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**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION
INTO "DUGGIE'S PRIDE" OFF
GREENORE POINT,
ROSSLARE, CO. WEXFORD
ON
15th MAY 2010**

The Marine Casualty Investigation Board was established on the 25th March, 2003 under the Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act, 2000.

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**REPORT No. MCIB/184
(No. 2 of 2011)**



Report MCIB/184 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board

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1. SYNOPSIS

- 1.1 On 15th May 2010 the Irish Coast Guard was alerted to an incident, which had occurred off Greenore Point, Co. Wexford. The report indicated that a small vessel had foundered and that a crew member was missing at sea. The casualty was subsequently recovered.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Description of the vessel

The vessel "Duggie's Pride" was an open boat constructed of Fibre Reinforced Plastic materials (commonly referred to as either FRP or GRP). The style of build is referred to as simulated clinker. It was of double skin, that is, an inner and outer moulding with the void spaces reportedly foam filled. There was a single seat forward which was of GRP. Two half seats slightly aft of this, just forward of amidships and there was a seat with a storage locker aft where the skipper would control the vessel which was powered by a Honda four stroke petrol fuelled outboard motor, rated at 10 HP.

2.2 Principal Particulars:

Vessel Name:	"DUGGIE'S PRIDE"
Vessel Type:	Open boat
Length:	4.65m (measured)
Beam:	1.70m (measured)
Draft:	0. 17m (approx.)
Depth from Gunwhale to Keel:	0.57m
Construction:	GRP
Registration Number:	None
Fishing Licence Number:	None
Code of Practice DOC:	None
Activity:	Spider Crab Fishing
Engine:	Honda 10 HP four stroke, petrol
Builder:	Not established
Owner:	Mr. Derek Sinnott (Deceased)
Crew:	Mr. Thomas Sinnott and Mr. Alan Walsh

EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

3. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

- 3.1 The vessel was maintained afloat in an artificial harbour beside Rosslare Europort, referred to locally as "the lagoon".
- 3.2 It is reported that on the night of 13th & 14th May 2010 Mr. Derek Sinnott took "Duggies Pride" out to lay the spider crab nets just off shore and to the south of Greenore Point, St. Helen's Bay.
- 3.3 Mr. Sinnott then spent the rest of 14th May working on board the M.F.V. "Hannah's Hope" a vessel he co-owned with his father. This vessel was late returning to the shore.
- 3.4 On 14th May 2010, at approx. 23.00 hrs. "Duggies Pride" departed from the lagoon with three persons on board:
Mr. Derek Sinnott as skipper
Mr. Thomas Sinnott as crew
Mr. Alan Walsh as crew
- 3.5 None of the crew were wearing lifejackets. There were no Life Saving Appliances on board the vessel. There was no VHF transceiver on board.
- 3.6 Weather conditions were good with light north-westerly winds and no significant wave height.
- 3.7 They arrived on site at approx. 23.30 hrs. on 14th May 2010. They found another net was laid over their nets and set about clearing it.
- 3.8 By 01.30 hrs. on 15th May 2010 they were able to access their own nets, noting they had a large catch.

4. THE INCIDENT

- 4.1 Between 01.30 and 03.10 hrs. on 15th May 2010 the crew were engaged in recovering their catch from the nets. At approx. 03.15 hrs. it was decided to return to the lagoon as the vessel had been filled. They used the inner channel (referred to as the Sound and marked by a perch) to head towards Rosslare Europort. As the vessel rounded Greenore Point it started taking on water.
- 4.2 A decision was made to approach the beach and land Mr. Walsh ashore in an effort to lighten the vessel's load. Following the drop off of Mr. Walsh, the vessel put about and headed for the lagoon.
- 4.3 The vessel was approx. 300 metres offshore when it started taking on water again. The remaining crew jumped overboard and started swimming towards the shore. Mr. Derek Sinnott got into difficulties and Mr. Thomas Sinnott went back to assist him, removing his outer clothing, including oilskins and boots.
- 4.4 They continued towards the shore but Mr. Derek Sinnott again fell behind and was in difficulty. Mr. Thomas Sinnott continued to the shore and headed to the nearest house to raise the alarm.

5. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT

- 5.1 The first alarm was recorded at 04.25 hrs. when MRCC Dublin was advised by Rosslare RNLI Lifeboat Station that a man was missing in the sea.
 - 5.1.1 Rosslare RNLI Lifeboat Station was launched at 04.28 hrs. and was on scene for 04.43 hrs.
 - 5.1.2 The local Coast Guard unit was also placed on alert and arrived on scene for 05.05 hrs.
 - 5.1.3 The Waterford Coast Guard SAR helicopter was tasked at 04.29 hrs.
 - 5.1.4 The Irish Naval Service Vessel L.E. "Ciara" was tasked at 05.08 hrs.
- 5.2 The first "Mayday" alert was issued at 04.17 hrs. on 15th May 2010 by the Irish Coast Guard. The location was given as 52° 14.85'N 006° 19.28'W (see Appendix 8.2).
 - 5.2.1 The first unit on the scene was the Rosslare Harbour RNLI All Weather Lifeboat (ALB) from Rosslare RNLI station.
 - 5.2.2 Subsequently Rosslare all weather Lifeboat launched its daughter craft.
 - 5.2.3 The L.E. "Ciara" launched a rescue boat at approx. 05.16 hrs. before slipping her moorings at Rosslare Europort.
 - 5.2.4 The Kilmore Quay RNLI Lifeboat was launched and arrived on scene at approx. 07.02 hrs.
 - 5.2.5 The Coast Guard Search and rescue helicopter (Rescue 117) from Waterford was launched and overflew the scene.
 - 5.2.6 A number of fishing boats from both Rosslare and Carne joined in the search.
 - 5.2.7 A number of persons were on the shore as part of the search.
- 5.3 The capsized vessel and a number of nets were recovered and brought to the shore.
- 5.4 Mr. Derek Sinnott was located in the water at some time between 10.48 and 10.52 hrs. He was recovered from the water by the M.F.V "Four Winds" and transferred to the care of the RNLI.

6. CONCLUSIONS

- 6.1 The vessel was viewed at the head of the area referred to as the lagoon. It was on shore and in an area cordoned off by railings and rope. There was evidence of minor repairs to the hull, particularly towards the port side of the fore foot (see appendix 8.1(a). This had no bearing on the casualty. The only significant openings were the transom well drain holes at 0.57 m above the base of the keel, and a slight reduction of transom height at the engine mounting point (see appendix 8.1(b). This was considered important when later it was advised that the vessel was floating at two strokes above the water, which allowed water to enter through the hull. The transom well drain holes were at the same level.
- 6.2 The incident and events were discussed with the father of the deceased and the two survivors:
- 6.2.1 Mr. Philip Sinnott (father of Deceased)
- 6.2.2 Mr. Sinnott advised that the vessel had been purchased second hand two to three years before the incident.
- 6.2.3 It had not been subjected to a Code of Practice inspection process (fishing vessels under 15 metres in length).
- 6.2.4 There were no Lifesaving appliances of any type on board nor was there a Portable VHF transceiver.
- 6.2.5 It was stated that it was intended to have the vessel inspected under the Code of Practice later in the year.
- 6.2.6 Mr. Sinnott was not aware that his son was using the vessel on the night.
- 6.2.7 The forward seating arrangement provided the only buoyancy for the vessel.
- 6.2.8 When the vessel was recovered it was floating approx. 600 mm below the surface of the water and there was no damage noted at that time.
- 6.3 Mr. Alan Walsh - Crew
- 6.3.1 Mr. Alan Walsh advised that the vessel left the lagoon at approx. 23.00 hrs. on 14th May. There were three persons on board and Mr. Derek Sinnott was skipper. It took between 10 and 15 minutes to reach Greenore Point from the lagoon.

