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INTO

THE FIRE ON BOARD THE

VESSEL - "CASTAWAY"

OFF CASTLETOWNBERE,

WEST CORK

ON 16th AUGUST 2010

REPORT No. MCIB/189 (No.5 of 2012)



Report MCIB/189 published by The Marine Casualty Investigation Board. Published 25th April 2012.





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## **SYNOPSIS**

#### 1. SYNOPSIS

1.1 On the 16 August 2010, four persons were on a fishing trip off Castletownbere, West Cork, Ireland, when the craft suddenly experienced uncontrollable flooding. This was followed shortly thereafter by an electrical fire which originated in an electrical cabinet. Efforts to extinguish the fire were unsuccessful and as such all four persons on board had to abandon the craft. Three persons subsequently drowned.





#### 2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

General Particulars - "CASTAWAY"

**Construction:** GRP (Glass Reinforced Plastic) Raked stem, transom stern.

Type: Aquabell 33 Mediterranean Flybridge - Semi-displacement

fast power craft.

Length Overall: 10.12m (33ft).

**Breadth Moulded:** 3.18m (11' 06").

**Draft:** 1.24m (3' 06").

**Displacement:** Approx. 8.8 tonnes.

Engine: Twin - Ford Sabre Diesels rated 250BHP/186kW) each to

twin screws.

**Builder:** Hull Moulding/part build Aquafibre (Part of Broom Boats)

1987.

Completion of fittings out - Winter Marine Limited,

Salcombe, Devon, U.K. - with provisional date of 05/1988.

Date: 1988.

Small Ships Register: (U.K) No. 82489.

**Speed:** Top speed of 26 knots.

Owner: Mr. Wolfgang N. Schmidt, Glengarriff, Co. Cork.

**Crew List/Details:** Mr. Wolfgang N.Schmidt - Skipper.

Mr. Wolfgang Schroder. Mr. Richard Harman. Mr. Edward Dziato.

**Remark:** The craft was lost in the incident and the following list of

relevant on-board equipment has been compiled from a variety of sources deemed to have been familiar with the

craft.

**Communications:** Two VHF Radios.

**Equipment:** Two mobile telephones on the Flybridge, one of which was

located on the Flybridge Console.

# Fire Fighting Equipment:

Fireboy - Machinery Space automatic fire extinguisher system.

Three portable fire extinguishers consisting of one C02 + two dry power units which were stowed starboard side aft in a rack in the Wheelhouse along with a single portable dry powder extinguisher in the Wheelhouse (From original craft purchase in 2003).

One Fire blanket.

# Life Saving Equipment:

Two horseshoe type Lifebuoys c/w lights - stowed one each wing of the Flybridge.

Six Person - Inflatable Liferaft - stowed in container on the Flybridge.

Six PFDs' [Personal Flotation Devices] - said to have consisted of 2 in original clear plastic bags and 4 ready for use stowed in the Fore Cabin.

Two Flares - stowed in a box starboard side in the Wheelhouse.

Note: The Flybridge is accessed through a hinged hatch at the head of a fixed stainless steel tubular fixed ladder mounted externally to the Wheelhouse portside bulkhead with heel at engine cover level.

## Bilge Pumping Installation:

Power Pumps:

Three electric Bilge pumps and two Manual pumps.

Main Bilge pump - Jabsco - rated at 1000 gal/hr - located under the Wheelhouse sole and accessible via portable hatch.

The Main Bilge Pump was operated directly from its dedicated control panel located portside on the Wheelhouse Console and forming part of the dedicated Pump Control panel.

Two electric bilge pumps [possibly RULE type]- were fitted in the Machinery Space under the Cockpit - one forward /one aft. The forward pump was said to have been of greater capacity than the after unit.

These two pumps were fitted with float switches which allowed them to operate automatically within preset parameters - starting when a predetermined level of bilge



was detected by operation of the float switch and shutting down when the lower limit was reached.

The latter two bilge pumps were controlled directly from their individual dedicated Bilge Pump controls sited on the console panel and allowing for either automatic or manual control. Console indicators consisted of manual toggle switches for automatic or manual operation, indicator lights and audible alarms in the event of a high bilge level being registered.

Manual Pumps:

Two manually operated bilge pumps were installed. One located starboard side in the Fore Cabin and one starboard side forward in the Cockpit in way of the recess between the engine casing and the bulwark.

Wash Deck Pump:

A powered Wash Deck Pump located in the Machinery Space discharged to a Cockpit fitting and via a tee connection to supply two portable fish cleaning tables set up one each side in the Cockpit.

Cooking Equipment: Two ring Gas Cooker/Oven-located portside aft in the Wheelhouse. Two Gas cylinders stowed in locker portside/Cockpit.

**Electrical** Installation: 240VAC with shore connection.

24V and 12V DC systems - 24V system with isolating switch.

Battery Charger.

The craft also carried a petrol powered 2kW portable Generator c/w with fuel tank. The unit was normally stowed in a locker accessible from within the Wheelhouse.

Fuel Tankage Capacity:

Two x 100 gal/455 litre diesel tanks.

## EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

#### 3. EVENTS PRIOR TO THE INCIDENT

- 3.1 The craft, an Aquabell 33 Mediterranean Flybridge, departed from the owner's jetty at Firkale, Glengarriff Harbour, Co. Cork, Ireland at about 09:00 hrs on 16th August 2010 on what was her first fishing trip of the season.
- 3.2 She was skippered by the owner Mr. Schmidt, with a party of three male friends on a sea angling trip in the general area of Bantry Bay.
- 3.3 The craft fished in various locations during the day. Mr. Schroder had spoken to his wife by mobile telephone about 15:30 hrs, he appeared in good spirits and excited, reporting that the fishing was good and that they had caught some 200 fish.



