF KNOWN)

Navigation error – compounded by change in tidal conditions resulting in cross current.

CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN

Tank s Nos 1 & 2Wings were pumped out to raise the bow, and vessel floated off with rising tide approximately one hour later.
General check of forward area carried out – water ingress apparently stopped.
Decision Taken by Master to proceed to Falmouth (nearest dock port) for repairs. During voyage, hourly tank monitoring showed that water Level in B/Thrust Compartment remained at a constant level.
Deputy DPA informed and necessary arrangements made for arrival , berthing etc.

Action By :- K[illegible] C — 2nd officer. Date : 23/9/12.

FURTHER ACTION INTENDED

Vessel to be dry-docked for repairs.

Action By :- [signature] Date 24/9/2012

FOR OFFICE USE

PREVENTATIVE ACTION :

On board management meeting to be held – to re-align courses followed in this restricted area.

CONFIRMATION
THE PREVENTATIVE ACTION DETAILED ABOVE HAS BEEN IMPLEMENTED.

CONFIRMED BY :- DATE :

LSC/S-5 Rev 0

**Appendix 7.13** ISM procedure check list for "flooding".

# FLOODING

**Extract from Procedures P5.6 Flooding**

| No. | Action to be taken | By |
|---|---|---|
| | Raise Alarm (Internal and External) | Bridge O.O.W. |
| 2 | Call Master | Bridge O.O.W |
| 3 | VHF to Ch 16 -- PAN-PAN | Bridge O.O.W |
| 4 | Close all Superstructure and deck openings | As per C/O's instructions |
| 5 | Close all W.T. Doors and Damage Control Valves | As per C/O's instructions |
| | Call Flood Response Team | (as per Muster List) |
| 7 | Assess effect of damage and/or weight distribution on vessel's stability and stresses | C/O |
| 8 | Fix Position of vessel | Bridge O.O.W. |
| 9 | Fill partially filled tanks, to avoid free surface | C/O |
| 10 | Weather and Sea Conditions | Master |
| 11 | Evaluation of ship's stability | Engineer |
| 12 | Reduce Speed | Master |
| 13 | Turn vessel head-on the waves to reduce rolling | Master |
| 14 | Discharge cargo or liquids to reduce list - Report possible pollution | Master |
| 15 | Request head office top calculate damage stability of ship's officers can not | Master |
| 16 | Forward initial report to all concerned parties as per SOPEP provisions | Master |
| 17 | Call for assistance in case situation worsens | Master |
| 18 | Record all events in Log Book | Bridge O.O.W. |

The following details must be included in the initial report :-

A. Ship's particulars (Name, Signal Letters, Flag, Port of Registry etc)
B Date and exact time of incident (Local or GMT)
C Exact position of vessel
D Weather Conditions and Sea State
E Course and Speed of Ship
F. Weight distribution on board (distribution of cargo, liquids in tanks etc) and drafts.
G Brief, but as precise as possible, description of the damage and ship's general condition.
H Corrective measures taken or programmed to reduce ship's list
I Environmental pollution
J Calculation of ballast and vessel's stability.
K Required assistance
L Authorities or persons informed
M Number of victims, if any, description of condition of injured persons
N Further communication arrangements (with the Company and others)

## 8. CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED



**Note**: The address and contact details of the individual respondents have been obscured for privacy reasons.

**Correspondence 8.1** Captain Frank Allen and MCIB Response.

Marine Casualty Investigation Board
28 MAR 2013
Bord Imscrúdú Tasimi Muiri

25/03/2013

MCIB

LEESON LANE,

DUBLIN 2

DEAR ASSUMPTA,

I HAVE READ THE REPORT ON THE GROUNDING OF THE M.V.HUELIN DISPATCH AND FOUND IT TO BE FAIR AND REASONABLE.