- 6.3.2 Three or four nets had been set the night before by Mr. Derek Sinnott. The nets had been hauled and reset on 14th May 2010. All this work took place during early morning or evening hours with Mr. Derek Sinnott working on "Hannah's Hope" by day.
- 6.3.3 They started to haul their nets at 23.30 hrs. on 14th May 2010. They found another net overlying their nets, which had to be cleared first. At approx. 01.30 hrs. they got to the first of their nets.
- 6.3.4 By 01.35 hrs. they had recovered two nets from the water and the vessel was filling with the catch. Mr. Walsh was sitting on the port side mid length seat with Mr. Thomas Sinnott seating forward. The vessel was heavy in the water with 2 strakes clear of the gunwhale.
- 6.3.5 It was decided to head for the shore pulling the nets with them and intended to clear the catch from the nets on the beach. As they came through the "Sound" the vessel started taking on water. The weather appeared to have gotten worse and water was coming in over the gunwhales.
- 6.3.6 The beach was approx. 0.5 miles ahead and he asked to be left off on the beach. He got off the vessel at approx. 04.05 hrs. He headed up to his home above the beach and then made his way to the lagoon to assist with the catch as the vessel came in.
- 6.3.7 He missed the vessel coming round the harbour wall and went to the back of the ferry terminal looking for it. He then saw the lifeboat lights and ran to the RNLI Box to see what was happening. He was told Mr. Derek Sinnott was missing.
- 6.4 Mr. Thomas Sinnott - Crew
- 6.4.1 The initial account of Mr. Sinnott was much the same as that of Mr. Walsh. Therefore we have not repeated it, rather we take up his account from in or around 03.00 hrs.
- 6.4.2 At around 03.00 hrs. the weather freshened with winds variable from NW to NE Beaufort Force 3 to 4. There was a very strong tide running.
- 6.4.3 Each net used comprised of 2 x 100 metre nets joined together as one. They had caught the equivalent of 25 boxes of crab. The crabs were thrown loosely into the bilge between the forward and middle seating. The weight per box was given as between 10 and 15 kg.
- 6.4.4 Mr. Walsh was let off on the beach. They then turned out to head for the lagoon. Approx. 200 metres off the beach the vessel started to take on water again. They went another 100 metres when a larger wave

lapped over the side of the vessel The vessel went approx. 600 mm below the surface at the bow and the engine was immersed.

- 6.4.5 They jumped out of the vessel intending to swim ashore. Neither of the men were wearing lifejackets. The distance to the shore was approx. 300 metres on a falling tide. They stripped their over-clothing and boots. Mr. Thomas Sinnott realised he was making better progress than Mr. Derek Sinnott and turned back to assist him. They tried to swim together but Mr. Derek Sinnott was getting weaker and was shouting for help.
- 6.4.6 Mr. Thomas Sinnott reached the shore and went to the nearest house and raised the alarm. Mr. Derek Sinnott had worked all of the night of the 14th May at the spider crabs before working all day on "Hannah's Hope". They had been delayed in setting out as "Hannah's Hope" was late returning from its trip.
- 6.5 Weather records for the time have been examined. Met Eireann provided an estimate of weather conditions for the area for the relevant period (see Appendix 8.3). They also provided data for the M5 weather buoy positioned in 51° 7 N 006° 7 W.
 - 6.5.1 The data from the buoy shows the wind direction as being between 330° T and 340° T between 00.00 and 08.00 hrs. on 15th May. The highest wind speed recorded was 18 knots at 00.00 hrs. and falling to 16 knots 04.00 hrs. Thus the weather at the M5 buoy was a Beaufort Force 5 falling to Force 4.
 - 6.5.2 The weather model for the scene is winds from a north-westerly direction at between Beaufort Force 3 and perhaps as high as Beaufort Force 5.
 - 6.5.3 The weather data provided by the Naval Service indicates that the weather was good with little wind.
- 6.6 The vessel in use was an open boat and was not registered as a fishing vessel and as such was not required to be inspected under the Code of Practice for Small Fishing Vessels of up to 15 metres in length. It carried no Life Saving Equipment or VHF Transceiver.
- 6.7 The vessel was in good condition. It was double hulled and reportedly the void spaces were foam filled. There was some reserve buoyancy. There was provision for propelling the vessel with oars.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1 The Board recommends that the Minister for Transport reminds anglers of their obligations as follows:

- To wear a suitable personal flotation device on vessels of less than seven metres in length in accordance with Statutory Instrument S.I. No. 921 of 2005.
- To develop a suitable passage plan in accordance with SOLAS Ch. V Marine Notice No. 9 of 2003.

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APPENDIX 8.1

Appendix 8.1 Photographs.




(a) Repair at port bow



(b) Transom drain holes almost at same level as second strake from gunwhale.

Appendix 8.2 Chartlet - approximate location of casualty.



Appendix 8.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

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Ms Eve Reddin
Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2

19/5/2010

Our Ref. WS3018/2B_13674
Your Ref. MCIB/184

Re: Estimate of weather conditions in the sea area near Greenore Point, Rosslare, Co. Wexford, on the morning of the 15th May 2010.

Dear Ms Reddin,

Please find enclosed the above report. I also attach Buoy M5 observations and the Sea Area Forecasts in operation at the time.

Yours sincerely,

Evelyn Murphy B.Sc. M.Sc. Meteorologist
(Climatology & Observations Div.)
Ph 01- 8064290 Fax 01 – 8064247
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Appendix 8.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



MET ÉIREANN
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19/5/2010

Our Ref: WS3018/2B_13674

**Estimate of weather conditions in the sea area near Greenore Point,
Rosslare, Co. Wexford, on the morning of the 15th May 2010.**

0 to 6 hours

Winds: from a north-westerly direction, Force 3, possibly Force 4 gusting Force 5, depending on the distance off-shore.