#### 4. THE INCIDENT

- 4.1 The day was generally uneventful up to about 16:00 hrs, when Mr. Schmidt went to use the heads/toilet in the Fore Cabin. He noticed that the forward bilge was full to the extent that the portable trap was afloat.
- 4.2 On checking the after bilge, it too was found to be flooded.
- 4.3 The craft's three electrically powered bilge pumps along with one manually operated pump were brought into service and dewatering of the craft commenced.
- 4.4 The source of the ingress was not ascertained and while the pumps were seen to be discharging the water, levels did not appear to be diminishing.
- 4.5 Mr. Dziato observed that Mr. Schmidt was "holding in" the starter switch of the Main Bilge Pump located under the sole of the Wheelhouse to keep it running.
- 4.6 The pumps had been operating for some 20/30 minutes when Mr. Dziato, while operating the manual bilge pump in the Fore Cabin, detected an odour of burning and sighted smoke issuing from behind a bulkhead mirror mounted in the heads/toilet. He reported the matter to Mr. Schmidt and was instructed to remove the detachable mirror mounting panel.
- 4.7 He observed "a mass of wiring behind" and noted that the visible electric cabling was overheating, giving off "puffs" of smoke and the cable insulation in way was melting.
- 4.8 He has no recollection of a switchboard/electrical panel in way of the opening but thought that there may have been "line fuses".
- 4.9 Mr. Schmidt attended and suddenly the wiring ignited.
- 4.10 Under Mr. Schmidt's instruction, Mr. Dziato, using a portable dry powder fire extinguisher, commenced to fight the fire giving it several short bursts but on each occasion it re-ignited almost immediately.
- 4.11 Mr. Dziato understood that the craft had only one portable fire extinguisher and when this was exhausted he suggested dowsing the fire with a bucket of water but Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Schroder, who had joined them, demurred.
- 4.12 The situation deteriorated quickly with flames suddenly "shooting up" from forward of the Wheelhouse console and the space filling rapidly with smoke and flame.
- 4.13 Mr. Schmidt instructed all members of the party to withdraw to the cockpit aft which they did. However, in their haste to evacuate the Wheelhouse, the door was left open behind them.

- 4.14 The heavy black smoke and heat drove them aft.
- 4.15 It was at this stage that Mr. Dziato realized that the two mobile phones had been left on the Wheelhouse console and he dashed back in and retrieved them getting his left hand singed in the process.
- 4.16 An initial call was made by Mr. Dziato using the recovered mobile telephone to the 999 emergency number requesting "Fire Service" indicating that he was on a boat which was on fire in Bantry Bay and subsequently advising the operator that there were four persons on board and the craft was located between Whiddy Island and Castletownbere.
- 4.17 Mr. Schroder then took over the communications, confirmed that the craft was the "Castaway", that they were near Roancarrig Lighthouse and that the "helm was on fire now".



#### 5. EVENTS FOLLOWING THE INCIDENT

- 5.1 The records confirm that Valentia Marine Rescue Sub Centre (MRSC) was contacted by Limerick Fire Service with a report of a burning boat in Adrigole Bay at 16:38 hrs (GMT).
- 5.2 At 16:40 hrs Valentia MRSC tasked the Waterford rescue helicopter (R117), which was at Castletownbere helipad for a separate incident.
- 5.3 At 16:42 hrs the Castletownbere Lifeboat (ALB) was tasked by Valentia MRSC and at 16:43 hrs a May Day relay broadcast was made.
- 5.4 On board the stricken craft the party of four had been driven aft by the intense heat and smoke and Mr. Schmidt advised the party to proceed to the transom bathing platform and enter the water.
- 5.5 Mr. Dziato recalls that the abandonment of the craft was carried out with an air of calmness and good order despite the circumstances and estimated an elapse of time of some 5 minutes from initial fire to entering the water.
- 5.6 Mr. Schroder threw two sausage fenders into the water.
- 5.7 Once in the water they hung onto the bathing platform for about two minutes. Mr. Harmon advised that he couldn't swim. Mr. Dziato was the last to let go the bathing platform and then only because of the intense heat, hearing "things bursting with pressure" and fearing an explosion.
- 5.8 He found Mr. Schmidt assisting Mr. Harmon and he took over having had lifeguard experience in the U.S. The party had abandoned the craft literally in what they stood up in and in the case of Mr. Harmon, who have been cleaning fish at the fish table, wearing an oilskin top and rubber boots.
- 5.9 Mr. Dziato assisted Mr. Harmon, got him to lie on his back while he supported him and helped him to divest himself of his oil skin top and boots and then tread water while being supported by Mr. Dziato. Mr. Harmon succumbed a short while later and Mr. Dziato released him and instinctively started swimming back to the craft which appeared to be some 50 metres off and from which members of the party had drifted apart in the interim. He noted at this stage that the craft was ablaze from stem to stern.
- 5.10 He did not see Mr. Schmidt or Mr. Schroder in the interim until he came across Mr. Schmidt lying face down in the water but was unable to roll him over.
- 5.11 He encountered one of the two sausage fenders which had been thrown over the side. He placed it between his legs for support. He recalls sighting a yacht, subsequently identified as French craft "Lord Jim 11" and attempted to attract the crew's attention by waving, but to no avail.

- 5.12 At that stage the rescue helicopter was on scene and Mr. Dziato was winched up within minutes. The rescue and recovery of the three bodies was logged as 17:11 hrs with the helicopter routing back to the Castletownbere helipad.
- 5.13 The Castletownbere Lifeboat [ALB] tasked by Valentia MRSC at 16:35 hrs, arrived on scene at 17:13 hrs, the casualty being some 6 nautical miles from the Station. Visibility was 1 to 4 nautical miles with mist but clear at sea level. The wind was noted as force 3 (7~10 knots) WSW, Sea State Slight (0.5~1.25m) and Swell 0.5m. Met Éireann recorded the sea water temperature as 16.5°C to 17°C. Low Water had occurred at 15:42 hrs.
- 5.14 The casualty was highly visible with black smoke issuing. The rescue helicopter was on scene attending to the recovery. All communications were on Channel 16. On arrival the casualty was noted to have its superstructure, flybridge and the forward section of coachroof consumed with only the forward section of guardrails remaining. The craft was lying stopped with the wind on her portside, the smoke tailing off to starboard. The Lifeboat stood off some 25~30 m being unable to render any significant assistance other than monitor the scene as requested by the Coast Guard and stood by until the craft sank, going by the stern. No explosions were witnessed only "air puffing" from the casualty.
- 5.15 At 17:43 hrs, the Lifeboat reported that the craft had sunk in position 051° 37.65'N; 009° 42.28'W 2.28 nautical miles SE of Roancarrig Lighthouse. Following the sinking, no pollution was visible other than light fire blacked structural debris floating on the surface.
- 5.16 The Lifeboat departed the scene at 17:40 hrs and returned to Base.
- 5.17 The Bantry Inshore Search & Rescue (RIB) had been tasked at 17:00 hrs, attended and returned to Base having been stood down at 17:51 hrs.
- 5.18 The May Day was cancelled at 18:30 hrs and all SAR units stood down.



