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**REPORT OF INVESTIGATION INTO
AN INCIDENT INVOLVING THE
CAPSIZED NAB 21 DORY,
'JILLIAN'
OFF SALTEE ISLANDS,
KILMORE QUAY,
CO. WEXFORD
ON
29th AUGUST 2015**

**REPORT NO. MCIB/247
(No.2 OF 2016)**

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

CGU	Coast Guard Unit
EPIRB	Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacon
GRP	Glass Reinforced Plastic
ILB	Inshore Life Boat
LB	Life Boat
LOM	Lifeboat Operations Manager
MRCC	Marine Rescue Coordination Centre
NMOC	National Maritime Operations Centre
PFD	Personal Flotation Device
RCD	Recreational Craft Directive
R117	Waterford Based Coast Guard Rescue Helicopter
SAR	Search and Rescue
VHF	Very High Frequency

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1. SUMMARY

On Saturday the 29th August 2015, the Owner/Skipper launched his Dory, “*Jillian*”, from the public slipway at Kilmore Quay to take a group of ten family members and friends on a fishing expedition in the vicinity of the Saltee Islands to the south of Kilmore Quay.

As the vessel was passing between Great and Little Saltee, it became swamped and capsized. All of the vessel’s occupants except one (who remained in the water throughout) managed to climb onto the upturned hull and remained there until they were rescued. No attempt was made to right the vessel.

The Skipper of the Saltee Island Ferry, a member of the RNLI Lifeboat, noted that the vessel had not returned and joined the search. The crew of the ferry heard shouting while searching along the south eastern shore of the Great Saltee with a search light. The Kilmore Quay and Fethard lifeboats and Dunmore East and Kilmore Quay Coast Guard units were all tasked along with R117 rescue helicopter.

All ten casualties were picked up by the ferry. One of the group was transferred to the Kilmore Quay lifeboat and then airlifted by R117 to Waterford Hospital where he was pronounced dead. The other nine casualties were brought ashore at Kilmore Quay, taken to Wexford General Hospital by ambulance and were later released.

All times quoted are local times.

2. FACTUAL INFORMATION

2.1 Vessel Description

Type of Boat:	NAB 21 Dory.
Name:	<i>“Jillian”</i> .
Construction:	GRP solid laminate hull with small cabin and wheelhouse forward. Inherent buoyancy provided by sealed deck. Planing hull.
Hull Number:	WB/11/95/101/N21.
Builder:	Winsor Brothers, Southampton, UK.
Year of Build:	1995, launched April 1996.
RCD Code:	None (built before RCD became a requirement).
Hull Colour:	White.
LOA:	6.4 metres (m).
Draft:	0.6 m maximum.
Engine:	165hp Yamaha inboard diesel CM165 with stern drive.
Safety Equipment:	Personal Flotation Devices (PFD) worn by each of those on-board. One hand flare. Fixed VHF.

2.2 Conditions at time of Incident

Time of Tide Locally:	HW approximately 18.13 hrs.
Weather:	Wind South-West to West, Force 2 to 3. Isolated showers but mostly dry. Visibility mostly good, clear skies and full moon. Seastate slight to moderate from a south-westerly direction. Wave height 1.1m to 1.3m significant wave height (See Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann weather report).
Air Temperature:	16 °C.
Sea Temperature:	16 °C.

It should be noted that wind and waves around the islands would vary from light to slight to above values due to shelter or exposure to wind and wave direction.

2.3 Persons Involved

Owner/Skipper: 55 years of age, owned the vessel from new.

Crew: Nine members of the owner's immediate family and extended family.

All were wearing light summer clothes - shirts, trousers, light jackets and personal flotation devices.

2.4 Marine Casualty Information

Date & Time: 29th August 2015, approximately 23.30 hrs.

Type of Casualty: Very Serious Marine Casualty.

Location of Incident: South of the Great Saltee Island, Wexford (See Appendix 7.2 Chart extract of the area of the incident).

Fatalities: One, 72 year old male.

Environmental Impact: None.