Weather: dry, good clear spells with very little cloud

Visibility: good, greater than 30 km

Air temperature: 9 to 10°C

Waves: Wavelets

6 to 12 hours

Winds: from a west-north-west direction, Force 3, gusting Force 4

Weather: Dry with clear or sunny spells, cloud amounts increased during this period.

Visibility: good, greater than 10 km

Air temperature: 10°C

Waves: Wavelets

.....continued



Appendix 8.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



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.....continued WS3018/2B_13674

M5 Buoy	year	month	day	hour	Latitude (°N)	Longitude (°West)	Wind Direction (degrees from north)	Wind Speed (Knots)	Wave period (sec)	Wave height (m)
62094	2010	5	15	0	51.7	-6.7	330	18	4	1.0
62094	2010	5	15	1	51.7	-6.7	340	17	4	1.1
62094	2010	5	15	2	51.7	-6.7	340	16	4	1.2
62094	2010	5	15	3	51.7	-6.7	340	16	4	1.2
62094	2010	5	15	4	51.7	-6.7	330	16	4	1.2
62094	2010	5	15	5	51.7	-6.7	330	17	4	1.2
62094	2010	5	15	6	51.7	-6.7	330	15	4	1.2
62094	2010	5	15	7	51.7	-6.7	330	12	4	1.1
62094	2010	5	15	8	51.7	-6.7	330	10	4	1.0
62094	2010	5	15	9	51.7	-6.7	300	6	4	0.9
62094	2010	5	15	10	51.7	-6.7	290	9	4	0.9
62094	2010	5	15	11	51.7	-6.7	290	8	4	0.8
62094	2010	5	15	12	51.7	-6.7	290	8	4	0.7
62094	2010	5	15	13	51.7	-6.7	260	10	4	0.7

Evelyn Murphy B.Sc. M.Sc. Meteorologist
Climatology & Observations Div.
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Appendix 8.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



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Wave Heights / State of Sea

The wave height is the vertical distance between the crest and the preceding or following trough. The table below gives a description of the wave system associated with a range of significant wave heights.

Sea State (Descriptive)	Significant Wave height in meters
Calm	0 – 0.1
Wavelets	0.1 – 0.5
Slight	0.5 – 1.25
Moderate	1.25 – 2.5
Rough	2.5 – 4
Very rough	4 – 6
High	6 – 9
Very high	9 – 14
Phenomenal	Over 14

Individual waves in the wave train will have heights in excess of the significant height. The highest wave of all will have a height about twice the significant height.


Visibility

Descriptions of visibility mean the following:

Visibility (Descriptive)	Visibility in nautical miles (kilometres)
Good	More than 5 nm (> 9 km)
Moderate	2 – 5 nm (4 – 9 km)
Poor	0.5 – 2 nm (1 – 4 km)
Fog	Less than 0.5 nm (< 1km)



Appendix 8.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.



Appendix 8.3 Met Éireann Weather Report.