#### 6. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

#### 6.1 Craft Maintenance

- 6.1.1 The craft was hauled out and laid up ashore at Laurence Cove Marina for the winter of 2009/2010 and launched on May 2010 for an envisaged five month season. Routine hull cleaning was effected.
- 6.1.2 Over-heating of both engines was experienced on initial commissioning once afloat. Subsequent examination revealed that the impellers of both attached seawater circulation pumps had been damaged and this was attributed to circumstances attending the flushing through of the engines with fresh water when the craft had been hauled at the end of the previous season. Both impellers were renewed with Owner's spares.
- 6.1.3 The Owner, suspecting that he had a fuel leak in the starboard fuel tank, engaged the services of a local contractor, Mr. John Murphy, to investigate. The craft was hauled out at Laurence Cove to facilitate repairs, the starboard fuel tank removed and examined. The bottom of the 2mm thick vee-bottomed stainless steel fuel tank was found to be with some eleven pin holes over an area of 12" x 4" about the vee bottom and these were repaired by TIG welding. The repaired tank was pressure tested to 10 lbs/sq. inch, proved tight and reinstalled in the craft.
- 6.1.4 The Owner had experienced problems with an electric powered capstan fitted to the portside bulwark rail capping and requested Mr. Murphy to investigate same. It was noted that the power cables to the two-button control unit located under the bulwark rail had been cut by the Owner but were still live and exposed. Mr. Murphy found that the power cables had been led directly from the battery to the capstan in the absence of a circuit breaker switch and fuse holder arrangements. The redundant cables were removed in their entirety. In the course of the related examination, evidence of electrical arcing activity between the exposed butts of the stainless steel rail capping in way of the capstan installation was noted.
- 6.1.5 Mr. Murphy noted the general poor state of the wiring. In the course of the examination of the capstan problem, multiple cable runs to the batteries did not have circuit breakers or fuse holders. Wiring behind a panel in the wheelhouse was also seen to be generally untidy. Additional electrical problems were in evidence in the Wheelhouse where the radar monitor was noted propped up on a wooden batten and the exposed wiring beneath was noted to be in considerable disarray. The Owner was advised to have the matter addressed professionally.
- 6.1.6 Attending at the Owner's home some weeks later, Mr. Murphy was advised that both engines were running satisfactorily but that he, the owner, had encountered a problem, in that part of a circuit board had caught fire and the

Mr. Murphy was asked to see if he could have it repaired. The circuit board was observed to show signs of shorting and burning.

- 6.1.7 The Investigation was advised that there was an electrical cabinet consisting of a "metal box" with a portable cover located behind the after bulkhead of the Toilet Compartment situated portside off the Fore Cabin, at "eye height", to which a detachable wood panel mounted mirror was affixed and which, on removal, gave access to the cabinet. The cabinet is said to have contained individual fuses for the various circuits albeit the services unidentified. While it is stated that the cable runs were colour coded red, black, yellow the wiring was confused and untidy.
- 6.1.8 The Owner re-commissioned the craft afloat in June/July. During that period, the bilge spaces were stated to have been flooded intentionally, the operation of the Main Bilge Pump and two after bilge pumps and their float switches tested and the Wheelhouse console alarms tested. All tests proved satisfactory.
- 6.1.9 Around the 9th August, Mr. Schmidt called to Mr. Schroder's home when it appeared in the course of discussion that the craft was experiencing electrical problems i.e. the "battery was not charging".

#### 6.2 Toxicology

6.2.1 Toxicology Test Reports in conjunction with the post-mortem examination of all three deceased indicated the following:

Name	<b>Blood analysis-</b> Ethanol mg %	Prescribed Drugs ug/ml
Wolfgang Schmidt Wolfgang Schroder Richard Harman	152 70 Not detected	Not detected. Citalopram 0.14. Not detected.
	Urine Analysis-	
	Ethanol mg %	Prescribed Drugs ug/ml

Note: The Investigation was advised that there was a bottle of whiskey on board and that, Mr. Schmidt, had been drinking whiskey all day. Mr. Dziato confirmed that he had been drinking rum & coke during the day and that they had taken a packed lunch consisting of sandwiches with them, along with some cans of beer.



- 6.3 Merchant Shipping [Pleasure Craft] [Lifejackets and Operation] [Safety] Regulations 2004-S.I.No.259 / 2004
- 6.3.1 Among the various matters addressed under this legislation is the aspect of the prohibition on operating pleasure craft while under the influence of alcohol or drugs:

Prohibition on operating pleasure craft while under influence of alcohol or drugs

8. The master or owner of a pleasure craft, shall not, or shall not allow another to, operate or control or attempt to operate or control the craft while he or she or the other is under the influence of alcohol or drugs or any combination of drugs or of drugs and alcohol to such an extent as to be incapable of having proper control of the craft.

Control of consumption of alcohol or drugs on board pleasure craft

9(1) A person on a pleasure craft shall not consume alcohol or drugs or any combination of drugs or of drugs and alcohol while on board the craft in circumstances which could affect the safety of persons or create a disturbance on board the craft or affect the safety of other persons using Irish waters or constitute a nuisance to such persons.

#### 7. CONCLUSIONS

#### 7.1 Electrical System

- 7.1.1 The condition of the craft's electrical installation immediately prior to the incident is regarded as being in poor overall condition and unsafe. Over a period of time, poor electrical practice and unorthodox modifications to the installation rendered it potentially dangerous in many respects leaving it vulnerable to overloads, short circuiting and involuntary earthing.
- 7.1.2 It would appear that Mr. Schmidt was his own electrician for the most part and that while he was aware of the presence of poor electrical practice in its various forms on board, he may not have been aware or comprehended the potential dangers attaching to it.
- 7.1.3 Despite evidence of him having conducted, in the course of re-commissioning the craft following winter lay-up, what may be regarded as a comprehensive and systematic operational check of the craft's bilge pumping installation, bilge alarms both local and remote, all of these installations were found to be deficient or ineffective on the day of the incident.
- 7.1.4 This fishing trip was the first following the re-commissioning.
- 7.1.5 The fire commenced in/about the electrical "cabinet" in the Toilet in the Fore Cabin and serving the Console systems in the Wheelhouse, where evidence of electrical cable insulation actually melting indicates serious overloading and the absence of suitable fuse protection/electrical protective arrangements.
- 7.1.6 While there is no evidence of a direct casual connection between the fire and the preceding ingress of seawater to the bilges, such ingress, given the known poor state of the craft's electrical installation, has to raise questions in this regard.