3. NARRATIVE

3.1 Events prior to the incident

- 3.1.1 At approximately 16.00 hrs on Saturday the 29th August 2015, the 21 ft dory “*Jillian*” was launched by its Owner/Skipper and his family at Kilmore Quay harbour in Co. Wexford. The intention was for the family and some friends to spend two to three hours fishing off Kilmore Quay in the vicinity of the Saltee Islands.
- 3.1.2 Initially, the complement on-board consisted of the Owner/Skipper and six members of his extended family and friends. However, shortly after launching, they returned to the slip to pick up an additional three passengers. A conflicting report states that there were nine on-board initially and that the vessel returned to the slip to pick up one additional passenger (See Appendix 7.3 Photographs 1 and 2).
- 3.1.3 The Owner/Skipper ensured that all on-board were fitted with personal flotation devices, some of which were of the buoyancy aid type, others, inflatable lifejackets.
- 3.1.4 Kilmore Quay harbour is covered by CCTV cameras and footage of the vessel leaving the harbour shows that the vessel appeared to be low in the water (See Appendix 7.3 Photographs 1 and 2).
- 3.1.5 The vessel left the harbour and turned south. Once in the vicinity of the Saltee Islands, the crew began fishing with little success. At this time, two members of the crew asked to be put ashore on the Great Saltee Island for a while.
- 3.1.6 Whilst the two were ashore, the vessel with the rest of the party continued around to the south of the Great Saltee where they found the fishing to be more successful.
- 3.1.7 After approximately half an hour on the island, the two ashore called the “*Jillian*” by mobile phone and asked to be picked up. The vessel approached the beach on the western shore of the island and both climbed back aboard the bow of the vessel.
- 3.1.8 At this stage, the group discussed whether to continue with the fishing or to return to Kilmore Quay. One of the two who had been ashore had not yet caught anything, so the decision was made to return to the previous fishing grounds to the south of the island.
- 3.1.9 Two of the passengers were on the foredeck in front of the wheelhouse when the Owner/Skipper turned the vessel to go between the two Saltee Islands. The water in this area is often churned up by the flow of water passing through the narrow gap and on this occasion, the water was quite rough and choppy.

3.2 The incident

- 3.2.1 At 18.50 hrs, as the “*Jillian*” proceeded between the islands, witnesses stated that a wall of water thrown up by the flow of water through the gap came over the bow. With the additional weight of the two persons on the foredeck, the bow was lower in the water than it should have been. This allowed the waves to crash into the front of the cabin/wheelhouse, forcing the Perspex windows from their frames and allowing a significant quantity of water to enter the cabin, flooding it instantly (See Appendix 7.3 Photograph 3).
- 3.2.2 The Owner/Skipper swung the vessel around and opened the throttle fully in an attempt to get clear of the rough water. One of the crew was bailing the cabin with a bucket in an attempt to remove the excess water from below. As the vessel turned, more water came over the bow and into the cabin. The engine stopped causing the bow to drop and more water to swamp the cabin and hull. The vessel rolled gently to port and then, very quickly capsized.
- 3.2.3 The Owner/Skipper was still in the wheelhouse when the vessel capsized and the PFD he was wearing inflated automatically. This had the effect of impeding his exit from the wheelhouse and he removed it before swimming out from under the now inverted hull.
- 3.2.4 Once the vessel was inverted, with everyone in the water, they noticed that one passenger was not with them. Correctly surmising that he had been trapped under the hull when it capsized, one of the others swam back underneath and pulled him clear.
- 3.2.5 Of the ten people in the party, all but one managed to climb onto the now upturned hull. One passenger remained in the water and held onto the engine stern drive.
- 3.2.6 One of the survivors had found a flare that drifted out from under the upturned hull, however, she did not know how to use it and being concerned about accidentally setting it off and striking herself or one of the others, it was discarded.
- 3.2.7 At 19.20 hrs, some of the survivors were concerned that the vessel might sink and three of them decided to try to swim for the Great Saltee. Although the evening was clear, from the low standpoint that they had, they were easily disorientated and the Owner/Skipper was concerned that they were swimming the wrong way. After a very short time, they returned to the vessel and resumed their positions on the upturned hull.
- 3.2.8 Approaching midnight on the 29th August 2015, the group were finding it difficult to remain on top of the capsized hull. They were encouraging each other and helping each other to remain on top of the hull. The vessel was drifting on the tide and was now heading back towards the Great Saltee Island.