BEAUFORT SCALE OF WIND

BEAUFORT NUMBER	DESCRIP- TIVE TERM	VELOCITY EQUIVALENT AT A STANDARD HEIGHT OF 10 METRES ABOVE OPEN FLAT GROUND				SPECIFICATIONS			Probable wave height* in metres	Probable wave height* in feet
		Mean velocity in knots	m s ⁻¹	km h ⁻¹	m.p.h.	Land	Sea	Coast		
0	Calm	< 1	0-0.2	< 1	< 1	Calm; smoke rises vertically	Sea like a mirror	Calm	—	—
1	Light air	1-3	0.3-1.5	1-5	1-3	Direction of wind shown by smoke drift but not by wind vanes	Ripples with the appearance of scales are formed, but without foam crests	Fishing smack just has steerage way	0.1 (0.1)	½ (½)
2	Light breeze	4-6	1.6-3.3	6-11	4-7	Wind felt on face; leaves rustle; ordinary vanes moved by wind	Small wavelets, still short but more pronounced; crests have a glassy appearance and do not break	Wind fills the sails of smacks which then travel at about 1-2 knots	0.2 (0.3)	½ (1)
3	Gentle breeze	7-10	3.4-5.4	12-19	8-12	Leaves and small twigs in constant motion; wind extends light flag	Large wavelets; crests begin to break; foam of glassy appearance; perhaps scattered white horses	Smacks begin to careen and travel about 3-4 knots	0.6 (1)	2 (3)
4	Moderate breeze	11-16	5.5-7.9	20-28	13-18	Raises dust and loose paper; small branches are moved	Small waves, becoming longer; fairly frequent white horses	Good working breeze, smacks carry all canvas with good list	1 (1.5)	3½ (5)
5	Fresh breeze	17-21	8.0-10.7	29-38	19-24	Small trees in leaf begin to sway; crested wavelets form on inland waters	Moderate waves, taking a more pronounced long form; many white horses are formed (chance of some spray)	Smacks shorten sail	2 (2.5)	6 (8½)
6	Strong breeze	22-27	10.8-13.8	39-49	25-31	Large branches in motion; whistling heard in telegraph wires; umbrellas used with difficulty	Large waves begin to form; the white foam crests are more extensive everywhere (probably some spray)	Smacks have double reef in main-sail; care required when fishing	3 (4)	9½ (13)
7	Near gale	28-33	13.9-17.1	50-61	32-38	Whole trees in motion; inconvenience felt when walking against wind	Sea heaps up and white foam from breaking waves begins to be blown in streaks along the direction of the wind	Smacks remain in harbour and those at sea lie to	4 (5.5)	13½ (19)
8	Gale	34-40	17.2-20.7	62-74	39-46	Breaks twigs off trees; generally impedes progress	Moderately high waves of greater length; edges of crests begin to break into the spindrift; the foam is blown in well-marked streaks along the direction of the wind	All smacks make for harbour, if near	5.5 (7.5)	18 (25)
9	Strong gale	41-47	20.8-24.4	75-88	47-54	Slight structural damage occurs (chimney pots and slates removed)	High waves; dense streaks of foam along the direction of the wind; crests of waves begin to topple, tumble and roll over; spray may affect visibility	—	7 (10)	23 (32)
10	Storm	48-55	24.5-28.4	89-102	55-63	Seldom experienced inland; trees uprooted; considerable structural damage occurs	Very high waves with long overhanging crests; the resulting foam, in great patches, is blown in dense white streaks along the direction of the wind; on the whole, the surface of the sea takes on a white appearance; the tumbling of the sea becomes heavy and shock-like; visibility affected	—	9 (12.5)	29 (41)
11	Violent storm	56-63	28.5-32.6	103-117	64-72	Very rarely experienced; accompanied by widespread damage	Exceptionally high waves (small and medium-sized ships might be for a time lost to view behind the waves); the sea is completely covered with long white patches of foam lying along the direction of the wind; everywhere the edges of the wave crests are blown into froth; visibility affected	—	11.5 (16)	37 (52)
12	Hurricane	64 and over	32.7 and over	118 and over	73 and over	—	The air is filled with foam and spray; sea completely white with driving spray; visibility very seriously affected	—	14 (—)	45 (—)

* This table is only intended as a guide to show roughly what may be expected in the open sea, remote from land. It should never be used in the reverse way; i.e., for logging or reporting the state of the sea. In enclosed waters, or when near land, with an off-shore wind, wave heights will be smaller and the waves steeper. Figures in brackets indicate the probable maximum height of waves.

APPENDIX 8.4

Appendix 8.4 Timeline of incident.

All times shown are approximate and based on information received from sources indicated.

Analysis of Time Line for "Duggies Pride"

Notes: All times used by Irish Coastguard for log purposes are given in UTC.
All times in the Naval Service Report are given in LMT
All times used by the RNLI are given in LMT