SECTION 4.10 LOOK AT THE IDEA OF USING THE EASTERN ROUTE THROUGH THE ALDERNEY RACE AND APPROACHING BRAYE HARBOUR FROM THE NORTH.WE ARE USING THIS ROUTE SINCE THE INCIDENT AND THE CHARTERS HAVE BEEN ADVISED ACCORDINGLY.BOTH MASTERS ARE FAR HAPPIER KEEPING WELL, SOUTH OF THE ISLAND, CLEARING THE ALDERNEY RACE AND COMING IN ON THE LEADING LIGHTS ON A COURSE OF 215 .I ENCLOSED A COPY OF THE ISLANDS GUIDE TO THE HARBOUR FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

ALL CREW MEMBERS WORKED AS A TEAM AFTER THE ACCIDENT CARRY OUT VARIOUS CHECKS AND SOUNDINGS. WE DID CARRY OUT 3 DRILLS BEFORE THE VESSEL ENTERED SERVICE.THE ISM SYSTEM HAS A CHECK LIST FOR DIFFERENT INCIDENCES AND THE FLOODING CHECK LIST WAS USED ON THE DAY.

YOURS FAITHFULLY,

CAPTAIN FRANK ALLEN

**MCIB RESPONSE:**
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.

**Correspondence 8.1** Captain Frank Allen and MCIB Response.

**Correspondence 8.1** Captain Frank Allen and MCIB Response.

## ANCHORAGES

There are a number of other anchorages around Alderney, in addition to Braye. None provide any facilities, and all are only safe in calm weather and/or offshore winds. Clockwise from Braye these are: Saye – sandy bottom; Longis Bay – sandy bottom, dries a long way out, a good place to wait for fair tide in the Race; Telegraph Bay – on SW point of island, small sandy bay that dries from half-tide down, holding patchy in sand and heads of rock; Hannaine Bay – S. of Fort Clonque, a good place to wait for fair tide through the Swinge; Burhou – the Lug, SW end of Burhou, below half-tide on the SW stream.

## HARBOUR MASTER AND COASTGUARD

Harbour Master and Coastguard are located at the Harbour Master's Office, at the SW end of the harbour. Weather forecasts and reports at the Harbour Master's Office or on VHF from Alderney Radio, which can also supply a Radar VTS and RDF service. The Harbour Master's office provides the Coastguard Service.

## VHF RADIO

Call 'Alderney Radio', VHF 16, 74. The Harbour launch also listens on Ch.74, call 'Harbour Launch'. If not obtainable, call St. Peter Port Radio, Guernsey (Ch.16,20 ) or CROSSMA (French Coastguard, CH 16, 13, 80, etc ).

## FACILITIES – IN THE HARBOUR

There are 70 yellow visitors' mooring buoys, and it is possible to raft up on these in good weather. All other mooring buoys are private and should not be used without permission. The anchorage in the middle of the bay has good holding ground in sand, but there are areas of rock and weed. Towards the entrance of the harbour, the bottom is generally more rocky. Because of the tidal range at Springs (up to 6.9m), a good scope of anchor line should be used, especially if anchoring in shoal areas. It is not permitted to anchor in the Fairway or close to Braye Jetty, or to tie up to Braye Jetty without permission.

## FACILITIES – AROUND THE HARBOUR

- The Harbour Master's Office is at the SW end of the harbour, near the entrance to Little Crabby Harbour. The dinghy pontoon, dinghy slipway, showers, toilets, launderette, telephones, chandlers and a skip for rubbish are all nearby. The launderette is in the same building as the showers, and uses £1 coins – both are open 24 hours a day in the summer, but the showers are closed in the winter.
- A water taxi service is in operation. Call Mainbrayce Taxi VHF Ch.37.
- The nearest post box is at the Railway Station by the crossroads at the end of Braye Street, about 11/2 cables S of the harbour; only Alderney and Guernsey stamps may be used.
- Fresh water is available from alongside Mainbrayce Chandlers, and also from a tap at the top of the dinghy slipway and at Braye Jetty by arrangement with the Harbour Office.
- Mainbrayce Chandlers in Little Crabby Harbour is accessible to yachts approximately +/-2 hrs HW. A tide gauge at the entrance indicates depth of water alongside. Mainbrayce is open 0830–1800 seven days a week in the summer and provides fresh water, diesel, bottled gas, spares and mechanical assistance.
- Cranes with a maximum lift of approximately 25 tonnes are available from the Harbour Office.
- Duty-free diesel is available from Mainbrayce Limited (01481 822772) and by arrangement through the Harbour Master's office bulk quantities can be supplied by road tanker from Alderney Electricity Limited (01481 822715).
- Bottled gas is supplied by Mainbrayce Limited (01481 822772), Alderney Fuel Services (01481 823352) and Blanchard Buildings Supplies (01481 822722)