3.2.9 At approximately midnight, one of the survivors thought he had spotted a light. They all started to shout and whistle loudly together.

3.3 Events following the incident

3.3.1 At approximately 23.00 hrs on Saturday the 29th August 2015 a member of the Kilmore Quay Lifeboat, who was the Skipper of the Saltee Island ferry, noticed a four wheel drive vehicle and trailer parked in the village. He recognised the vehicle as belonging to the Owner/Skipper of the vessel “*Jillian*”. He tried to call the Owner/Skipper and other members of his family by mobile phone, but received no answer. Contact was finally established with a family member who was not on the vessel and he was informed that they were expected back at about 20.00 hrs.

3.3.2 Realising that the vessel was now overdue, the individual made contact with the Lifeboat Operations Manager (LOM) for Kilmore Quay and at 23.26 hrs, the LOM alerted the Marine Rescue Coordinating Centre (MRCC) Dublin of the situation.

3.3.3 At 23.26 hrs, MRCC tasked Kilmore Quay Lifeboat which was launched at 23.36 hrs and began their search in Ballyteige Bay to the west of Kilmore Quay.

3.3.4 At 23.45 hrs, the Skipper of the Saltee Island ferry along with three others (two of whom were also off-duty lifeboat crew) left Kilmore Quay on the ferry to join in the search for the overdue “*Jillian*”. The Skipper was well acquainted with the Owner/Skipper of the “*Jillian*” and was aware that he liked to fish around the Conningbeg rocks.

3.3.5 As the ferry left the harbour, they saw a light ahead through the slight haze and continued approximately half a mile in a south easterly direction before they confirmed that it was the light from the Bore Rocks navigation mark.

3.3.6 At 23.44 hrs, MRCC tasked Dunmore East Coast Guard unit to the scene. They reported that at approximately 17.30 hrs that day, when on exercises near the Saltees, they had seen a number of vessels in that area, one of which could have been the “*Jillian*”.

3.3.7 At 23.53 hrs, MRCC tasked the rescue helicopter R117 to the scene and at 23.56 hrs they also tasked the Fethard lifeboat.

3.3.8 The Saltee Island ferry moved their search area to Little Saltee and commenced sweeping the coastline with their searchlight with no success. They then moved the search area to the coastline of the Great Saltee, again sweeping the shoreline with their searchlight. Whilst under the head of the island to the south, the Skipper of the ferry put the engine into neutral so that they could fix the plug connecting the searchlight to the electrical supply. In the relative quiet, they heard whistling and shouts and trained the light in the

direction that the sounds were coming from. The light caught the reflection of the retro-reflective strips on the lifejackets of some of the survivors and the ferry proceeded in that direction and came upon the inverted “*Jillian*” with all ten of the survivors either on top of the upturned hull or in the water beside it.

- 3.3.9 At 00.15 hrs on the 30th August 2015 the Skipper of the Saltee Island ferry made contact with the Kilmore Quay Lifeboat on VHF Channel 16 informing them that they had spotted the survivors and gave their position. At 00.20 hrs, they reported that all the survivors had been taken aboard the Saltee Island ferry.
- 3.3.10 At 00.26 hrs, having motored into calmer water, one of the survivors was transferred to the Kilmore Quay Lifeboat as he appeared to be in trouble. The crew of the lifeboat commenced CPR on the casualty. Both the lifeboat and the ferry headed back to Kilmore Quay.
- 3.3.11 As soon as the lifeboat arrived at Kilmore Quay, R117 rescue helicopter winched the casualty aboard the helicopter and airlifted him to Waterford Hospital. All during this time, the crew of the lifeboat and then R117 continued CPR on the casualty. The casualty was pronounced dead at the hospital. The cause of death was later confirmed to have been death by drowning.
- 3.3.12 On arrival at Kilmore Quay, the nine remaining survivors were treated at the scene by ambulance staff and then taken to Wexford General Hospital. All were later released.
- 3.3.13 The “*Jillian*” was later recovered and brought ashore (See Appendix 7.3 Photograph No.4).