STATION	TIME UTC	TIME LMT	EVENT
MRCC DUBLIN	04.25.00		Rosslare LB advises report
	04.28.00		Rosslare LB launched
	04.29.00		R117 tasked
	04.30.00		Rosslare CGU tasked
	04.43.00		Rosslare LB on scene
	05.05.00		Rosslare CGU on scene & LE "Ciara" tasked
	05.08.00		LE "Ciara" Proceeds
	05.35.00		LE "Ciara" on scene
	LE "CIARA"		05.16.00
		05.50.00	Request On Scene Commander Status
		06.39.00	Kilmore Quay LB proceeding to scene
		07.30.00	R117 departs to refuel
		08.28.00	"My Girl Lisa" searching inshore
		09.36.00	R117 tasked to new search area
		10.31.00	Rosslare LB starts new search area
		10.40.00	R117 Search of Slaney Estuary negative
		10.48.00	Rosslare LB Returning to datum request permission to join Rosslare Inshore LB
		10.52.00	Rosslare Inshore LB reports casualty on board , proceeds to Rosslare Europort
		10.58.00	Confirmed that casualty was recovered.
	11.05.00	Rosslare Coastguard cancels "Mayday alert"	
ROSSLARE HARBOUR		04.17.00	Assembly Signal Time - First Information
		04.25.00	Launch All Weather Boat
		04.32.00	Arrive on scene
		04.36.00	Inshore Boat launched
		05.20.00	Le "Ciara" deployed 2 x RIB's
		05.25.00	R117 on scene
		07.00.00	Kilmore Quay LB on scene
		10.50.00	Body found in sea
		11.00.00	Depart from scene
		11.10.00	Depart from casualty / Back on station
KILMORE QUAY		06.24.00	First Information
		06.26.00	Assembly Signal
		06.35.00	Launch
		07.02.00	Arrive on scene
		11.00.00	Report of body found
		11.03.00	Depart from scene
	12.10.00	Back at Station	

9. CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

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Note: The address and contact details of individual respondents have been obscured for privacy reasons.

An Garda Síochána

An Leas-Choimisinéara
(Oibríochtaí)
An Garda Síochána
Ceanncheathrú na nGardaí
Páirc an Fhionn-Uisce
Baile Atha Cliath 8

Tel. / Teileafón (01) 666 2057/8/9
Fax. / Facs (01) 666 2060
Please quote the following Ref. No.



Deputy Commissioner
(Operations)
An Garda Síochána
Garda Headquarters
Phoenix Park
Dublin 8

Web Site : www.garda.ie
E-mail : commissioner_ops@garda.ie

OPS79.13/10
PS676/10

Your Reference: MCIB/184

**Ms. Eve Reddin,
Secretariat,
Marine Casualty Investigation Board,
Leeson Lane,
Dublin 2.**

AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER'S
OFFICE

22 OCT 2010

OPERATIONS
GARDA HEADQUARTERS

**Re: Draft report of the investigation into the fatal incident involving
"Duggies Pride" off Greenore Point, Rosslare, Co. Wexford, on
15 May 2010.**

Dear Ms. Reddin,

I am directed by Deputy Commissioner, Operations to refer to Mr. John O'Donnell's correspondence to the Commissioner in relation to the above matter dated the 22nd September, 2010.

I wish to advise that the draft report in relation to this tragic incident has been reviewed and An Garda Síochána have no observations or submissions to make in respect of same.

Yours sincerely,


Louise Synnott Inspector
for Deputy Commissioner.

27th October 2010



Ráiteas Misin / Mission Statement :

Ag obair le Pobail chun iad a chosaint agus chun freastal orthu / Working with Communities to Protect and Serve

MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the comments of this response.



Lifeboats

Royal National Lifeboat Institution

Admiral the Lord Boyce GCB OBE DL
Trustee: John Coyle MBE
Chief Executive: Paul Bossier

RNLI (Trading) Ltd 01073377, RNLI (Sales) Ltd 200240 and RNLI (Interim) Ltd 1184000
are all companies registered at West Quay Road, Poole, Dorset BH15 1JZ

From:
RNLI Ireland
Airside, Swords, Co. Dublin

Telephone: (01) 8900460
Fax: (01) 8900458
www.lifeboats.ie

Inspector of Lifeboats : Martyn Smith

Mr. John G O'Donnell B.L.
Chairman
Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Leeson Lane
Dublin2

11th October 2010

Sir,

DRAFT REPORT INTO THE FATAL INCIDENT INVOLVING "DUGGIES PRIDE" OFF GREENORE POINT, ROSSLARE, COUNTY WEXFORD ON 15TH MAY 2010


Reference: Yr letter MCIB/184 dated 22nd September 2010

Thank you for affording the RNLI the opportunity to view the draft report into the incident which resulted in the tragic loss of a life.

The RNLI has no comment to make in relation to the incident except to offer our sincere condolences to the family and friends of Mr. Derek Sinnott.

Yours faithfully

Martyn Smith
RNLI Divisional Inspector of Lifeboats
Ireland



The RNLI is the charity that saves lives at sea

Charity number CHY 2678 in the Republic of Ireland and registered in England and Wales (209603) and Scotland (SC037736)

MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the content of this response.

L.É. CIARA
Ceannasaíocht Oibríochtaí Cabhlaigh
Bunáit Cabhlaigh
Inis Sionnach
Co. Corcaigh.