#### 7.2 Lifesaving Appliances

- 7.2.1 The lifesaving appliances appear to have been adequate for a craft of her size other than with regard to Flares, where the Investigation was advised that two flares, type and validity unknown, were stowed in a box in the Wheelhouse.
- 7.2.2 There was no Safety Instruction, even of an informal nature, dealing with the basics of the craft's lifesaving appliances, imparted to third parties prior to commencement of the trip. In addition, there was no evidence found that this was addressed on previous occasions.
- 7.2.3 Mr. Dziato stated that while he had been on board the craft on some six occasions previously in the course of fishing trips, he was not aware that the



craft carried a 6/8 person inflatable liferaft housed on the Flybridge - while recalling that he had sat on its container on several occasions not realising what it was. He was unaware that there were two horseshoe-type lifebuoys c/w lights and safety lines located one each side on the wings of the Flybridge.

- 7.2.4 He was aware that the craft carried six Personal Flotation Devices(PFDs), having seen them in the Fore Cabin. The Fore Cabin was not accessible at the relevant time due to the rapid spread of the fire in the Wheelhouse.
- 7.2.5 The Investigation is of the opinion that if all persons on board the craft had being wearing lifejackets or PFD's at the time of entering the water, the water temperature was such that the outcome of this particular casualty would have been significantly different.

#### 7.3 Fire-fighting Equipment

7.3.1 The evidence suggests that the craft carried only one portable fire extinguisher - a dry powder unit which was used to fight the fire. The stated original complement when purchased in 2003 is said to have consisted of:-

Three portable fire extinguishers consisting of one CO2 + two dry power units which were stowed starboard side aft in rack in Wheelhouse along with a single portable dry powder extinguisher in the Wheelhouse (From original craft purchase in 2003).

- 7.3.2 There is no independent evidence to confirm that the Fireboy Machinery Space automatic fire extinguisher system operated as designed or failed to operate on the day of the incident. However, in the circumstances of the extent of the fire it would not have had a decisive bearing on the outcome.
- 7.3.3 The Investigation established that the following combustible materials were present on board: Easy-Start type pressurised canister and a portable generator petrol tank. This may account for some of the "puffing" type issues observed by both RNLI personnel and Mr. Dziato during the course of the fire.

#### 7.4 Ingress of Water to Bilge area

- 7.4.1 With the loss of the craft it was not possible for the Investigation to determine the source of the ingress, nor its' mechanism or duration. Given that its discovery was fortuitous, it suggests that it had not developed to the stage where it had affected the craft's stability.
- 7.4.2 There is no anecdotal evidence that the craft had struck an underwater object or had sustained bottom damage.
- 7.4.3 There are two other possible sources of ingress skin fitting failure or sea water

- circulating pipework system failure/breach. There is no evidence indicating that it may have been either.
- 7.4.4 A further possibility is inadvertent ingress via the transom scuppers. The Investigation is aware that when the current RCD (Recreational Craft Directive¹) was introduced it was found necessary to increase the freeboard and deck height to allow compliance the cockpit was designed to be self-draining. Prior to that it appears that the commercial version of the craft had a greater freeboard than the standard or pleasure version, which the incident craft appeared to be.
- 7.4.5 The cockpit sole arrangements consisted of portable flanged moulded GRP panels, each some 2' x 4', biscuit-tin cover type, fitted with flanges inserted into the channels of the inverted channel section moulded deck beams. There appears to have been no method of securing the sole panels to the deck beams other than that described above, which the previous Owner regarded as weathertight based on his six years of ownership and extensive use.
- 7.4.6 The transom was fitted with two stainless steel hinge mounted scuppers non-return type flap arrangement designed to open outboard to aft permitting the cockpit sole to drain directly overboard while not allowing ingress inboard. Some of these scupper arrangements have been known to have had wing nut closure arrangements fitted in the past to effect closure.
- 7.4.7 Given the combination of a designed low freeboard aft at the transom along with three adults standing in the cockpit and an estimated 40kg of fish on board, it is possible that ingress of water over the transom scupper sills allowed water to penetrate the weathertight but not watertight cockpit sole panelling closure arrangement and flow below deck.
- 7.4.8 While the evidence is that the craft had flooded to the extent noted when first observed, the source of that ingress could not be established with any certainty.
- 7.4.9 The earlier referred incidence of pitting noted about the bottom of the starboard fuel tank may reflect conditions over a period where higher than normal levels of bilge water were experienced.

#### 7.5 Search and Rescue Response

- 7.5.1 Once the emergency services became aware of the casualty, the search and rescue response was appropriate and in a timely manner.
- <sup>1</sup> [E.U. Directive 94/25/EC Regulations mandatory from 16 June 1998 applicable to the construction of recreational craft from 2.5m to 24m in length.]



#### 8. RECOMMENDATIONS

- 8.1 Recreational craft should comply with the Code of Practice for Safe Operation of Recreational Craft published by the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport.
- 8.2 The Board recommends that a Notice to Mariners be issued reminding them of the necessity of accessing life jackets, PFD's or fire extinguishers from the cockpit of a vessel so that it becomes unnecessary to go below to retrieve such items in an emergency. Consideration should also be given to advising owners to keep a hand held VHF in the cockpit.

# LIST OF APPENDICES

Met Eireann weather report.

9.4

9.5

Glossary.

# 9. LIST OF APPENDICES PAGE 9.1 Photographs by Mr. Paul Berger. 9.2 Admiralty Chart No.1840 - Bantry Bay - Black Ball Head to Shot Head. 9.3 List of Statutory Instruments referred to in Report. 23

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


Appendix 9.1 Photographs by Mr. Paul Berger.





Appendix 9.2 Admiralty Chart No. 1840 - Bantry Bay - Black Ball Head to Shot Head.





Appendix 9.3 List of Statutory Instruments referred to in Report.

Merchant Shipping [Pleasure Craft] [Lifejackets and Operation] [Safety] Regulations 2004 - S.I.No.259 / 2004.

Merchant Shipping Act 1992 - Section 20 – Amended by Section 47 of the Maritime Safety Act 2005.



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19/8/2010

WS3018/2C 13760 Our Ref:

Estimate of weather conditions, 4 miles south of Roancarrigmore Lighthouse, Adrigole Harbour in Bantry Bay on the 16th August 2010.

#### General Weather Situation

A ridge of High Pressure over Ireland declined during the morning and a south-westerly airflow became established. Frontal troughs remained close to the west coast all day, finally moving eastwards overnight.