4. ANALYSIS

- 4.1 The CCTV footage from the harbour shows the vessel as sitting quite low in the water, therefore it is considered likely that with ten people on-board the vessel was overloaded (see photographs 1 and 2 in Appendix 7.3).
- 4.2 The seas between Little and Great Saltees are known to be rough at certain stages of the tide, causing a short and sharp chop. This combined with the positioning of two crew forward of the cabin, caused the bow to settle very low and contributed to the waves breaking over the bow and knocking out the perspex windows.
- 4.3 It would appear that the Owner/Skipper did not have sufficient information on the load capacity of the vessel. It is noted that the maker's name plate doesn't have information regarding the maximum number of persons that the vessel was rated to carry.
- 4.4 The perspex windows at the front and sides of the cabin and wheelhouse were held in place with a PVC bead. This was an original feature, however, it seems that on later versions of this type of boat the perspex windows were through bolted to the cabin/wheelhouse.
- 4.5 There was a fixed VHF set in the wheelhouse, but the vessel capsized very quickly and the Owner/Skipper did not have the opportunity to use it to broadcast a MAYDAY message. There was no handheld VHF or EPIRB on-board.
- 4.6 The Owner/Skipper and each of the passengers wore a PFD. The Owner/Skipper had to remove his when it inflated automatically when the boat capsized, effectively trapping him under the hull.
- 4.7 A flare was on-board, but no member of the group knew how to operate it. The operating instructions are generally written on the flare itself but this was not recovered. It is not known whether the flare was in date.

5. CONCLUSIONS

- 5.1 The Owner/Skipper was not aware whether the vessel was overloaded when it departed Kilmore Quay. It is likely that the additional weight of two of the passengers in front of the wheelhouse caused the bow to sit low in the water. When the vessel entered the rougher water between the islands this may have been sufficient to allow the waves to break over the bow, rather than the boat riding over them. The waves breaking over the bow was sufficient to break the perspex windows, rapidly filling the vessel and causing it to capsize.
- 5.2 The Owner/Skipper did not know the maximum number of people that the vessel should carry. All Skippers of vessels should be aware of the load capacity of their vessels despite the fact that in this instance this vessel was built before compliance with the RCD became mandatory. There was no requirement for the maker's name plate to show information such as the maximum number of people it was rated to carry.
- 5.3 If a handheld VHF radio and/or float-free EPIRB had been on the vessel it would have been possible to alert the Rescue Services, thereby declaring a MAYDAY and advising of the precise location of the casualty.
- 5.4 If anyone on the vessel had any knowledge on the use of flares, it is possible that the alarm could have been raised earlier and the rescue services could have been directed to the location of the casualties sooner. Skippers and Owners of recreational craft should familiarise themselves with the use of emergency equipment, including distress flares, hand held VHF radios and float-free EPIRBs.
- 5.5 The Owner/Skipper ensured that all on-board were fitted with personal flotation devices, some of which were of the buoyancy aid type, others, inflatable lifejackets


6. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS

- 6.1 It is recommended that the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport should issue a Marine Notice reminding recreational craft owners that they should comply with the Code of Practice for The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft.
- 6.2 It is recommended that the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport updates the Code of Practice for The Safe Operation of Recreational Craft and considers including the use of EPIRBs for a wider range of craft. This supports Action No. 16 in the Maritime Safety Strategy published by the Irish Maritime Administration of the Department of Transport, Tourism and Sport in April 2015 in this regard.

7. APPENDICES

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Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Cnoe Ghlas Naíon, Tel: +353-1-806 4200
Dublin 9, Ireland. Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire. Fax: +353-1-806 4247
www.met.ie E-mail: met.eireann@met.ie

4/9/2015

Our Ref. WS 3018/2_15994
Your Ref. MCIB/12/247


Estimate of weather conditions in the sea area near the Saltees Islands, Co Wexford, on the 29 and 30th August 2015

General Situation
Ireland lay in a moderate south-westerly airflow. Embedded showery troughs moved eastwards in the flow. Although the winds, in general, were light and the waves were Moderate, the proximity to the Islands means much shallower areas underwater could have caused a focusing of waves and some localised higher waves.