L.É. CIARA
Naval Operations Command
Naval Base
Haulbowline
Co. Cork

13 Oct 2010

P42/OC/119


Marine Casualty Investigation Board
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2

DRAFT INVESTIGATION REPORT:
FATAL INCIDENT OFF ROSSLARE 15 MAY 2010


Refs: A. MCIB/184 "Draft report of the investigation into the fatal incident involving "Duggie's Pride" off Greenore Point, Rosslare, Co. Wexford on 15th May 2010" dated 22 Sep 2010
B. Merchant Shipping (Investigation of Marine Casualties) Act 2000

Dear Sir or Madam

1. Having received and examined this draft report, Ref (A), sent to me in accordance with Section 36 of Ref (B), I find that I have a number of observations which I wish to submit.
2. Many, but not all, of these observations concern discrepancies in the timeline, which may be a result of some times in the report being in "Zulu" time (Greenwich Mean Time), with other times being in "Alpha" time (Daylight Saving Time, which was in effect at the time of the incident).
3. As an officer of the Defence Forces, I am required to submit any such observations, to be made to an external agency (such as the MCIB), through my chain of command.
4. I therefore notify you of my intention to make such observations, and that such observations should reach you in due course, with any necessary endorsements or comments by my superior officers.


Frank O'Connor
Lieutenant Commander
Officer Commanding LÉ Ciara

cc Officer Commanding Naval Operations Command



MCIB RESPONSE


The MCIB notes the observations made in this response and has clarified the timelines. See Appendix 8.4.


Dear Mr O' Donnell,

On behalf of my family I Kathleen Sinnott, Mother of Derek Sinnott who was involved in a fatal incident on " Duggie's Pride" on the 15th of May 2010, I would like to know from you as Chairman of the MCIB who is responsible for informing the immediate family in such cases, as on the morning of the 15th of May 2010 the first we knew was when we heard a helicopter fly over our home which overlooks the scene of the incident, this was approximately 5-10am, my husband immediately was alerted by this and went to see what was going on when he met some onlookers and asked what was going on and was then told that a boat had come ashore and was told that someone was missing, on further investigation he then discovered that it was his son's boat, He then proceeded to the beach where a lot of local people had gathered and he was told that Derek was missing he then rang me to tell me of the news that was going on.

Our observation is that someone official should have made sure that the immediate family was notified as the alert had been made at 4.25am giving them about 40minutes if not more time to inform the family as they did not know anything was amiss, I request that no other person should ever find out second hand again as it has caused me much grief that not at any stage, no official in any compassidty informed us of what was happing until we had to identify our son's body in the Lifeboat Station This was at about 11.00am on the 15th of May 2010. Hope you understand were this is coming from and enforces this recommendation that this does not happen again the way that it had happened to us, as it is bad enough losing someone close but worse when you are told by onlookers.

Yours Sincerely,


Kathleen Sinnott



Investigation of "Duggie's Pride"

15 May 2010

1. Who informs the immediate family that their family member is missing or presumed dead. As we were not informed by any legal person that our son was missing and he was presumed dead. ?
2. Question 5.3 the boat did not capsize at any time, it was found a float. ?
3. Question 3.2 Derek was not out on the 13th of May he had just started a new job in Kilmore. *Alter*
4. Question 3.2 He was not out on the 14th of May during the daytime on "Duggie's Pride" he was only on the "Hannah's Hope" during the day as stated in 6.3.2
5. Question 6.3.4 Derek was sitting at the stern of the boat. *File paper does not p. Derek in boat at a*
6. Question 6.3.7 no one told Alan, this was said after the incident.
7. Question 6.3.5 it was never intended to clear the catch from the nets only to drop Alan off to lessen the weight on the boat. *Why? →*
8. Question 6.3.7 Alan ran to the lifeboat hut on top of the bank and not the lifeboat station.

Robert Smith

Kathleen + Philip Smith




Final Draft Report
Investigation of (Duggie Pride) May 15th 2010

Recommendation

My recommendation is that all boats should be equipped with life saving materials, it should be a compulsory law to enforce and that all boats should inform the stations before they take off and tell them who and how many people are onboard so that if an accident is to happen that the lifeboat and coastguards are able to get to the boat and maybe stop anyone from dying or being injured. Also if anything like this tragedy was to happen again that the family is notified as soon as the coastguards are notified and that the guards are also notified. No family should have to find out the way that my family found out. They should also take into consideration that not to presume that the family know what is going on just because you see the victim's uncle and aunt on the beach or a different family member which is not a member of the immediate family.