#### Details

0 to 6 hours

Winds: Force 1 to 3, from a south-westerly direction

6 to 12 hours

Winds: Force 2 to 4, from a south to south-west direction

12 to 24 hours

Winds: Force 3 to 4, from a south to south-west direction

Weather: It was mostly cloudy throughout with occasional patches of mist and drizzle.

The visibility was poor at times in drizzle and mist, otherwise it was moderate to good.

Waves: Smooth to Slight

Sea temperatures: 16.5°C to 17°C

Evelyn Murphy B.Sc. M.Sc. Meteorologist

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#### MET ÉIREANN

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Weather Observations in the area:

Buoy M3 weather observations at Latitude 51.2°N and Longitude 10.6°W

МЗ	year	month	day	hour	Wind Direction (degrees)	Wind Speed (knots)	Highest gust (knots)	Sea surface temperature (°C)	Wave period (seconds)	Wave height (metres)
62092	2010	8	16	0	220	8	10	17.0	5	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	1	220	9	12	16.9	5	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	2	230	9	12	16.8	5	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	3	230	9	12	16.6	4	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	4	230	8	12	16.5	4	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	5	220	9	10	16.5	4	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	6	240	9	11	16.5	4	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	7	220	9	12	16.6	4	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	8	220	9	11	16.6	4	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	9	210	10	12	16.6	4	0.7
62092	2010	8	16	10	210	10	13	16.5	4	0.8
62092	2010	8	16	11	200	12	15	16.6	4	0.8
62092	2010	8	16	12	210	14	18	16.6	4	0.8
62092	2010	8	16	14	210	13	19	16.5	4	1.0
62092	2010	8	16	15	210	13	16	16.5	4	1.1
62092	2010	8	16	19	230	11	15	16.6	4	1.1
62092	2010	8	16	20	220	11	15	16.6	4	1.0
62092	2010	8	16	21	230	11	16	16.6	4	1.0
62092	2010	8	16	22	240	13	17	16.6	4	1.0
62092	2010	8	16	23	320	17	23	16.6	4	1.1

[Note some observations were missed due to communication problems]



Sea area forecasts that were issued by this office on that day were as follows



WeatherDial Fax Product Code 0021

#### General Forecasting Division

Fax: 1570 131 838

#### Sea Area Forecast



#### Sea Area Forecast until 2400 Monday 16 August 2010 Issued at 2400 Sunday 15 August 2010

- I. Gale warning: NIL Small craft warning: NIL
- Meteorological situation at 2300: A large ridge of high pressure over Ireland is declining. Fronts are approaching from the Atlantic, preceded by a moderate southerly airflow. The fronts will move eastwards across the country later Monday and Monday night.
- 3. Forecast for coasts from Fair Head to Howth Head to Carnsore Point and for the Irish Sea :

Wind: Northerly or variable, force 3 or less, backing westerly or variable by Monday afternoon, force 2 to 4, with sea breezes, increasing west to southwest, force 3 or 4 on Monday evening.

#### Forecast for coasts from Carnsore Point to Roches Point to Mizen Head:

Wind: Variable force 2 to 4, becoming westerly or variable by morning. Backing southwest to south, force 4 or 5, during Monday afternoon.

#### Forecast for coasts from Mizen Head to Erris Head to Fair Head:

Wind: South to southwest, or variable, force 2 to 4, increasing south to southwest, force 3 or 4, during Monday, later veering northwesterly, force 3 or 4, in the southwest, west and northwest.

Weather for all sea areas: Fair, apart from local mist and fog patches. Rain developing in the west and northwest towards morning, spreading gradually southeastwards during Monday.

Visibility for all sea areas: Mostly good, becoming moderate to poor on Monday as rain spreads from the west and northwest.

- 3a. Warning of heavy swell: Nil
- 4. Outlook for a further 24 hours until 2400 Tuesday 17 August 2010: Moderate to fresh west to northwest winds developing on Monday night, with further rain and a risk of fog, clearing gradually to scattered showers. Fresh to strong westerly winds later.



Warning of	heavy Atlant	ic swell: NIL.

Text of Gale Warning	
NIL	

Text of Small Craft Warning	
NIL	

Coastal Reports	at 11 PM Sunday 15 August 2010
Malin Head Automatic	South, 04 Knots, Cloudy, 15 Miles, 1024, Falling slowly
Buoy M5	Northwest, 11 Knots, The visibility at Tuskar Lighthouse is Greater than 10 Miles, 1024, Steady
Roche's Pt (Automatic)	West-Northwest, 08 Knots, Fair, Greater than 10 Miles, 1025, Steady
Valentia	South-Southeast, 01 Knot, Fine, 21 Miles, 1026, Steady
Belmullet	Southwest, 03 Knots, Fog patches, 21 Miles, 1024, Falling slowly
Dublin Airport	West-Southwest, 03 Knots, Fine, 21 Miles, 1024, Falling slowly
Buoy M1 53° 8'N, 11° 12'W	NOT AVAILABLE,
Buoy M2 53° 29'N, 5° 26'W	East-Southeast, 03 Knots, WAVE HT 00.3 m, 1024, Steady
Buoy M3 51° 13'N, 10° 33'W	South, 03 Knots, WAVE HT 00.7 m, 1025, Steady
Buoy M4 55° 0'N 10° 0'W	West-Southwest, 10 Knots, WAVE HT NOT AVAILABLE m, 1023, Falling slowly
Buoy M5 51° 41'N 6° 42'W	Northwest, 11 Knots, WAVE HT 00.4 m, 1024, Steady
Buoy M6 53° 4'N 15° 56'W	Southwest, NOT AVAILABLE Knots, WAVE HT 00.7 m, 1022, Falling slowly

Disclaimer: buoy locations are approximate and are not for navigational purposes

Sea Crossings	State of sea until 2400 Tuesday 17 August 2010
Dublin - Holyhead	Slight
Rosslare - South Wales	Slight
Cork - South Wales	Slight to moderate
Rosslare - France	Mostly slight, increasing to moderate
Cork - France	Mostly slight, increasing to moderate

Next update before 0700 Monday 16 August 2010
A detailed forecast may be obtained by dialling *Weatherdial* on 1550 123 855.
Calls cost € 0.95 per minute (Incl. VAT).