Details
18 hours 29/8/2015 to 00 hours 30/8/2015
Winds: Light Force 3, from a south-west and later more westerly direction
Weather: generally dry apart from isolated showers as the main bands of showers stayed mainly to the north and south of the area
Temperature: air and sea temperatures were both about 16°C
Visibility: good
Waves: Moderate from a south-westerly direction

00-06 hours 30/8/2015
Winds: Light Force 2, mainly from a westerly direction
Weather: mostly cloudy and mostly dry
Temperatures: air temperatures about 15°C and sea temperatures about 16°C
Visibility: good
Waves: mainly Slight

Attached closest weather buoy M5 reports



Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Report.

Weather Buoy M5

time	Latitude °N	Longitude °W	Air temperature (°C)	Significant wave height (m)	Maximum individual wave height (m)	Mean wave direction (degrees from North)	Sea Temperature (°C)	Mean wind direction (degrees from North)	Wind Gust (knots)	Mean wind speed (knots)
29/08/2015 17:00	51.7	-6.7	16.2	1.4	1.9	234.8	15.9	219	11.1	8.7
29/08/2015 18:00	51.7	-6.7	16.2	1.3	1.8	233.4	15.9	226.4	12	9.3
29/08/2015 19:00	51.7	-6.7	16.1	1.3	2.1	233.4	15.9	226.1	12.4	9.5
29/08/2015 20:00	51.7	-6.7	16	1.3	2	233.4	16	241.2	12.5	10.1
29/08/2015 21:00	51.7	-6.7	16	1.3	1.8	236.3	16	245.4	10.5	8.3
29/08/2015 22:00	51.7	-6.7	16	1.1	1.7	236.3	16	256.3	9.3	6.7
29/08/2015 23:00	51.7	-6.7	15.9	1.1	1.6	227.8	15.9	247.1	7.7	6
30/08/2015 00:00	51.7	-6.7	15.8	1.1	1.6	229.2	15.8	245.4	7.4	5.7
30/08/2015 01:00	51.7	-6.7	15.7	1.1	1.6	229.2	15.8	252.4	6.7	5.1
30/08/2015 02:00	51.7	-6.7	15.6	0.9	1.4	230.6	15.8	277.4	6.4	5
30/08/2015 03:00	51.7	-6.7	15.5	0.9	1.5	232	15.8	287.2	5.4	3.8
30/08/2015 04:00	51.7	-6.7	15.3	0.9	1.5	232	15.8	305.5	5.4	4.3
30/08/2015 05:00	51.7	-6.7	15.1	0.9	1.4	233.4	15.7	287.6	4.4	3.1
30/08/2015 06:00	51.7	-6.7	15.2	0.9	1.5	232	15.8	320.3	5.6	3.8

Appendix 7.1 Met Éireann Weather Report.



MET ÉIREANN
The Irish Meteorological Service

Glasnevin Hill, Dublin 9, Ireland. Cnoc Ghlas Naion Baile Átha Cliath 9, Éire. Tel: +353-1-806 4200 Fax: +353-1-806 4247
www.met.ie Email: met@met.ie

Beaufort Scale of Wind					
Force	Description	Speed*		Specification -sea	Wave height** (metres)
		knots	km/hr		
0	Calm	<1	<1	Sea like mirror	
1	Light air	1-3	1-5	Ripples	0.1 (0.1)
2	Light breeze	4-6	6-11	Small wavelets	0.2 (0.3)
3	Gentle breeze	7-10	12-19	Large wavelets, crests begin to break	0.6 (1)
4	Moderate breeze	11-16	20-28	Small waves becoming longer, frequent white horses	1 (1.5)
5	Fresh breeze	17-21	29-38	Moderate waves, many white horses, chance of spray	2 (2.5)
6	Strong breeze	22-27	39-49	Large waves, white foam crests, probably some spray	3 (4)
7	Near gale	28-33	50-61	Sea heaps up, streaks of white foam	4 (5.5)
8	Gale	34-40	62-74	Moderately high waves of greater length	5.5 (7.5)
9	Strong gale	41-47	75-88	High waves, dense streaks of foam, spray may reduce visibility	7 (10)
10	Storm	48-55	89-102	Very high waves, long overhanging crests, visibility affected	9 (12.5)
11	Violent storm	56-63	103-117	Exceptionally high waves, long white foam patches cover sea	11.5 (16)
12	Hurricane	64+	117 & over	Air filled with foam and spray, sea completely white	14 (-)

*Speed = mean speed at a standard height of 10 metres.
**Wave height is only intended as a guide to what may be expected in the open sea.
Bracketed figures indicate the probable maximum wave height.