Kathleen + Philip Sinnott



REPLY TO RESPONSE FROM MR. PHILIP & KATHLEEN SINNOTT RECEIVED 15 OCTOBER 2010.

Firstly the MCIB offers its deepest sympathy to the family and friends of the deceased, Mr. Derek Sinnott.

The MCIB notes the contents of this response and wishes to make the following comments:

A) The sole remit of the MCIB is to investigate the cause of a casualty and to make recommendations to prevent such happening again. It should be understood that the MCIB investigator only arrives at the scene after the incident has been reported and takes no part in search and rescue.

The MCIB is always mindful of the distress and grief such incidents cause family and friends of those lost and will always attempt to be discreet, respectful and non-intrusive to both family and friends at these times. The MCIB stresses that the breaking of such news to family is not within their remit and consider that this is a matter for the emergency services, who are on the front line of any incident.

B) During the interview with the MCIB investigator Mr. P Sinnott stated that he found the vessel some 600mm below the surface, that he righted it and brought it to the shore. Mr. Sinnott also advised that he was unaware that his son, Derek, was out that night.

C) Mr. T. Sinnott and Mr. A Walsh stated that Derek Sinnott had laid nets out during the nights of 13 & 14 May 2010. Thus Mr. D Sinnott was out on the vessel on both nights during the hours of darkness.

D) Section 3.4 identifies Mr. D Sinnott as the skipper of the vessel. The vessel was powered by an outboard motor so the most probable location of the deceased was at the stern. The MCIB has identified the seating location of both survivors so the stern was the only location the deceased could have occupied.

E) The MCIB has amended the Report to confirm that Mr. Walsh went to the RNLI box located on the cliff top rather than the RNLI Station. Mr. Walsh stated that whilst at the RNLI Box he was informed that Derek Sinnott was missing and that the alarm was raised by Mr. T Sinnott.


F) Mr. Walsh stated that it was the intention to clear the crabs from the nets as they approached the shore where he landed. The intention was to lighten the load in the vessel by placing him ashore.

The recommendations offered by Mr. & Mrs. Sinnott are covered in law and have already been included in the recommendations in this report.

Recommendation

My recommendation is that all boats should be equipped with life saving materials, it should be a compulsory law to enforce and that all boats should inform the stations before they take off and tell them who and how many people are onboard so that if an accident is to happen that the lifeboat and coastguards are able to get to the boat and maybe stop anyone from dying or being injured. Also if anything like this tragedy was to happen again that the family is notified as soon as the coastguards are notified and that the guards are also notified.

Ellen Walsh



MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of this response and advises that the aspects mentioned are already covered by SOLAS chapter V and S.I. 921 of 2005 and the Code of Practice for Fishing Vessels of less than 15 metres in length.



Recd. 30/9/2010

Dear Mr. O'Donnell,

First of all allow me to offer my condolences to the family of Mr. Sinnott on this most tragic incident.

I have a few amendments to make to the text of your report. Specifically these are;

1.1 the Irish Coast Guard was alerted...

5.1 Rosslare RNLI Lifeboat Station

5.1.1 Rosslare RNLI Lifeboat Station

5.1.2 local Coast Guard

5.1.3 The Waterford Coast Guard SAR...

5.1.4 The Irish Naval Service Vessel L.E. Ciara...

5.2 ...by the Irish Coast Guard

5.2.1 Rosslare Harbour RNLI All Weather Lifeboat (ALB)

5.2.2 Subsequently the RNLI Inshore Lifeboat...

5.2.4 The Kilmore Quay RNLI Lifeboat

5.2.5 The Coast Guard Search and rescue helicopter (Rescue117) from...

The Irish Coast Guard believes it essential to carry a VHF transceiver on all seagoing craft whatever the size. It is imperative to carry and wear lifejackets as they are the simplest way of saving your life. Emergency calls should be to the RNLI or other agencies directly using 999 or 112 to the Coast Guard who can task the most appropriate resources.

Yours Sincerely,


Chris Reynolds,

Director IRCG

28/09/2010

*Irish Coast Guard, Department of Transport, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2, Ireland.
Garda C6sta na hEireann An Roinn Iompair, L6na Chill Mocharg6n, Baile 6tha Cliath 2, Eire.
Tel: + 353 1 6783455 / 3427. Fax: + 353 1 6783459, email: admin@irishcoastguard.ie*

MCIB RESPONSE

The MCIB notes the contents of this response and has made the necessary amendments.