## THE ALDERNEY SAILING CLUB

Adjacent to the Harbour Office. The clubhouse is open from 1800–2000 every day during the summer and Thursday to Sunday during the winter and welcomes visiting yachtsmen.

## REGULATIONS

There is a speed limit of 4 knots in the harbour, and also in Saye, Corblets and Longis bays. It is not permitted to tie up to the Commercial Quay or the Breakwater, nor beach on Braye or Saye bays. For Customs clearance, Braye is the only port of entry, and all vessels entering from outside the Bailiwick of Guernsey must complete a customs form which will be supplied by the Harbour Launch or obtained from the Harbour Master's Office – UK forms are not valid. Customs must be notified of any animals aboard – UK rules apply.

## IMPORTANT TELEPHONE NUMBERS

*STD 01481 – from all other countries: +44 1481*

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Harbour Master, Coastguard | 822620 | Fax: 823699 |
| Emergency | 112 or 999 | |
| Customs | 823573 | |
| Mainbrayce Chandlers | 822772 | Fax 823683 |
| Police Station | 822731 | |
| Island Medical Centre | 822077 | |
| Eagle Medical Practice | 822494 | |
| Mignot Memorial Hospital | 822822 | |
| Dental Practice | 823131 | |
| Veterinary Clinic | 822260 | |
| Animal Welfare | 822610 | |
| Tourist Information Centre | 823737 (day) | 822333 (eve) |
| Tourist Board | 822811 | |

### Taxis

| | |
|---|---|
| ABC Taxis | 823760 |
| Island Taxis | 823823 |
| JS Taxis | 07781 100830 |
| A1 Taxis | 07781 440121 |

### Banks and Foreign Exchange

*In Town:* HSBC (*) (**), Lloyds TSB(*) (**), NatWest (**)
*At the Harbour:* Channel Jumper (**)

(*) = ATM Cash Dispensers (**) = Foreign Exchange

### Internet Access

| | |
|---|---|
| Channel Jumpers (at the Harbour) | 822202 |
| The Tourism Information Centre (in town) | 823737 |
| The Gift Box (in town) | 823532 |
| Alderney Computing Flexi Centre (in town) | 824898 |

www.visitalderney.com

**Correspondence 8.2** Huelin Renouf Shipping and MCIB Response.

**BATES Anthony**

**From:** Nick Gibson
**Sent:** 07 March 2013 16:46
**To:** Marine Casualty Investigation Board
**Cc:** Richard Evans
**Subject:** FAO Cliona Cassidy - your reference MCIB/12/226

Good afternoon

In reference to **DRAFT Report of the investigation into the grounding of "Huelin Dispatch" on Pierre Au Vraic on 21st September 2012.**

in reply to your letter of the 19th February 2013 I can confirm that Huelin Renouf Shipping do not have any observations to add in respect of the draft report.

Best regards,
Nick Gibson
UK Director
Huelin Renouf Shipping Limited
45 Berth Central Road, Eastern Docks, Gate 4, Southampton, SO14 3AH

---

SAVE PAPER - THINK BEFORE YOU PRINT!

This email is confidential.

It may also be legally privileged. If you are not the addressee you may not copy, forward, disclose or use any part of it. If you have received this message in error, please delete it and all copies from your system and notify the sender immediately by return email.