Wave Heights / State of Sea

The wave height is the vertical distance between the crest and the preceding or following trough. The table below gives a description of the wave system associated with a range of significant wave heights. The Significant wave height is defined as the average height of the highest one-third of the waves. (It is very close to the value of wave height given when making visual observations of wave height.)

Sea State (Descriptive)	Significant Wave height in meters
Calm	0 - 0.1
Smooth (Wavelets)	0.1 - 0.5
Slight	0.5 - 1.25
Moderate	1.25 - 2.5
Rough	2.5 - 4
Very rough	4 - 6
High	6 - 9
Very high	9 - 14
Phenomenal	Over 14

Individual waves in the wave train will have heights in excess of the significant height. The highest wave of all will have a height about twice the significant height

Visibility Descriptions of visibility mean the following:


Visibility (Descriptive)	Visibility in nautical miles (kilometres)
Good	More than 5 nm (> 9 km)
Moderate	2 - 5 nm (4 - 9 km)
Poor	0.5 - 2 nm (1 - 4 km)
Fog	Less than 0.5 nm (< 1 km)

Note:

If there are no measurements or observations available for an exact location, these estimated conditions are based on all available meteorological measurements and observations which have been correlated on the routine charts prepared by Met Éireann.

APPENDIX 7.2

Appendix 7.2 Chart extract of the area of the incident.



Appendix 7.3 Photographs.



Photograph 1 - CCTV still photograph of “Jillian” before picking up final passengers.



Photograph 2 - CCTV still photograph of “Jillian” leaving the harbour with 10 people on-board.

Appendix 7.3 Photographs.



Photograph 3 - Damage to forward facing windows suffered by “*Jillian*” during the incident.



Photograph 4 - “*Jillian*” ashore following recovery.

8. CORRESPONDENCE RECEIVED

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Note: The names and contact details of the individual respondents have been removed for privacy reasons.

CORRESPONDENCE 8.1

Correspondence 8.1 RNLI and MCIB response



Royal National Lifeboat Institution
Chairman: Charles Hunter-Pease
Chief Executive: Paul Bossier
RNLI (Trading Ltd 01073375, RNLI (Sole) Ltd 2702240 and RNLI (Emergency) Ltd 0784509 are all companies registered at West Quay Road, Poole, Dorset, BH12 1HZ.

Regional Base Ireland and Isle of Man
Airside, Swords, Co. Dublin, Ireland
Tel (01) 890 0460
Fax (01) 890 0458

[Redacted]
MCIB
Leeson Lane
Dublin 2.



15th March 2016

Ref: Draft Report of the Investigation into the fatal incident involving "Jullian" at Saltees Islands, Co. Wexford 29th August 2015

Dear [Redacted]

With reference to the above draft report – thank you for your inclusion of the RNLI in its findings, I would also like to let you know that I have no comments on the report.

Yours sincerely


[Redacted]
Community Lifesaving Delivery Manager

The RNLI is the charity that saves lives at sea
Charity number: CHY 2576 in the Republic of Ireland and registered in England and Wales (209603) and Scotland (SC037736)

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence.



Correspondence 8.2 Garda Síochána and MCIB response

An Garda Síochána



An Leas-Choimisinéara
(Oibríochtaí)
An Garda Síochána
Ceanncheathrú na nGardaí
Páirc an Fhionn-Uisce
Baile Átha Cliath 8

Teileafón/Tel: (01) 666 2057/8/9
Facs/Fax: (01) 666 2060

Bí linn/Join us  

Deputy Commissioner
(Operations)
An Garda Síochána
Garda Headquarters
Phoenix Park
Dublin 8

Láithreán Gréasain/Web Site:
www.garda.ie
Ríomh-phoist/Email:
Commissioner_OPS@garda.ie