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#### Warning of heavy Atlantic swell: NIL

Text of Gale Warning	
NIL	
	Text of Gale Warning NIL

#### Text of Small Craft Warning NIL

Coastal Reports	at 5 AM Monday 16 August 2010
Malin Head Automatic	South-Southwest, 06 Knots, Cloudy, 24 Miles, 1021, Falling slowly
Buoy M5	West-Northwest, 08 Knots, The visibility at Tuskar Lighthouse is Greater than 10 Miles, 1022, Falling slowly
Roche's Pt (Automatic)	North-Northwest, 05 Knots, Fair, Greater than 10 Miles, 1023, Falling slowly
Valentia	East-Northeast, 03 Knots, Cloudy, 18 Miles, 1023, Falling slowly
Belmullet	South-Southwest, 08 Knots, Light rain, 11 Miles, 1021, Falling slowly
Dublin Airport	West-Southwest, 07 Knots, Cloudy, 16 Miles, 1021, Falling slowly
Buoy M1 53° 8'N, 11° 12'W	NOT AVAILABLE,
Buoy M2 53° 29°N, 5° 26°W	West-Southwest, 07 Knots, WAVE HT 00.3 m, 1021, Falling slowly
Buoy M3 51° 13'N, 10° 33'W	Southwest, 08 Knots, WAVE HT 00.7 m, 1023, Falling slowly
Buoy M4 55° 0'N 10" 0'W	Southwest, 11 Knots, WAVE HT NOT AVAILABLE m, 1020, Falling slowly
Buoy M5 51° 41'N 6° 42'W	West-Northwest, 08 Knots, WAVE HT 00.4 m, 1022, Falling slowly
Buoy M6 53° 4'N 15° 56'W	South-Southwest, NOT AVAILABLE Knots, WAVE HT 01.1 m, 1019, Falling

Disclaimer: buoy locations are approximate and are not for navigational purposes

Sea Crossings	State of sea until 0600 Wednesday 18 August 2010
Dublin - Holyhead	Slight
Rosslare - South Wales	Slight
Cork - South Wales	Mostly slight, increasing to moderate
Rosslare - France	Mostly slight, increasing to moderate
Cork - France	Mostly slight, increasing to moderate

Next update before 1300 Monday, 16 August 2010
A detailed forecast may be obtained by dialling *Weatherdial* on 1550 123 855.
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WeatherDial Fax Product Code 0021

#### General Forecasting Division

Fax: 1570 131 838

#### Sea Area Forecast



#### Sea Area Forecast until 1200 Tuesday 17 August 2010 Issued at 1200 Monday 16 August 2010

1. Gale warning: NIL

Small craft warning: In operation

- Meteorological situation at 0900: A mainly moderate southwesterly airflow covers the country, with frontal troughs in west, southwest and northwest sea areas, continuing to push eastwards today.
- 3. Forecast for coasts from Fair Head to Howth Head to Carnsore Point and for the Irish Sea:

Wind: Variable force 2 to 4, increasing west to southwest, force 3 or 4 by this evening. Veering northwest overnight and increasing force 4 or 5 by morning.

Forecast for coasts from Carnsore Point to Roches Point to Mizen Head:

Wind: southwest to south, force 4 or 5, gradually veering northwest later tonight.

Forecast for coasts from Mizen Head to Erris Head to Fair Head:

Wind: Southwest force 2 to 4, slackest today for northeast coasts. Veering northwest this evening or early tonight and increasing force 4 to 6, strongest for southwest coasts. Backing westerly overnight and decreasing force 3 to 5.

Weather for all sea areas: Rain extending eastwards this afternoon, parts of southeast staying dry till later. Rain clearing to scattered showers overnight.

Visibility for all sea areas: Decreasing moderate or poor in rain/showers

- 3a. Warning of heavy swell: Nil
- 4. Outlook for a further 24 hours until 1200 Wednesday 18 August 2010: Moderate to fresh west to northwest winds, increasing fresh to strong west to southwest on Tuesday night. Showers some heavy.

#### Warning of heavy Atlantic swell: NIL

Text of Gale Warning	
NIL	

Text of Small Craft Warning Northwest winds will reach force 6 at times this evening and early tonight on coasts from Mizen Head to Loop
Head to Slyne Head.

Coastal Reports	at 12 Noon Monday 16 August 2010	
Malin Head Automatic	South-Southwest, 10 Knots, MOD. DRIZZLE, 11 Miles, 1017, Falling slowly	
Buoy M5	West, 69 Knots, The visibility at Tuskar Lighthouse is >10 Miles, 1021, Falling slowly	
Roche's Pt (Automatic)	West-Southwest, 08 Knots, Fair, >10 Miles, 1021, Falling slowly	
Valentia	South, 08 Knots, Light rain, 10 Miles, 1020, Falling slowly	
Belmullet	South-Southwest, 12 Knots, Light rain, 6 Miles, 1018, Falling slowly	
Dublin Airport	West, 10 Knots, Cloudy, 21 Miles, 1019, Falling slowly	
Buoy M1 53° 8'N, 11° 12'W	NOT AVAILABLE,	
Buoy M2 53° 29'N, 5° 26'W	NOT AVAILABLE,	
Buoy M3 51° 13'N, 10° 33'W	South-Southwest, 12 Knots, WAVE HT 00.8 m, 1021, Falling slowly	
Buoy M4 55° 0'N 10° 0'W	Southwest, 14 Knots, WAVE HT NOT AVAILABLE m, 1017, Falling slowly	
Buoy M5 51° 41'N 6° 42'W	West, 09 Knots, WAVE HT 00.4 m, 1021, Falling slowly	
Buoy M6 53° 4'N 15° 56'W	North-Northwest, NOT AVAILABLE Knots, WAVE HT 01.6 m, 1018, Rising	

Disclaimer: buoy locations are approximate and are not for navigational purposes

Sea Crossings	State of sea until 1100 Wednesday 18 August 2010	
Dublin - Holyhead	Slight	
Rosslare - South Wales	Slight	
Cork - South Wales	Mostly slight, increasing to moderate later.	
Rosslare - France	Mostly slight, increasing to moderate later.	
Cork - France	Mostly slight, increasing to moderate later.	

Next update before 1900 Monday, 16 August 2010
A detailed forecast may be obtained by dialling *Weatherdial* on 1550 123 855.
Calls cost € 0.95 per minute (Incl. VAT).

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Warning of heavy	Atlantic swell: NIL
------------------	---------------------

Text of Gale Warning
 Text of Guit Williams
NIL

Text of Small Craft Warning Northwest winds will occasionally reach force 6 this evening and for a time tonight on coasts from Mizen Head to Valentia to Loop Head.