Internet communications cannot be guaranteed to be timely secure, error or virus-free. The sender does not accept liability for any errors or omissions.

1

**MCIB RESPONSE:** The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.

**Correspondence 8.3** States of Alderney, Harbour Authority and MCIB Response.

**HARBOUR AUTHORITY**

Harbour Office,
Braye Harbour,
Alderney,
Channel Islands
GY9 3XX
Tel: 01481 822620
Fax: 01481 823699
E-Mail: harbour@alderney.gov.gg

Marine Casualty Investigation Board
02 APR 2013
Bord Imscrúdú Tasimí Muirí

**STATES OF ALDERNEY**

**MCIB Report of the Investigation into the grounding of the "Huelin Dispatch" on Pierre Au Vraic on the 21st September 2012**

Thank you for the sight of the draft report into the grounding of the Huelin Dispatch on the 21st September 2012. This report has been reviewed by:

M Gaudion - The States of Alderney Harbour Master & Senior Coastguard Officer.

S Shaw – Alderney General Pilot and Chairman of the Alderney Pilotage Examination Committee.

The above persons concur with the observations made by P Gill the Guernsey Harbour Master but in addition make the observations listed below:

1/ We confirm that this was the first visit to Alderney made by the Master of the Huelin Dispatch. As such we consider that it would have been prudent for the Master to have called the Mate to the bridge well prior to seeking the approach to the confined waters of the Swinge, even with the use of the full navigational systems. The Mate is the holder of an Alderney Special Pilots Licence, although not for this vessel, and has undertaken many entries to Alderney Harbour, including navigating the Swinge. That the ECDIS chart plotters were not performing correctly exacerbated the situation. The Report notes in Section 4.1 that the Mate was employed because he held Pilot Licenses for all three Channel Island Ports.

2/ We confirm that an Alderney Special Pilots Licence is the equivalent to a Pilotage Exemption Certificate (PEC).

3/ We consider that it would have been helpful to show the tidal information at the time of the vessels approach to the Swinge relating to tidal information as shown on Chart No 60 and the Admiralty Tidal Stream Atlas relating to Alderney based on the tidal information for St Helier.

**MCIB RESPONSE:** The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.

**MCIB RESPONSE:** The MCIB refers to Appendices 7.7 and 7.8.

**Correspondence 8.3** States of Alderney, Harbour Authority and MCIB Response.

4/ The report refers to the Admiralty Sailing Directors and the Report states that 'The recommended course to clear Pierre au Vraic to eastward is wait until a line of bearing of 057 degrees T is established between the SE side of Fort Clonque and the Tourgis Beacon. This is in fact the eastern strike line for Pierre au Vraic and 3 cables to the West of the course marked on the vessels charts. The Sailing Directions 11.157 state: **From south-south-west passing south east of Pierre au Vraic – leading marks:**
Front mark. W extremity of the largest of Les Etacs.
Rear mark: Fort Clonque.
From a position SSW of the Swinge the alignment (032T) of these marks leads in the approach passing ESE of Richards Rock etc.

The course marked permanently on the charts onboard the vessel was some 6 cables west of this recommended safe approach line.

5/ The automatic tide gauge at the Alderney Harbour Office showed that at the time of the grounding there was 0.52 mt of water covering Pierre au Vraic. Given the strong tidal stream very considerable turbulence would have clearly marked the rock. An effective lookout should have observed this. This raises the question as to whether an effective lookout being kept?

6/ Pierre au Vraic is not within the Compulsory Pilotage area or included within the Pilotage syllabus, this is a matter that has been discussed within the Pilotage Examination Committee and will be progressed to the Pilotage Board.

The observations made above are provided in order to assist in understanding the incident and for clarity within the Report.

Signed:

M Gaudion
Harbour Master

S Shaw MBE
General Pilot

**MCIB RESPONSE:** The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.

**MCIB RESPONSE:** The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.

**MCIB RESPONSE:** The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.