Our ref: OPS_29-320497/15
Your ref: MCIB/12/247

AN GARDA SÍOCHÁNA
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER
24 MAR 2016
OPERATIONS
GARDA HEADQUARTERS

**Marine Casualty Investigation Board,
Lesson Lane,
Dublin 2.**


Re: DRAFT Report of the Investigation Into the fatal incident Involving "Jillian" at Saltees Islands, Co Wexford, 29 August 2015

Dear [REDACTED]

I refer to your correspondence in the above matter dated 29th February, 2016 to the Garda Commissioner and am to advise that the draft report completed by the Marine Casualty Investigation Board into the fatal incident involving 'Jillian' at Saltees Islands, Co. Wexford on 29th August, 2015, has been reviewed by local Garda Management for the area concerned and that all matters in the report are correct and in line with reports made.

It is noted, that the skipper in this matter had no knowledge of the Emergency Position Indicating Radio Beacon (EPIRB) and therefore it is respectfully recommended that the Minister for Transport, Tourism and Sport, include in the Marine Notice, the benefits of having an EPIRB device fitted to recreational craft or life jackets which have EPIRB or PLB (Personal Location Beacons) devices.

Yours sincerely,
[REDACTED]



24 March 2016.

Ráiteas Misín / Mission Statement:
Ag obair leis an Poblal chun an Poblal a chosaint agus chun freastal orthu / Working with Communities to Protect and Serve

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes the contents of this correspondence and has included the recommendation in respect of EPIRBs.

Correspondence 8.3 Passenger and MCIB response

Tuesday 12th April 2016

Ref: MICB/12/247

Secretariat,
Marine Casualty Investigation Board,
Leeson Lane,
Dublin 2

**Draft Report of the fatal incident involving Jillian
at Saltees Islands, Co Wexford 29th August 2015**

Dear [REDACTED]

Thank you for granting an extension of time for the provision of comments.

The following is a list of observations that my family and I would like to be included in the above report.

- From section 1. Summary, second line

Please omit "and friends"
*The crew consisted of family only.

- From section 3. Narrative 3.1.2 (please amend highlighted words)

Initially, the complement on-board consisted of the owner/skipper and **eight** members of his extended family. However, shortly after launching, they returned to the slip to pick up **one additional passenger**.

- From section 3. Narrative 3.3.11

"The casualty was pronounced dead at the hospital. The cause of death was later confirmed to have been **death by drowning**."

***How was this confirmed? We have no reason to believe this as the casualty was alive and alert after the boat capsized. We all worked hard as a crew to ensure that he didn't drown by keeping his head out of the water and his body on the hull.**

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes this comment but has not amended the report.

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB has made an addition to 3.1.2, however statements made to the MCIB indicated that there were seven people on-board initially and that a further three people were picked-up before departure. In any event there were ten people on-board the vessel.

MCIB RESPONSE:
The cause of death given was taken directly from the autopsy report.

Correspondence 8.3 Passenger and MCIB response

• From section 4. Analysis 4.1

"The CCTV footage from the harbour shows the vessel as sitting quite low in the water, therefore it is considered likely that with ten people on-board the vessel was overloaded."
(Quote)

***Please insert image of the boat in the same location as photo 1 with 10 passengers on board. We feel that photo 2 shows partiality towards the above statement. We would like this statement/consideration to be revised. Like with like.**

• From section 5. Conclusions

Please insert the following:

5.5 The Owner/skipper ensured all passengers were wearing PDF's at all times while on board the boat thereby reducing the loss of life.

• From APPENDIX 7.3 Photographs


Please replace Photo 2 with an image of the boat in the same location as photo 1 with 10 passengers on board.

• From APPENDIX 7.3 Photographs – Please amend highlighted words

"Photo 1 – CCTV still photo of "Jillian" before picking up **one final passenger**."
***Only one additional passenger was picked up**

If you would like more clarification, please don't hesitate to contact us. We welcome the updated changes in due course.

Yours sincerely,



MCIB RESPONSE:
The CCTV footage is the only available photographic record of the vessel on this trip, therefore it is as presented. The Board considers that the statement does not need to be amended.

MCIB RESPONSE:
The MCIB notes this comment and has amended the report to repeat the statement at 3.1.3 in the Conclusions.

MCIB RESPONSE:
Please see comments above.