Coastal Reports	at 4 PM Monday 16 August 2010	
Malin Head Automatic	South-Southwest, 06 Knots, LIGHT RAIN, 3 Miles, 1015, Falling slowly	
Buoy M5	NOT AVAILABLE, , The visibility at Tuskar Lighthouse is Greater than 10 Miles, .	
Roche's Pt (Automatic)	Southwest, 11 Knots, Cloudy, Greater than 10 Miles, 1019, Falling slowly	
Valentia	South, 06 Knots, Recent rain, 8 Miles, 1018, Falling slowly	
Belmullet	South-Southwest, 13 Knots, Rain/drizzle, 0.6 Miles, 1016, Falling slowly	
Dublin Airport	West-Southwest, 08 Knots, Light rain, 16 Miles, 1017, Falling slowly	
Buoy M1 53° 8'N, 11° 12'W	NOT AVAILABLE,	
Buoy M2 53° 29'N, 5° 26'W	NOT AVAILABLE,	
Buoy M3 51° 13'N, 10° 33'W	South-Southwest, 13 Knots, WAVE HT 01.1 m, 1019, Falling slowly	
Buoy M4 55° 0'N 10° 0'W	Southwest, 11 Knots, WAVE HT NOT AVAILABLE m, 1015, Falling slowl	
Buoy M5 51° 41'N 6" 42'W	NOT AVAILABLE,	
Buoy M6 53° 4'N 15° 56'W	North-Northwest, NOT AVAILABLE Knots, WAVE HT 01.9 m, 1019, Rising slowly	

Disclaimer: buoy locations are approximate and are not for navigational purposes

Sea Crossings	State of sea until 1500 Wednesday 18 August 2010	
Dublin - Holyhead	Slight.	
Rosslare - South Wales	Slight.	
Cork - South Wales	Slight increasing moderate.	
Rosslare - France	Slight increasing moderate.	
Cork - France	Slight increasing moderate.	

Next update before 0100 Tuesday 17 August 2010
A detailed forecast may be obtained by dialling Weatherdial on 1550 123 855.
Calls cost € 0.95 per minute (Incl. VAT).

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## APPENDIX 9.5

Appendix 9.5 Glossary.

Flybridge: A light weight steering/control/observation area located over the

Wheelhouse.

SAR: Search and Rescue - helicopter.

Impellers: Rotating element.

TIG: Welding process

- INERT-GAS SHIELDED TUNGSTEN ARC WELDING (AC).

PFD: Personal Flotation Device - a proprietary type inflatable lifejacket.

Mayday: International radio distress signal used by vessels calling for help.

LSA: Life Saving Appliances.

Cockpit: Sunken area abaft the Wheelhouse, bounded by bulwarks and containing

seating etc.

Cockpit Sole: Floor of Cockpit.

Transom: Stern of craft.

Freeboard: Height of lowest deck above the waterline.



## 10. CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

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**Note:** The address and contact details of the individual respondents have been obscured for privacy reasons.



## MURRAY THORNTON & Co.

SOLICITORS
6 NEW ST, BANTRY, CO. CORK
TEL: 027 51465 FAX: 027 50825
EMAIL: INFO@MURRAYTHORNTON.COM

Marine Casualty Investigation Board, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.

Via Post, Fax & E-mail

30th December 2011

#### OUR REF EC/SCHW112/MCIB

Draft Report of the Investigation into the Fire on Board the vessel "Castaway" off Castletownbere, West Cork on August 16th 2010

Dear Sirs.

Please find below the comments of our client on the Draft Report into the abovementioned accident.

"I. Mrs. Rosina Schmidt; of Furkeal, Glengarriff, Co. Cork, widow of the late Wolfgang Schmidt, wish to make the following submission to the Board with regard to its Draft Report:

This has been a terrible tragedy and has affected all of us deeply. Three friends drowned accidentally while enjoying fishing on a summer's day.

I wishes to make the following comments on aspects of the Draft Report:

6.1.3

The boat had been maintained since 2010 by local contractor John Murphy. He is not named nor is his professional education/ training mentioned. I believe that his statements appear to be self serving and based on hearsay.

EAMONN C. MURRAY B.C.L. THERESE THORNTON B. COMM., L.L.B. INCORPORATING EC MURRAY & CO SOLICITORS & THERESE THORNTON SOLICITOR





#### 6.1.4

"A power cable had been cut by the owner" according to contractor's statement. If W.S. had installed the capstan himself, he would have known the power cables led directly from the battery to the capstan without a circuit breaker and he definitely would have disconnected the cables off the battery.

Also I must point out, that this was part of the reason why W.S. had employed the contractor.

#### 6.1.9

W.S. called Mr. Schroeder about the 9th of August telling him "the battery is not charging".

Who could confirm this as they always spoke German?
Who or what is the source of this statement?
I submit that this statement should be deleted from the Report.

#### 7.1.2

"It appears that Mr. Schmidt was his own electrician".

I totally disagree with this assertion and consider it to be false.

I submit that this statement should be deleted from the Report

The boat file W.S. always maintained the Castaway to a high standard. He used to be extremely careful about electricity. In my own personal experience he always endeavored to have everything safe, neat and tidy. This assertion should be deleted from the report.

#### 7.2.

It should be note in the Board's Report that W.S. and Mr. Schroeder had been on big merchant marine ships for more than 40 years without any serious incidents. Safety on t ships has always priority. Schroeder has known the Castaway very well spending a lot of time on her. W.S. and Mr. Schroeder had worked on big merchant marine ships for more than 40 years without any incidents (W.S. 29 years as Captain /Navigator AG, License for all ships worldwide/ also Mr. Schroeder had the Navigator AG License).

#### 7.4.

It has not been clearly ascertained why the boat took on so much water so quickly and experienced such uncontrollable flooding.

The Board has not been able to say what caused the Castaway to take on so much water so quickly.

There was no evidence of a collision causing a breach of the hull.

I wish to register my surprise that the cause of the ingress of water to the hull so quickly surprised that the boat has not been raised by the boat's insurers."

EAMONN C. MURRAY B.C.L THERESE THORNTON B. COMM., L.L.B. INCORPORATING EC MURRAY & CO SOLICITORS & THERESE THORNTON SOLICITOR

## CORRESPONDENCE

Our client hereby respectfully submits her comments to the Board on the Draft Report and wishes to convey her deepest sympathies to all concerned and their friends and families. She also wishes to thank the Air & Sea Rescue Services and Medical Professionals who responded so quickly and effectively to this tragedy.

Yours Sincerely,

Murray Thornton & Co., Solicitors.

EAMONN C. MURRAY B.C.L THERESE THORNTON B. COMM., L.L.B. INCORPORATING EC MURRAY & CO SOLICITORS & THERESE THORNTON SOLICITOR

#### **MCIB RESPONSE**

The MCIB wishes to convey its deepest sympathy on the tragic and untimely passing of your husband. The Board has amended the references to the local contractor. All other comments are noted, however the Board stands over the contents of the report.





Ms. Eve Reddin, Secretariat, Marine Casualty Investigation Board, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2.

1st December 2011

Re; DRAFT Report of the Investigation into the fire on board the vessel "Castaway" off Castletownbere, West Cork on 16th August 2010

Dear Ms. Reddin,

I refer to the above draft Report and I wish to make the following comments/observations with regard thereto:-

- I was only notified of this accident by the Gardai at 11 p.m. on the 16th of August 2010. I was deeply upset not to have been notified earlier or immediately after the incident occurred. I feel that the communication of this incident to me was extremely poor. When I was brought by the Gardai to see my husband in the mortuary that night, I believed that my husband may only have been in a coma as he was a diabetic; his eyes were open, his skin was supple, he was not cold and he didn't look as if he was dead. I believe that if I had been notified earlier or immediately after the incident occurred I may have been able to advise of my husband's diabetic condition and the fact that he may have been in a diabetic coma when he was lifted from the sea. I expressed these beliefs to the members of the Gardai in the mortuary and I was disappointed by their response which was less than compassionate. I am still distressed about this issue.
- With regard to paragraph 3.3 I confirm that I spoke to my husband Mr. Schroder by mobile phone at 15.30 hours.
- 3. With regard to paragraphs no. 5 re "Events following the incident" I note that there is no mention from paragraphs 5.7 to 5.12 as to what happened to my husband, Mr. Schroder after he threw the two sausage fenders into the water. In paragraph 5.9 Mr. Dziato mentions Mr. Harmon and in paragraph 5.10 he mentions Mr. Schmidt, but there is no mention as to the whereabouts of my husband, Mr. Schroder, who was a strong swimmer.
- According to the Merchant Shipping (Pleasure Craft)(Lifejackets and Operation)(Safety)
   Regulations 2004 regarding the safe operation of recreational crafts there is no obligation

## CORRESPONDENCE

on passengers on board a vessel the size of the "Castaway", being over 10 metres in length, to actually wear a life jacket as long as life jackets are accessible on board the vessel in case of emergencies.

I trust that you will consider my aforesaid comments/observations and I await hearing further with regard to the final Report of the investigation into this incident.

Yours sincerely,

Kristina Schroder.

K Schrößer







#### **MCIB RESPONSE**

The MCIB wishes to convey its deepest sympathy on the tragic and untimely passing of your husband. It should be understood that the MCIB is only called to an incident after it has occurred and that the MCIB plays no part in the rescue or recovery of casualties. Consequently, the MCIB cannot make any comment on any action which took place subsequent to the incident unless such action impacts on the investigation. The MCIB suggests that Mrs. Schroder takes up any dissatisfaction she may feel with the local Authorities.

Mrs. Schroder is quite correct regarding the regulations contained in the Merchant Shipping (Pleasure Craft)(Lifejackets and Operation)(Safety) Regulations 2004 (S.I. No. 259 of 2004) as to the requirement to wear PFDs or lifejackets while on deck, but such PFDs or lifejackets must be on board at all times.

15 November 2011

For the attention of John O'Donnell Marine Casualty Investigation Board Leeson Lane Dublin 2 Eire

Dear Mr O'Donnell

Re: DRAFT REPORT OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO FIRE ON BOARD THE VESSEL "CASTAWAY" OFF CASTLETOWNBERE, WEST CORK ON 16<sup>TH</sup> AUGUST 2010 Ref: MCIB/189

Please take this letter as confirmation that I do not wish my observations to be included.

Benje

Yours sincerely

Paul Berger (esq)



#### **MCIB RESPONSE**

The Board notes the contents of this correspondence.







Mr. John G O'Donnell B.L. Chairman Marine Casualty Investigation Board Leeson Lane Dublin2

17th November 2011

Sir.

#### Royal National Lifeboat Institution

Chairman, Administ the sund Boyus AC data data. Olinf Executive Paul Biblioler

This planting has interested their plant has been been been been prompted on the best

Francis

Divisional Base Ireland

Airside, Swords, Co. Dublin, Ireland

Tel (01) 8900460 Fax (01) 8900458

## DRAFT REPORT INTO THE FIRE ON BOARD THE VESSEL "CASTAWAY OFF CASTLETOWNBERE, WEST CORK 16<sup>TH</sup> AUGUST 2010

Reference: Yr letter MCIB/189 dated 7TH November 2011

Thank you for affording the RNLI the opportunity to view the draft report into the incident which resulted in the tragic loss of three lives.

The RNLI has nothing to add to the comments and recommendations made in the report. On behalf of the RNLI I offer my sincere condolences to the families and friends of Mr. Wolfgang Schmidt, Mr Wolfgang Schroder and Mr. Richard Harman.

Yours faithfully

Martyn Smith

RNLI Divisional Inspector of Lifeboats

Ireland

The Casualty Investigation to the Ca

The RNLI is the charity that saves lives at sea

Charty number CHY 2019 in the Resider of Intend and regioned in England and Water (2016)75 and Southern (2025)759.

#### **MCIB RESPONSE**

The Board notes the contents of this correspondence.





17 November 2011

Your Ref. MCIB/189 Our Ref. 22/52/2

Ms. Eve Reddin Secretariat Marine Casualty Investigation Board Leeson Lane Dublin 2

#### <u>Draft Report of the Investigation into fire on board the vessel "Castaway" off</u> <u>Castletownbere, West Cork on 16<sup>th</sup> August 2010</u>

Dear Ms Reddin,

I wish to advise that the draft report in relation to this incident has been reviewed and the Irish Coast Guard has no observations on the matter.

Yours sincerely,

Chris Reynolds Director



Administration Office, Irish Coast Guard, Department of Transport, Leeson Lane, Dublin 2, Ireland.

Oifig Riaracháin, Garda Cósta na hÉireann, An Roinn Iompair, Lána Chill Mochargán, Baile Átha Cliath 2, Éire.
Tel: + 353 1 6783455 / 3427, Fax: + 353 1 6783459, email: admin@irishcoastguard.ie

#### **MCIB RESPONSE**

The Board notes the contents of this correspondence.







# NOTES

